MAROULIS v. ENTERGY LOUISIANA LLC (2021)

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fifth Circuit.2021-02-10No. NO. 20-C-241

Summary · law.co

Holding. The court reversed the trial court's denial of ACE's summary judgment motion and granted ACE's motion, dismissing Castleman's third-party claims against ACE with prejudice because no evidence supported the existence of an indemnification agreement or an obligation by Sunbelt to procure coverage naming Castleman as an additional insured.

This case involves a workplace accident at a hotel renovation project in which an employee of Sunbelt Rentals suffered an electrical shock. The injured employee's employer and the property owner initiated claims that eventually led Castleman, a general contractor, to seek insurance coverage under a liability policy that Sunbelt had obtained from ACE Insurance. Castleman argued that Sunbelt had promised to provide insurance coverage naming Castleman as an additional insured under that policy.

ACE moved for summary judgment to dismiss Castleman's claims, but the trial court denied the motion, finding disputed questions of fact about whether an indemnification agreement existed between the parties. ACE then sought supervisory review of that decision. The appellate court reviewed the case from scratch and found no evidence—written or oral—that Sunbelt and Castleman had agreed to any indemnification arrangement or that Sunbelt had agreed to add Castleman as an additional insured on the ACE policy. Because the ACE policy itself did not name Castleman as an additional insured and no valid agreement required Sunbelt to do so, Castleman had no legal basis to claim coverage under that policy.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether an indemnification agreement existed between Castleman and Sunbelt
Whether Sunbelt agreed to add Castleman as an additional insured on its liability policy
Whether Castleman had a legal basis to claim coverage under ACE's policy to Sunbelt

Procedural posture

ACE sought supervisory review of a trial court judgment that had denied ACE's motion for summary judgment dismissing Castleman's third-party claims for insurance coverage.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

ACE American Insurance Company (“ACE”) seeks supervisory review of a June 30, 2020 judgment of the trial court denying its motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of third-party claims filed by Castleman, Donlea, and Associates, LLC (“Castleman”) seeking coverage as an additional insured under a commercial general liability (“CGL”) policy issued by ACE to Sunbelt Rentals Scaffold Services, LLC (“Sunbelt”). Pursuant to the provisions of La. C.C.P. art. 966(H), this case was assigned for briefing and oral argument. For the following reasons, we grant this writ application, reverse that portion of the trial courts ruling that denied ACEs motion for summary judgment, render judgment granting ACEs motion for summary judgment, and dismiss Castlemans third-party claims against ACE with prejudice.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This complex, multiparty case arises from a work-related accident that occurred during the renovation of the Hampton Inn located in Metairie, Louisiana. Hotel Investors, LLC (“Hotel Investors”), the owner of the hotel, and its management company, Expotel Hospitality - HIM, LLC (“Expotel”), hired Sigur Construction, LLC (“Sigur”) and Castleman as the general contractors for the project. Castleman, in turn, hired Sunbelt as the scaffolding subcontractor for the project. On April 19, 2018, Ioannis Maroulis, an employee of Sunbelt, suffered an electrical shock when a piece of scaffolding equipment came into contact with an overhead power line.

Mr. Maroulis filed a petition for damages against Hotel Investors and Expotel, and various other defendants, alleging various counts of negligence. Hotel Investors and Expotel then filed a third-party demand against Castleman and its insurer, Evanston Insurance Company (“Evanston”), alleging a breach of the construction contract between Hotel Investors and Castleman and seeking insurance coverage under the Evanston policy. Castleman filed its own third-party demand against Sunbelt and its insurer, ACE, seeking contractual indemnification and insurance coverage as an additional insured under the CGL policy issued by ACE.

Castleman alleged in its third-party complaint that Sunbelt owes contractual indemnity to Castleman for the damages asserted by Hotel Investors and Expotel. Castleman further alleged that Sunbelt agreed to provide insurance coverage to Castleman to insure it against claims that arose in connection with Sunbelts work on the project and to add Castleman as an additional insured on its liability policy that was issued by ACE. According to Castleman, Sunbelt provided it with a certificate of insurance to prove that it had sufficient coverage to insure Castleman against claims arising in connection with Sunbelts work. Castleman also alleged that Sunbelt is in breach of an oral obligation to insure Castleman.

In addition to its claims against Sunbelt, Castleman also filed claims against ACE, seeking insurance coverage under the CGL policy issued by ACE to Sunbelt. Both Sunbelt and ACE filed motions for summary judgment seeking dismissal of Castlemans claims. Following a hearing on the matter, the trial court denied the motions for summary judgment on the basis that there existed genuine issues of material fact regarding whether an indemnity agreement existed between Castleman and Sunbelt. ACE filed this timely writ application seeking supervisory review of that judgment.

DISCUSSION

Appellate courts review summary judgments de novo using the same criteria that govern the trial courts determination of whether summary judgment is appropriate. OKrepki v. OKrepki, 16-50 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/26/16), 193 So.3d 574, 577. A motion for summary judgment will be granted if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is not genuine issue as to material fact, and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. La. C.C.P. art. 966; Semco, LLC v. Grand Ltd., 16-342 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/31/17), 221 So.3d 1004, 1031 (citing Oubre v. Louisiana Citizens Fair Plan, 11-0097 (La. 12/16/11), 79 So.3d 987, 1002-03). If the mover will not bear the burden of proof at trial on the issue that is before the court on the motion for summary judgment, the movers burden on the motion does not require him to negate all essential elements of the adverse partys claim, action, or defense, but rather to point out to the court the absence of factual support for one or more elements essential to the adverse partys claim, action, or defense. La. C.C.P. art. 966; David v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 19-36 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/2/19), 282 So.3d 329, 331. The burden is on the adverse party to produce factual support sufficient to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact or that the mover is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. La. C.C.P. art. 966.

Upon de novo review, we find that, although Sunbelt did obtain CGL and workers’ compensation policies to protect itself against risks during the construction project, there is no evidence of a contractual indemnity agreement, written or oral, between Castleman and Sunbelt. We also find that there is no evidence that Sunbelt agreed to procure insurance on Castlemans behalf or name Castleman as an additional insured.

A review of the policy issued by ACE to Sunbelt shows that Castleman was not named as an additional insured. In the absence of any indemnity agreement between Sunbelt and Castleman, there is no legal basis for Castlemans third-party demand seeking insurance coverage under the ACE policy. The burden in this instance is on Castleman to produce factual support sufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact or that ACE is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. We find that Castleman has failed to meet its burden.

CONCLUSION

Upon de novo review and in accordance with reasons articulated in the opinion on the related writ, 20-C-246, we find that Castleman has failed to produce factual support to establish a genuine issue of material fact or that ACE is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, we grant this writ application, reverse that portion of the trial courts ruling that denied ACEs motion for summary judgment, render judgment granting ACEs motion for summary judgment, and dismiss Castlemans third-party claims against ACE with prejudice.

WRIT GRANTED; SUMMARY JUDGMENT GRANTED; THIRD-PARTY CLAIMS DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE

CHAISSON, J.