UNITED STATES v. SWAIN (2021)

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.2021-08-05No. No. 20-30098

Summary · law.co

Holding. The court affirmed the district court's denial of the motion to suppress evidence and its denial of the request for an additional evidentiary hearing.

Dominique James Swain appealed the district court's refusal to suppress evidence and denial of an additional evidentiary hearing in a felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm case. The appellate court determined that the initial traffic stop was justified because an officer observed Swain driving with unlit headlights in violation of local traffic regulations. Additionally, when the officer discovered during the stop that Swain's license was revoked and he was on probation, this provided independent reasonable suspicion to extend the stop and conduct a probation search, making any extension lawful.

Swain also challenged the district court's decision not to hold further evidentiary hearings. The court found no abuse of discretion because the critical facts—the status of Swain's headlights and license—had already been presented at the initial hearing, with Swain given the opportunity to cross-examine the officer and present rebuttal evidence. Swain's failure to address the license issue at the evidentiary hearing did not entitle him to a new hearing.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether the traffic stop was supported by reasonable suspicion
Whether the extension of the stop for a probation search was justified
Whether the district court abused its discretion by denying a second evidentiary hearing

Procedural posture

Swain appealed following the district court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence and request for additional evidentiary hearings in a conditional guilty plea to felon-in-possession of a firearm.

Authorities cited

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Opinion · public domain

MEMORANDUM *

Dominique James Swain appeals the district courts denial of his motion to suppress evidence following his conditional guilty plea to being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). Swain also appeals the district courts denial of his request for an additional evidentiary hearing. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

1. The district court properly concluded that Officer Palmatier had reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop. “[T]he decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred.” Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996); see also United States v. Choudhry, 461 F.3d 1097, 1100 (9th Cir. 2006) (“A traffic violation alone is sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion.”). The district court found that Officer Palmatier observed Swain driving with unlit headlights at 12:50 A.M.—a violation of local traffic laws that require the use of headlights from a half-hour after sunset until a half-hour before sunrise. See Alaska Admin. Code tit. 13 § 04.010(a)(1); Anchorage Mun. Code § 9.36.290.

Moreover, Officer Palmatier formed independent reasonable suspicion to extend the stop to conduct a probation search. See United States v. Gorman, 859 F.3d 706, 715 (9th Cir. 2017) (“Police simply may not perform unrelated investigations that prolong a stop unless they have ‘independent reasonable suspicion justifying [the] prolongation.’ ” (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Evans, 786 F.3d 779, 787 (9th Cir. 2015))). When Officer Palmatier asked Swain for his drivers license, Swain represented that he did not have it with him, and he was unsure whether it was valid. Officer Palmatier returned to his patrol car and ran a computer check that revealed Swain was driving with a revoked license and that he was on probation. At this point, any extension of the stop was justified because Officer Palmatier developed independent reasonable suspicion of a probation violation due to Swain driving with a revoked license. Even if Swain did not in fact have a revoked license, Officer Palmatiers reliance on the computer checks results was reasonable, and suppression would not be warranted. See Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 61, 135 S.Ct. 530, 190 L.Ed.2d 475 (2014).

2. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Swains request for further evidentiary hearings. See United States v. McTiernan, 695 F.3d 882, 891 (9th Cir. 2012). Officer Palmatiers observation that Swains headlights were off was included in his police report. He also testified to that fact at the evidentiary hearing. Swain even cross-examined Officer Palmatier on the issue. Similarly, Swain had the opportunity to address the status of his license at the evidentiary hearing but failed to do so. See United States v. Kimball, 975 F.2d 563, 568 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating that “where a defendant ‘fail[s] to present any facts in rebuttal’ to the governments evidence, there need be no new evidentiary hearing” (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Monaco, 852 F.2d 1143, 1149 (9th Cir. 1988))).

AFFIRMED.