Marcos Jones, federal prisoner # 18114-043, is serving a 160-month term of term of imprisonment for a methamphetamine conspiracy conviction and a concurrent 120-month sentence of imprisonment for a conviction of being a felon in possession of a firearm. He appeals the district courts denial of his motion for a sentence reduction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).
Generally, a district court is prohibited from modifying a defendants sentence after it has been imposed. United States v. Banks, 770 F.3d 346, 348 (5th Cir. 2014). Under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), however, on the motion of either the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) director or a prisoner, a district court may reduce a prisoners sentence if, after considering the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, the court finds that “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction” and “that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). A district courts decision to deny a prisoners motion for compassionate release is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Chambliss, 948 F.3d 691, 693 (5th Cir. 2020).
Jones argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion for compassionate release because the district court failed to give enough weight to his medical problems and the conditions at his prison unit and instead placed too much weight on the sentencing factors of § 3553(a). Jones notes that numerous people at his prison unit had contracted COVID-19, and he asserts that his health problems, particularly his asthma, place him at increased risk of suffering severe consequences from COVID-19. In addition to emphasizing his underlying health problems, Jones asserts that statistics show that his race places him at a higher risk of hospitalization and other complications from the virus. Jones also argues that the district courts concern over creating sentencing disparities by reducing his sentence of imprisonment was unwarranted given his risk of death from COVID-19; he seems to assert that his death would create a type of sentencing disparity.
Because Jones moved for compassionate release, the district court was “bound only by § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) and ․ the sentencing factors in § 3553(a).” United States v. Shkambi, 993 F.3d 388, 393 (5th Cir. 2021). Our review shows that the district court permissibly determined that the § 3553(a) factors weighed against granting compassionate release; it explicitly considered the nature and circumstances of Joness offense, the seriousness of the offense, Joness history and characteristics, and whether a sentence reduction would promote respect for the law, provide just punishment, protect the public from further crimes, and avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities. See § 3553(a)(1)(2), (6). Because the district court did not, in its § 3553(a) analysis, “base its decision on an error of law or a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence,” it did not abuse its discretion in denying Joness motion for compassionate release. See Chambliss, 948 F.3d at 694.
Accordingly, the district courts order is AFFIRMED.
FOOTNOTES
FOOTNOTE
Per Curiam:*
FN* Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.