MEMORANDUM *
Alexander Martinez appeals the district courts denial of his motion for compassionate release for “extraordinary and compelling reasons” under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review sentence reduction decisions under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1) for abuse of discretion, United States v. Aruda, 993 F.3d 797, 799 (9th Cir. 2021) (per curiam), and we affirm.
Contrary to Martinezs contention, we find no indication that the district court impermissibly treated U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 as a binding policy statement or misapplied Aruda. See Aruda, 993 F.3d at 802 (“[T]he current version of U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 is not an ‘applicable policy statement[ ]’ for 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) motions filed by a defendant․ The Sentencing Commissions statements in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 may inform a district courts discretion for § 3582(c)(1)(A) motions filed by a defendant, but they are not binding.”). The district court did not cite § 1B1.13, and the record does not support Martinezs argument that the court improperly limited its review to the statements provided in that provision. See United States v. Gasca-Ruiz, 852 F.3d 1167, 1174–75 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (stating that “absent some indication that the district court had in mind a different definition,” we “will not assume that the court applied the wrong legal standard”).
Rather, the district court applied the correct law when determining whether “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant[ed]” a reduction in Martinezs term of imprisonment, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), and appropriately considered the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) in concluding that Martinezs sentence accurately reflected his involvement in the offense, “even after COVID-19 and appellate guidance.” The district court explained that compassionate release was not warranted because—unlike his co-defendant who chose to go to trial—Martinez “solicited kickbacks for referrals,” stipulated to the amount of loss behind the alleged miscalculation in his plea agreement, and waived his right to appeal and to collaterally attack his conviction and/or sentence. The record supports the district courts conclusions, and the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Martinezs motion for compassionate release. See Aruda, 993 F.3d at 799 (“A district court may abuse its discretion if it does not apply the correct law or if it rests its decision on a clearly erroneous finding of material fact.” (citation omitted)).
AFFIRMED.