OPINION AND ORDER
Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule (SCR) 3.480(2), Movant, Shameka Lynn ONeil, moves this Court to enter a negotiated sanction resolving the pending disciplinary proceeding against her (KBA File No. 19-DIS-0425) by imposing a public reprimand with conditions. The Kentucky Bar Association has no objection. Finding this sanction adequate, we grant ONeils motion.
ONeil was admitted to the practice of law in the Commonwealth of Kentucky on October 19, 2017. Her KBA number is 95090, and her current bar roster address is 1229 Shelby Street, Louisville, Kentucky 40203.
I. BACKGROUND
Shalonda Meaux hired ONeil to represent her in a racial discrimination claim against the Kentucky Department of Revenue, where Meaux worked as a revenue program officer. The engagement agreement the parties signed provides: “Client hereby engages Attorney to represent her state court lawsuit—racial discrimination hiring preference.” The agreement references a nonrefundable retainer of $1,850. It later refers to the $1,850 as a “flat fee.” The agreement also provides that ONeils rate is $150/hour and that Meaux may be required to “replenish” her engagement fee by making additional payments.
Meaux paid ONeil $1,900, which included the filing fee for her case. ONeil filed Meauxs verified complaint in Jefferson Circuit Court against the Kentucky Department of Revenue and the manager of her department. However, ONeil failed to serve either the attorney general or assistant attorney general, as required by CR 4.04. Building on these errors, ONeil also filed the suit in the wrong forum, as the claim should have been filed with the Kentucky Claims Commission. Defendants’ counsel filed a motion to dismiss the case on the grounds of insufficiency of service of process, lack of subject matter jurisdiction, failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and improper venue. When ONeil failed to appear at the hearing on the motions, the Jefferson Circuit Court continued the matter and gave ONeil additional time to respond. The court also noted that ONeil had yet to cure the service of process errors.
ONeil again failed to respond to the various motions or appear at the hearing and the matter was submitted for final adjudication, with the court dismissing the case with prejudice. More than a week later, ONeil filed a motion stating she had been out of town when the motions were filed and served by mail. In the motion, she asked the trial court to alter, amend, or vacate its order dismissing the case with prejudice and alleged she had cured the service defects. The trial court altered its order and dismissed the case without prejudice due to a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. ONeil failed to communicate the cases dismissal to Meaux. In fact, Meaux did not learn her case had been dismissed until she consulted another attorney who, in turn, called ONeil to check on the status of Meauxs case. ONeil then informed Meaux she could no longer represent her, as the action would have to be filed in Frankfort. ONeil took no further action in Meauxs case.
ONeil sent Meaux an invoice indicating she spent 16 hours on her case at the rate of $150 per hour, for a total of $2,400, of which Meaux had paid $1,900. A significant portion of the time was devoted to ONeils attempts to overcome the motion to dismiss, which she was unable to do. ONeil did not return any of the $1,900 Meaux paid her. The engagement agreement, at least in one place, referred to Meauxs payment as a “flat fee,” but then the invoice indicated she owed an additional $500. ONeil charged this fee in spite of the fact that none of ONeils time benefited Meaux in the least—due largely to ONeils lack of preparation and research on the case and her lack of diligence in the case and the dearth of communication with her client.
Based on ONeils actions (and inactions) in Meauxs case, the Inquiry Commission filed a five-count charge against her. The charge alleged ONeil violated SCR 3.130-1.1 (competence), SCR 3.130-1.3 (diligence), SCR 3.130-1.4(a)(3) (keeping client reasonably informed), SCR 3.130-1.5(a) (unreasonable fee), and SCR 3.130-1.5(b) (communication with client regarding fee). ONeil admits she violated these rules, attempting to draw this matter to a close through the parties’ agreed-upon negotiated sanction of a public reprimand and ONeil refunding $1,900 to Meaux within thirty days.
II. ANALYSIS
This Courts precedent supports the sanction agreed upon by the parties. For example, in Lutes v. Kentucky Bar Assn, 338 S.W.3d 278 (Ky. 2011), the attorney failed to work on a case and failed to communicate with his clients. 338 S.W.3d at 278. Lutes refunded his clients fee after a bar complaint was filed against him. Id. He admitted to violating SCR 3.130(1.3) (failing to exercise reasonable diligence and promptness in dealing with a client), (1.4)(a) (failing to keep his client reasonably informed about the representation and failing to respond to reasonable requests for information), (1.15)(a) (failing to hold property of clients or third persons that is in a lawyers possession in connection with a representation separate from the lawyers own property), (1.15)(b) (failing to notify the client upon receiving funds or other property in which a client has an interest), and (1.16)(d) (failing to return the case file after the termination of representation). Id. at 279. The sanction in the Lutes case was a public reprimand with the condition that he attend an Ethics and Professionalism Enhancement Program (EPEP). Id. Lutes had a disciplinary record consisting of one private admonition in 2009 for similar wrongdoing, and an ongoing suspension for failing to pay bar dues. Id.
In Riley v. Kentucky Bar Assn, 262 S.W.3d 203 (Ky. 2008), the attorney failed to communicate or return the clients phone calls about the progress of her uncontested divorce. 262 S.W.3d 203. He terminated his representation without contacting his client or refunding the advance fee. Id. Similar to Lutes, Riley had previously received a private reprimand for violating SCR 3.130(1.3) (failing to exercise reasonable diligence and promptness in dealing with a client) and (1.4)(a) (failing to keep his client reasonably informed about the representation and failing to respond to reasonable requests for information). He admitted violations in the current case of SCR 3.130(1.3), (1.4)(a), and (1.16)(d) (failing to return the case file after the termination of representation). Id. This Court publicly reprimanded Riley.
We acknowledge that ONeil has no prior disciplinary history unlike Lutes and Riley. However, we note the extent of her misconduct in Meauxs case. ONeil charged Meaux $1,900 and then filed her case in a court lacking jurisdiction. ONeil failed to inform Meaux the defendants had filed a motion to dismiss—let alone that the trial court granted the motion and dismissed her case with prejudice (and then, later, without prejudice). Meaux did not discover the status of her case until she had another lawyer contact ONeil to inquire about it. Then, ONeil dropped Meaux as a client, telling her she could no longer prosecute the claim, as it needed to be filed in Frankfort. Finally, ONeil sent Meaux an invoice showing that she still owed $500 for representation, as Meaux had previously paid $1,900 and ONeil worked on her case for 16 hours at the rate of $150 per hour (only to have the case dismissed as she filed in a court lacking jurisdiction). We also note that this case is distinguished from Lutes in that Lutes returned his clients fee upon the filing of a bar complaint. ONeil has yet to do so, though she now agrees to repay the entire fee.
For the foregoing reasons, we accept this negotiated sanction and publicly reprimand ONeil, with conditions.
III. ORDER
ACCORDINGLY, IT IS ORDERED THAT:
1. Shameka Lynn ONeil is publicly reprimanded.
2. ONeil shall repay Meaux $1,900 within thirty days of the entry of this order; if she fails to do so, this Court may convert the public reprimand to a thirty-day suspension from the practice of law.
3. In accordance with SCR 3.450, ONeil shall pay all costs associated with these disciplinary proceedings against her. Execution may issue from this Court upon finality of this Opinion and Order.
/s/ John D. Minton, Jr.
CHIEF JUSTICE
All sitting. All concur.