UNITED STATES v. PRADO MONTOYA (2021)

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.2021-02-12No. No. 20-10554

Summary · law.co

Holding. The conviction and sentence are affirmed.

Felipe Prado-Montoya pleaded guilty to illegal reentry under federal law and received an upward variance in his prison sentence along with three years of supervised release. He appealed, arguing that his sentence was substantively unreasonable and violated due process because it allegedly exceeded the statutory maximum for the offense charged in his indictment. The appellate court rejected both arguments, finding his substantive reasonableness claim inadequately developed and conclusory, and noting that his due process argument was foreclosed by established precedent, though the defendant acknowledged this limitation.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether an upward variance sentence is substantively unreasonable
Whether a sentence exceeds the statutory maximum when prior convictions were not charged in the indictment
Requirements for adequately briefing appellate arguments

Procedural posture

The defendant appealed his guilty plea conviction for illegal reentry and the resulting sentence imposed by the trial court.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

Felipe Prado-Montoya appeals his guilty plea conviction for illegal reentry and the upward variance prison term and the three-year supervised release term that followed. See 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), (b)(1). We affirm.

Because it is purely conclusory, unsupported by record citations and legal authorities, and in essence unbriefed, we reject Prado-Montoyas claim that the sentence imposed is substantively unreasonable. Although Prado-Montoya contends that the sentence unreasonably fails to reflect the statutory sentencing factors and is greater than necessary to serve Congresss sentencing objectives, he does not identify any such factors or objectives and discuss them in the context of the facts of his case. We will not search the record to find support for Prado-Montoyas counseled brief. See Nicholas Acoustics & Specialty Co. v. H & M Const. Co., 695 F.2d 839, 847 (5th Cir. 1983); see also Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8)(A). “Inadequately briefed issues are deemed abandoned.” United States v. Stevens, 487 F.3d 232, 242 n.1 (5th Cir. 2007). A matter merely mentioned in passing without being developed into an argument is inadequately briefed. See id.; see also United States v. Cothran, 302 F.3d 279, 286 n.7 (5th Cir. 2002); Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 225 (5th Cir. 1993). We do not liberally construe a counseled brief. Woodfox v. Cain, 609 F.3d 774, 792 (5th Cir. 2010).

Additionally, Prado-Montoya contends that his sentence violates due process because it exceeds the statutory maximum for the offense charged in the indictment. In gist, he contends that the indictment did not charge him with having a prior offense and that consequently he was guilty of violating only § 1326(a) and may not have his sentence enhanced under § 1326(b)(1). He correctly concedes that this issue is foreclosed by Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 226–27, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998), but wishes to preserve it for further review.

AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

FOOTNOTE

Per Curiam:*

FN* Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.