The mother of J.T., born September 2020, appeals the termination of her parental rights.
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When J.T. was just one day old, she was removed from her mothers care under an ex parte removal order. One week later, after a removal hearing, the juvenile court found:
The childs life or health would be in imminent danger if returned to the custody of a parent because: [the mother] has been involved with [the Iowa Department of Human Services] as a parent since 2015. Her parental rights were terminated to two children in two separate actions in 2017 and to another child in May, 2019. The reasons for prior court involvement have been [the mothers] mental health, parenting capacity and skills, and association with dangerous individuals ․ placing her infant children at risk. Lack of participation in visits, stable housing, and lack of participation in mental health services have also been factors. [The mother] currently has an open [child-in-need-of-assistance] case with another child. In that matter she has not progress[ed] past supervised visits.
Numerous services were offered to the mother, as well as the services already in place from the ongoing juvenile case involving one of the mothers other children. On November 6, 2020, the juvenile court adjudicated J.T. a child in need of assistance after finding the mothers mental health had not improved to the extent that she could safely parent J.T. After a review hearing on June 28, 2021, the court found:
Placement outside the parental home is necessary because a return to the home would be contrary to the childs welfare due to [the mothers] unresolved mental health issues which lead to instability and association with dangerous individuals and interfere with consistent and safe parenting. [The mother] has not been consistently attending visits with [J.T.] or attending her routine medical appointments․ There is a pattern of [the mother] associating with chaos and many different individuals she does not seem to know well. [The mother] has not gained the skills to discern safe from unsafe people.
With little to no progress in the mothers ability to safely care for J.T., the State filed a petition to terminate the mothers parental rights on June 29, 2021. The matter came on for hearing on August 17, and on September 13 the juvenile court ordered the termination of the mothers parental rights under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(g) and (h) (2021). The mother appeals.
“We review termination of parental rights proceedings de novo.” In re J.H., 952 N.W.2d 157, 166 (Iowa 2020). “While we are not bound by the juvenile courts factual findings, we accord them weight, especially in assessing witness credibility.” Id. “ ‘[O]ur fundamental concern’ on review ‘is the childs best interests.’ ” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting In re J.C., 857 N.W.2d 495, 500 (Iowa 2014)). We employ a three-step statutory framework analysis on our de novo review of termination-of-parental-rights cases. In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 40 (Iowa 2010).
“The first step in our analysis is to determine if a ground for termination exists under section 232.116(1).” Id. The mother asserts the State failed to prove her parental rights should be terminated under both Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(g) and (h). “When the juvenile court terminates parental rights on more than one statutory ground, we may affirm the juvenile courts order on any ground we find supported by the record.” In re A.B., 815 N.W.2d 764, 774 (Iowa 2012).
We choose to review the mothers assertion as to the proof under section 232.116(1)(h), which provides the court may terminate parental rights if it finds all of the following:
(1) The child is three years of age or younger.
(2) The child has been adjudicated a child in need of assistance pursuant to section 232.96.
(3) The child has been removed from the physical custody of the childs parents for at least six months of the last twelve months, or for the last six consecutive months and any trial period at home has been less than thirty days.
(4) There is clear and convincing evidence that the child cannot be returned to the custody of the childs parents as provided in section 232.102 at the present time.
The mother only challenges the findings as to the fourth element, asserting there was a lack of evidence presented that J.T. “would be subject to adjudicatory harm” under Iowa Code section 232.2(6)(c)(2)
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if she were returned to the mother. The mother participated in a psychological evaluation on March 3, 2021, after which the clinical psychologist concluded the mother “meets the diagnostic criteria for Borderline Intellectual Functioning.” On June 25, the mothers therapist noted that the mother “continues to engage and participate in individual therapy services”; however:
[The mother] has and continues to struggle with keeping appointments. I determined that telehealth session might be the most appropriate form of therapy for her. [The mothers] response and interactions with this writer continue to be optimistic during the sessions. However, she struggles in almost all aspects of her life that include but are not limited to her family, significant other, employment, housing, along with her long and extensive involvement with the Department of Human Services and removal of her children from her care. As I continue to process with [the mother] she continues to have some insight into her situation. Still, she cannot follow through with the skills and behaviors learned during previous sessions. It appears [the mother] continues to have crisis after crisis within her life that are concerning.
The Iowa Department of Human Services (DHS) provided numerous services to the mother, including the offer of four visits with J.T. each week. And while the mother showed “positive parenting and interaction skills” during the visits, her lack of regular attendance at the prearranged visits became problematic. The DHS worker, after reviewing all the services offered to the mother, concluded that the mother had “not been able to make enough progress in mental health treatment in terms of stability in her relationships and unsafe situation with others” and recommended her parental rights be terminated. The same DHS worker testified at the termination hearing, standing by the comments and recommendations in her report. We conclude on our de novo review of all the evidence, the State proved by clear and convincing evidence the elements under Iowa Code section 232.1161(1)(h).
Next, the mother asserts the State failed to prove it was in J.T.’s best interests to have the mothers rights terminated. As the State points out, the mother conflates Iowa Code section 232.116(2) and (3), by asserting the mothers claimed “bond” with J.T. should preclude termination because it is not in J.T.’s best interests. In doing so, the mother does conflate the second and third steps of our framework. See P.L., 778 N.W.2d at 40–41. Regardless, it is clear that J.T. needs a stable home, free from the many challenges the mother continues to encounter in her life. The record includes the early reports of the mothers life shortly after J.T. was born, as well as ongoing reports as to the mothers lack of progress in establishing a safe and stable environment for J.T. See In re J.E., 723 N.W.2d 793, 802 (Iowa 2006) (Cady, J., concurring specially) (stating that a childs safety and the childs need for a permanent home are the “defining elements” in determining a childs best interests). The juvenile court concluded the mother was not able to provide J.T. with the stability she deserves and also that none of the permissive factors under section 232.116(3) would preclude termination. We agree and affirm.
AFFIRMED.
FOOTNOTES
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. The parental rights of two named men “and any unknown putative fathers” were also terminated. None appeal.
2
. Iowa Code section 232.2(6)(c)(2) provides a child is in need of assistance if the child “has suffered or is imminently likely to suffer harmful effects as a result of ․ [t]he failure of the childs parent, guardian, custodian, or other member of the household in which the child resides to exercise a reasonable degree of care in supervising the child.”
VOGEL, Senior Judge.