Joint petition for consent discipline rejected as too harsh. See per curiam.
The Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) commenced an investigation into allegations that respondent negligently mishandled his client trust account. Respondent and the ODC then submitted a joint petition for consent discipline.
Based on the stipulated facts presented, including the negligent nature of respondents actions, his willingness to take corrective measures and the lack of any actual harm, we find formal discipline is not warranted and therefore reject the petition for consent discipline. However, nothing in this order shall preclude the ODC from considering alternatives to public discipline, such as an admonition or diversion.
As I have previously written, the Louisiana Constitution vests this Court with original jurisdiction in all “disciplinary proceedings against a member of the bar.” La. Const. art. V, § 5(B). Notwithstanding the fact that petitioner and the Office of Disciplinary Counsel have submitted this matter as a joint petition, our Constitution provides that the seven justices may determine the appropriate result under that exclusive grant of jurisdiction. See, e.g., In re: Washington, 20-0577 (La. 7/2/20), 297 So. 3d 739, 740-41 (Crichton, J., would reject petition for consent discipline as “unduly harsh”); In re: Wells, 20-0603 (La. 7/2/20), 297 So. 3d 741 (same); In re: Hardee, 18-1555 (La. 11/14/18), 259 So. 3d 329 (same). Upon examination of this record, including the significant mitigating factors present here—notably, the fact that this case involves a single inadvertent error, the absence of a prior disciplinary record, good faith effort to rectify the mistakes, and a cooperative attitude towards disciplinary proceedings—I agree with the decision to reject the joint petition for consent discipline as too harsh.