Stephanee Lindsay, federal prisoner # 79335-180, appeals the denial of her 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) motion for compassionate release. We review the denial for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Chambliss, 948 F.3d 691, 693 (5th Cir. 2020).
Even if a movant otherwise qualifies for a § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) reduction, a district court may deny relief based solely upon its consideration of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. Id. at 693-94. While the district court must provide specific factual reasons for its decision to deny a motion for a sentence reduction, id. at 693, the amount of explanation needed depends “upon the circumstances of the particular case,” Chavez-Meza v. United States, ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S. Ct. 1959, 1965, 201 L.Ed.2d 359 (2018). “In some cases, it may be sufficient for purposes of appellate review that the judge simply relied upon the record, while making clear that he or she has considered the parties’ arguments and taken account of the § 3553(a) factors.” Id.
The district court cataloged the parties’ pleadings (which largely debated whether the § 3553(a) factors warranted relief) and explicitly stated that it had denied relief after considering, inter alia, the § 3553(a) factors. The district court thus indicated that it had considered the parties’ arguments, and it provided a sufficient, albeit brief, explanation for the denial. See Chavez-Meza, 138 S. Ct. at 1965-68. While Lindsay argues at length that the district court misbalanced the § 3553(a) factors, her disagreement does not warrant reversal. See Chambliss, 948 F.3d at 694. She fails to show that the district court abused its discretion. Id. at 693.
AFFIRMED.
FOOTNOTES
FOOTNOTE
Per Curiam:*
FN* Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.