Randi Wilson appeals the trial courts final order, entered sua sponte, dismissing her petition for adoption as moot. The court did not explain in its order why Wilsons petition was moot; and, from our record, it is unclear how the trial court reached this conclusion. Nevertheless, as we explain, Wilson has failed to make a sufficient argument here for reversal of this final order. See Hammond v. State, 34 So. 3d 58, 59 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (“Claims for which an appellant has not presented any argument, or for which he provides only conclusory argument, are insufficiently presented for review and are waived.” (citing Doorbal v. State, 983 So. 2d 464, 482–83 (Fla. 2008); Shere v. State, 742 So. 2d 215, 217 n.6 (Fla. 1999))).
Wilsons initial brief is almost entirely devoted to arguing what she contends were various errors allegedly committed in the earlier termination of parental rights proceeding involving the two minor children that she later sought to adopt below. Her arguments are misplaced. First, Wilson was neither the parent nor legal guardian of these two children and was not a party to that litigation. Thus, to the extent her arguments regarding the termination of parental rights proceeding would somehow be germane to the instant adoption proceeding, Wilson lacks standing to raise these arguments. See C.K. v. Dept of Child. & Fams., 65 So. 3d 1179, 1180 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011) (holding that the mother did not have standing to raise an issue personal to the father, who did not appeal the termination of parental rights final judgment). Second, the final judgment that was entered terminating the parental rights of the mother and father of these minor children was appealed by the mother and was affirmed by this court without opinion. See L.W. v. Dept of Child. & Fams., 274 So. 3d 392 (Fla. 5th DCA 2019). As such, we had necessarily concluded in that earlier appeal that no reversible error in the final judgment of termination of parental rights had been shown.
Wilsons sole, limited argument raised in her brief for reversal that is actually related to the final order dismissing her adoption petition is, essentially, her belief or speculation that the trial court improperly held an ex parte hearing, attended by only the appellee, and then entered the final order now being appealed. While such a hearing would clearly be inappropriate, Wilsons argument lacks merit as there is nothing in the record that would suggest or show that the trial court held a hearing.
Whether a better argument for reversal could have been made here by Wilson is not our task to address. Simply put, it is neither the function nor role of an appellate court to make an argument for a party. See Williams v. Skylink Jets, Inc., 229 So. 3d 1275, 1278 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) (recognizing that an appellate court “will not make arguments for an appellant”).
Accordingly, we are compelled to affirm the final order of dismissal.
AFFIRMED.
PER CURIAM.
LAMBERT, C.J., EVANDER and HARRIS, JJ., concur.