The State of Florida timely appealed an order suppressing evidence in a DUI case. We have jurisdiction.
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Because the trial court erroneously found that law enforcement officers violated the Miranda
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rights of appellee, Alyssa Abache, we reverse.
On the evening in question, Florida Highway Patrol Trooper Ryan Mooney was dispatched to the scene of a motor vehicle collision. During the course of his accident investigation, Trooper Mooney came into contact with Abache—the alleged driver of one of the vehicles involved in the collision. As a result of his observations of Abache, Trooper Mooney believed that Abache had been driving under the influence of an alcoholic beverage to the extent that her faculties may have been impaired. He moved Abache away from the other individuals gathered around the accident scene, advised her that he was conducting a criminal investigation, and read her Miranda warnings.
At Trooper Mooneys request, Abache agreed to perform certain field sobriety exercises. However, immediately prior to Abaches commencement of the exercises, an acquaintance of Abache moved toward Trooper Mooney, held up a cell phone, stated that Abaches attorney was on the phone, and asked that Abache be permitted to speak to her attorney. Another law enforcement officer told Abaches acquaintance to leave the area. As a result, Abache did not speak to her attorney prior to performing the field sobriety exercises. At the conclusion of the field sobriety exercises, Trooper Mooney arrested Abache for DUI.
Abache subsequently filed a motion to suppress all evidence derived from and related to her performance of the field sobriety exercises. She alleged that the law enforcement officers refusal to notify her that her attorney was telephonically present and had requested to speak with her constituted a due process violation under Article 1, section 9 of the Florida Constitution. After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the trial court entered an order granting Abaches motion. However, the trial court order did not address Abaches due process argument. Rather, the trial court found that “once Miranda [was] read to the Defendant, even if not required, that the Defendant [was] afforded all the rights associated with Miranda.” The trial court then concluded that law enforcement officers had violated Abaches Miranda rights when they did not allow her to speak with her attorney.
The trial courts decision contravenes the United States Supreme Courts decision in Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986). There, the Supreme Court held that the failure of police to inform the defendant of the efforts of his attorney, who had been retained by the defendants sister without his knowledge, to reach him did not deprive the defendant of his right to counsel or vitiate his waiver of his Miranda rights:
The purpose of the Miranda warning ․ is to dissipate the compulsion inherent in custodial interrogation and, in doing so, guard against abridgment of the suspects Fifth Amendment rights. Clearly, a rule that focuses on how the police treat an attorney—conduct that has no relevance at all to the degree of compulsion experienced by the defendant during interrogation—would ignore both Mirandas mission and its only source of legitimacy.
Nor are we prepared to adopt a rule requiring that the police inform a suspect of an attorneys efforts to reach him. While such rule might add marginally to Mirandas goal of dispelling the compulsion inherent in custodial interrogation, overriding practical considerations counsel against its adoption.
Id. at 425, 106 S.Ct. 1135. Accordingly, the trial court erred in granting Abaches motion on the grounds that her Miranda rights had been violated.
Abache argues that we should employ the “tipsy coachman” rule and affirm on the ground that Abaches due process rights were violated. Under the tipsy coachman rule, “if a trial court reaches the right result, but for the wrong reasons, it would be upheld if there is any basis which would support judgment in the record.” Dade Cnty. Sch. Bd. v. Radio Station WQBA, 731 So. 2d 638, 644 (Fla. 1999). However, an appellate court should not employ the tipsy coachman rule where the trial court has not made the necessary factual findings on the issue. Bueno v. Workman, 20 So. 3d 993, 998 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009). Here, the trial court did not address Abaches due process argument. Additionally, the factual findings that were made by the trial court were not sufficient for us to fully address the merits of such argument.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
“In appellate proceedings the decision of a trial court has the presumption of correctness and the burden is on the appellant to demonstrate error.” Applegate v. Barnett Bank of Tallahassee, 377 So. 2d 1150, 1152 (Fla. 1979). Because the State of Floridas initial brief overlooks both the United States Supreme Courts ruling in Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986), and the reasoning behind the high courts ruling, I respectfully dissent. Rosier v. State, 276 So. 3d 403, 406 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019) (explaining the dispassionate role of an appellate court).
FOOTNOTES
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. Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(c)(1)(B) authorizes the State to appeal an order “suppressing before trial confessions, admissions or evidence obtained by search and seizure.”
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. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
EVANDER, J.
HARRIS, J., concurs.
NARDELLA, J., dissents, with opinion.