BRADFORD v. STATE (2021)

Court of Appeals of Iowa.2021-10-20No. No. 20-1010

Summary · law.co

Holding. The court affirmed the dismissal of Bradford's second postconviction relief application because it was filed outside the three-year statutory deadline and did not qualify for relation-back treatment under Allison, as the sixteen-month delay between the conclusion of his first PCR action and the filing of his second application was not sufficiently prompt.

David Bradford was convicted of a drug offense in 2005 and filed his first postconviction relief (PCR) application several months after his direct appeal concluded in 2009. That application was denied, and the appellate court affirmed in 2016. More than sixteen months later, in June 2018, Bradford filed a second PCR application. The state moved to dismiss on grounds that the application was filed outside the three-year deadline set by Iowa Code section 822.3, and the trial court granted the motion.

On appeal, Bradford argued that a prior supreme court decision (Allison) permitted his second application to proceed because it was filed promptly after his first PCR action concluded. The appellate court disagreed, holding that Bradford's sixteen-month delay did not satisfy the "filed promptly" requirement established in subsequent cases interpreting Allison. The court also rejected Bradford's argument that the statute's time limit should have been tolled (suspended) while his first PCR was pending, finding that Allison discussed but did not adopt equitable tolling.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Timeliness of successive postconviction relief applications under Iowa Code section 822.3
Whether equitable tolling applies during pendency of an earlier PCR action
Meaning of "filed promptly" for relation-back purposes under Allison v. State

Procedural posture

Bradford appealed the trial court's dismissal of his second postconviction relief application for lack of timeliness.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

The district court dismissed David Bradfords second application for postconviction relief (PCR) because it was not timely. We affirm.

In 2005, Bradford was convicted of a drug offense. This court affirmed. State v. Bradford, No. 05-0778, 2006 WL 1229930, at *1–2 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 26, 2006). Procedendo issued on May 26, 2009. A few months later, Bradford filed his first PCR application. The PCR court denied relief, and our court affirmed. Bradford v. State, No. 15-0811, 2016 WL 7403701, at *1–2 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 21, 2016). Procedendo issued in January 2017. Over sixteen months later, in June 2018, Bradford filed this case, his second PCR action. The State moved to dismiss, claiming this action was time-barred under Iowa Code section 822.3 (2018). The PCR court agreed and dismissed. Bradford appeals.

Following our review, we conclude Bradford has not demonstrated reversible error.

In general, section 822.3 requires PCR applications to be “filed within three years from the date the conviction or decision is final or, in the event of an appeal, from the date the writ of procedendo is issued.” Bradfords present application was filed nine years after the issuance of procedendo following his direct appeal. This is far outside the statutory three-year period.

But Bradford directs our attention to Allison, in which the supreme court held:

[W]here a PCR petition alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel has been timely filed per section 822.3 and there is a successive PCR petition alleging postconviction counsel was ineffective in presenting the ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim, the timing of the filing of the second PCR petition relates back to the timing of the filing of the original PCR petition for purposes of Iowa Code section 822.3 if the successive PCR petition is filed promptly after the conclusion of the first PCR action.

914 N.W.2d at 891.

Bradford argues that Allison adopted “equitable tolling.” So, Bradford suggests, the three-year period was tolled—meaning, it did not run—while his first PCR was being litigated. We disagree. Allison discussed—but did not adopt—this sort of tolling. See Polk v. State, No. 18-0309, 2019 WL 3945964, at *2 n.3 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 21, 2019).

Alternatively, Bradford suggests Allison applies because his current PCR application was “filed promptly after the conclusion of the first PCR action.” Allison, 914 N.W.2d at 891. We disagree. “Since Allison, our court has had several opportunities to consider the phrase ‘filed promptly.’ ” Johnson v. State, No. 19-1949, 2021 WL 210700, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 21, 2021). “And we have repeatedly concluded that ‘delays [of] one year or more’ are not sufficiently ‘prompt.’ ” Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted).

Bradford did not file this action until sixteen months after his first PCR concluded. This was not sufficiently prompt. So Allison does not apply.

Finally, Bradford argues the PCR court erred by failing to address certain pro se filings. As explained, however, we conclude this case is time-barred. So we believe the pro-se-filing issue is moot.

AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

. “[W]e review a grant of a motion to dismiss a PCR petition for correction of errors at law.” Allison v. State, 914 N.W.2d 866, 870 (Iowa 2018).

. This does not mean delays of less than a year are sufficiently prompt. For instance, we have held delay as short as 121 days was too long. Maddox v. State, No. 19-1916, 2020 WL 5230367, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Sept. 2, 2020).

MAY, Judge.