Welly Garza appeals the denial of her motion for attorneys fees filed after entry of the parties divorce judgment. The trial court denied the motion in the mistaken belief that Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.525 divested it of jurisdiction to entertain a motion for fees filed more than thirty days after the judgment. But rule 1.525 did not affect the courts jurisdiction because it does not apply to family law cases. Therefore, we reverse and remand for the court to consider Garzas motion anew.
The facts necessary to resolve this appeal are few. The trial court entered a final judgment, then issued an amended judgment four days later to correct an error regarding the restoration of Garzas surname. Both judgments included language reserving jurisdiction to consider fee claims and a number of other issues. They also provided that fee motions filed more than thirty days after the final judgment would be “deemed waived.”
Garza filed a motion for attorneys fees under section 61.16, Florida Statutes (2019), on the twenty-ninth day after entry of the amended judgment. Her former husband, Ted Juhl, urged the court to reject the motion as untimely because it was filed more than thirty days after the original judgment.
1
Garzas counsel argued that the clock ran from the date of the amended judgment. At a hearing on the issue, Juhl relied heavily on Mook v. Mook, 873 So. 2d 363 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004), in which this court applied rule 1.525 and its thirty-day deadline for filing fee motions to a family law case.
Following the hearing, the court issued an order that reflected that it was persuaded by Juhls reliance on Mook. The court wrote that “[a]fter the 30 days expired, the Court unfortunately lost jurisdiction to determine attorneys fees and costs.”
2
(Emphasis added.) Thus, the court denied Garzas motion for fees. This was error.
When this court decided Mook in 2004, the law controlling the issue of fees in family law cases was vastly different than it is today. At that time, the Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure were not a stand-alone scheme regulating family law cases. Rather, the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure governed family law matters generally, while the family law rules modified the civil rules where specified. See Fla. Fam. L. R. P. 12.020 (2016) (“The Florida Rules of Civil Procedure are applicable in all family law matters except as otherwise provided in these rules.”).
In 2004, there was no family law rule specifically governing fee proceedings. Therefore, civil rule 1.525 applied in family law cases. Amends. to the Fla. Fam. L. R. P. (Rule 12.525), 897 So. 2d 467, 467 (Fla. 2005).
But many recognized that “rule 1.525 is ill-fitting to family law matters.” Id. (recognizing the Family Law Rules Committees position on the problems associated with applying rule 1.525 in the family law context). In 2005, the Florida Supreme Court agreed that, henceforth, “rule 1.525 should not apply in family law proceedings.” Id. Consequently, it promulgated family law rule 12.525, which stated simply that rule 1.525 did not apply in family law matters. Id. at 467. The court held that “section 61.16, Florida Statutes (2004), already governs the award of attorneys fees and costs in family law cases.” Id.
This 2005 amendment abrogated the principles applied in Mook, and to this day, rule 1.525 does not apply to family law cases. In 2017, the Florida Supreme Court overhauled the entirety of the family law rules in order to make them a “stand-alone set of rules to govern family law proceedings,” no longer dependent on the civil rules for their underpinnings. See In re Amends. to Fla. Fam. L. R. P., 214 So. 3d 400, 400 (Fla. 2017). The court struck from rule 12.020 the language that had incorporated the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. See id. at 409. Accordingly, the court deleted the now-superfluous rule 12.525, see id. at 464; because the civil rules were no longer incorporated in the family law rules, there was no need to except the application of civil rule 1.525.
Since 2005, then, fee proceedings in family law cases have been governed by section 61.16, unfettered by rule 1.525. Id.; 897 So. 2d 467, 467. That statute does not impose a thirty-day limitation on a trial courts postjudgment jurisdiction to consider fee motions. Rather, it authorizes fee awards in family law cases “from time to time [and] after considering the financial resources of both parties.” § 61.16(1). Under section 61.16, the court below had jurisdiction to entertain Garzas motion for fees.
3
“[A] misconception by the trial judge of a controlling principle of law can constitute grounds for reversal.” Applegate v. Barnett Bank of Tallahassee, 377 So. 2d 1150, 1152 (Fla. 1979). Here, the trial courts mistaken belief that it was without jurisdiction or discretion to consider Garzas motion for fees requires us to reverse. See, e.g., Thompson v. Douds, 852 So. 2d 299, 305 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (“Usually when a trial court applies the incorrect legal standard, we reverse and remand for a new hearing at which the trial court must reconsider its decision in light of the proper legal standard.”); Cowart v. State, 860 So. 2d 1041, 1042 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) (reversing and remanding for further proceedings where it was “evident that the court misunderstood its options”); Griffin v. State, 783 So. 2d 337, 338 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001) (holding that trial courts misunderstanding of its discretion in sentencing required reversal for resentencing). On remand, the court may consider the merits and any procedural arguments that have been or could be raised to the extent they do not conflict with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
FOOTNOTES
1
. Assuming that the original judgment controlled, the motion was filed one day beyond the deadline under the calculation method mandated by Florida Rule of General Practice & Judicial Administration 2.514(a)(1), effective January 1, 2019. See In re Amends. to Fla. R. Civ. P., 257 So. 3d 66, 70 (Fla. 2018).
2
. It is unnecessary for us to determine whether the trial court was correct in assuming that the original judgment, rather than the amended judgment, started the running of the clock under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.525 because, as we explain below, that clock does not apply to family law proceedings.
3
. Even if rule 1.525 had applied to this case, the thirty-day time limit would not have been jurisdictional and could have been extended by application of Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.090(b). See DAngelo v. DAngelo, 903 So. 2d 378 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (“[R]ule 1.525 procedures can be overridden by ․ an order under rule 1.090(b) extending the time for filing a motion for attorneys fees.”). And a court would abuse its discretion by denying a motion for fees filed late under rule 1.525 where the movant has shown excusable neglect. See Boudot v. Boudot, 925 So. 2d 409 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006) (reversing the denial of a motion for fees in a dissolution case for an abuse of discretion when the movant demonstrated that a calendaring error resulted in the attorneys missing rule 1.525s thirty-day time limitation).Similarly, there would be no jurisdictional bar to Garzas fee motion even in the face of the language in the judgment and amended judgment that fee claims not filed within thirty days would be “deemed waived.” That time limit would have been a matter of discretion, not jurisdiction. Cf. Fasig v. Fasig, 830 So. 2d 839, 842 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (“[T]his court recognizes the need to allow trial judges broad discretion to manage their dockets to insure that matters are timely resolved.”).
NORTHCUTT, Judge.
SILBERMAN and SMITH, JJ, Concur.