LAW.coLAW.co

DUNSMORE v. CALIFORNIA (2021)

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.2021-07-29No. No. 20-56135

Summary

Holding. The district court's dismissal was reversed and the case was remanded, as the prisoner's allegations of deliberate indifference to disability accommodations by public entity defendants satisfied the pleading requirements for an ADA claim.

A California state prisoner challenged the dismissal of his lawsuit alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act and related claims. The district court had rejected his ADA claim, reasoning that he failed to allege sufficient facts of intentional discrimination and that individual defendants lacked liability under Title II of the ADA. On appeal, the court found that the prisoner had adequately pleaded his case by alleging that public entity defendants—the County of San Diego and the Sheriff in his official capacity—knew of his disability accommodation needs, deliberately refused to provide reasonable accommodations, and discouraged him from seeking them through threats of retaliation. These allegations were sufficient to meet the legal standard for an ADA failure-to-accommodate claim based on deliberate indifference.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

  • Whether allegations of deliberate indifference to disability accommodations state a claim under the ADA
  • Liability of public entities versus individual defendants under Title II of the ADA
  • Sufficiency of pleading facts to proceed past motion to dismiss in disability discrimination cases

Procedural posture

The prisoner appealed the district court's dismissal of his ADA complaint for failure to state a claim.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion

MEMORANDUM **

California state prisoner Darryl Lee Dunsmore appeals from the district courts order dismissing Dunmores action alleging Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and other claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2). Belanus v. Clark, 796 F.3d 1021, 1024 (9th Cir. 2015); Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). We reverse and remand.

The district court dismissed Dunsmores ADA claim because Dunsmore failed to allege facts sufficient to show that defendants intentionally discriminated against him because of his disability, and because defendants, in their individual capacities, were not liable under Title II of the ADA. However, Dunsmore alleged that the public entity defendants, the County of San Diego and San Diego Sheriff Bill Gore, in his official capacity, were deliberately indifferent to his accommodations requests because they knew of Dunsmores need for accommodations, refused to provide reasonable accommodations, encouraged Dunsmore to use facilities and equipment inconsistent with his accommodations and threatened Dunsmore with reprisals for requesting the accommodations. See 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1)(A)-(B) (defining a public entity under the ADA as any local government or agency of a local government); Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1135, 1138-39 (9th Cir. 2001) (setting forth elements of an ADA failure-to-accommodate claim; in order to recover monetary damages under the ADA, a plaintiff must show intentional discrimination; the test for intentional discrimination is deliberate indifference). Dunsmores allegations “are sufficient to warrant ordering [defendants] to file an answer.” Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1116 (9th Cir. 2012).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

We do not consider Dunsmores pro se motion for a preliminary injunction (Docket Entry No. 24) because Dunsmore is represented by counsel.

REVERSED and REMANDED.