Jennifer Hollingsworth appeals the district courts order affirming the decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (Commissioner) to deny her application for disability insurance benefits. Hollingsworth asserts three issues on appeal, which we address in turn.
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I. DISCUSSION
A. Due Process
Hollingsworth contends the administrative law judge (ALJ) violated her due process rights by issuing a decision that encompasses a period during which she was prohibited from producing evidence. Hollingsworth asserts the ALJs decision has prejudiced her because it prevented her from presenting evidence related to the period between February 23, 2017 and March 31, 2017.
Hollingsworth has failed to establish her due process rights were violated. Nothing in the record indicates Hollingsworth submitted any additional evidence to the ALJ that was not considered, and she does not argue that she attempted to submit evidence from the relevant time period that the ALJ declined to consider. Thus, she cannot establish she suffered any prejudice amounting to a due process violation. See Graham v. Apfel, 129 F.3d 1420, 1422 (11th Cir. 1997) (explaining there must be a showing of prejudice before a determination that a claimants right to due process was violated to such a degree that the case must be remanded).
B. Severity of Symptoms
Hollingsworth argues the ALJ erred in the consideration of symptoms when assessing her residual functional capacity (RFC)
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based on the evaluation of her subjective complaints. She contends the ALJs determination she stopped working because she had a child is not supported by the evidence because she returned to her normal job after she had her son and stopped working after her accident. She asserts the daily activities described in the record, including her medical records, do not indicate she could work on a regular and continuing basis. She specifically notes her doctor “limited her daily activity to only do light housework though her pain was still there.” Hollingsworth contends the ALJ improperly considered she drove 42 minutes to her hearing, and the ALJs reasoning that she “worked through her pain for a time” is insufficient because she did that work before the alleged date of disability. She also asserts the medical evidence cited by the ALJ fails to provide substantial evidence to support denying her claim, including the ALJ repeatedly noting she did not seek treatment because she could not afford to do so.
An individual seeking disability benefits has the burden to prove she is disabled and unable to perform her past relevant work. Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005). A claimant may establish she has a disability through her “own testimony of pain or other subjective symptoms.” Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005). When a claimant attempts to establish disability through her own testimony concerning pain or other subjective symptoms, we apply a three-part “pain standard,” which requires: evidence of an underlying medical condition and either (A) objective medical evidence that confirms the severity of the alleged pain stemming from that condition, or (B) the objectively determined medical condition is so severe it can reasonably be expected to cause the alleged pain. Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1225 (11th Cir. 2002); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 (setting out standards for evaluating pain and other symptoms). “The standard also applies to complaints of subjective conditions other than pain.” Holt v. Sullivan, 921 F.2d 1221, 1223 (11th Cir. 1991). “The claimants subjective testimony supported by medical evidence that satisfies the standard is itself sufficient to support a finding of disability.” Id.
“After considering a claimants complaints of pain, the ALJ may reject them as not creditable, and that determination will be reviewed for substantial evidence.” Marbury v. Sullivan, 957 F.2d 837, 839 (11th Cir. 1992). The ALJ must explicitly and adequately articulate his reasons if he discredits subjective testimony. Id. When evaluating a claimants subjective symptoms, the ALJ must consider such things as: (1) the claimants daily activities; (2) the nature and intensity of pain and other symptoms; (3) precipitating and aggravating factors; (4) dosage and effects of medications; and (5) treatment or measures received by the claimant for relief of symptoms. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3). The fact a claimant can perform daily activities that are inconsistent with her subjective symptom complaints does not constitute substantial evidence where there is other evidence indicating her daily activities have been significantly affected by her condition. See Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1561 (11th Cir. 1995). While not dispositive, a claimants activities may show her pain or other symptoms are not as limiting as alleged. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(i).
Substantial evidence supports the ALJs finding that Hollingsworths subjective symptom complaints were not credible, as the objective medical evidence did not confirm the severity of her symptoms. See Mitchell v. Commr of Soc. Sec., 771 F.3d 780, 782 (11th Cir. 2014) (stating credibility determinations are the province of the ALJ, and we will not disturb a clearly articulated credibility finding supported by substantial evidence). The ALJ articulated clear reasons for discrediting Hollingsworths subjective complaints about the extent of her limitations and those reasons are supported by substantial evidence. See id. Hollingsworth sought treatment for pain management through Charlotte County Medical Solutions throughout 2015 and notes reflect she benefitted from opioid pain-relieving therapy as her pain levels dropped when she took her medications. Hollingsworth had a normal sensory exam, her x-ray studies showed the surgery she had was a success, and she benefitted from the physical therapy she attended. In addition, Hollingsworth stated she cares for her eight-year-old son, gets him ready for school, makes him breakfast, helps take him to school, and does light cleaning.
Hollingsworths argument the ALJ misstated the fact she initially stopped working due to the birth of her son lacks merit as she told Dr. Visser that she stopped working for that reason. Thus, the ALJ noted Hollingsworth may have stopped working for reasons other than because of her alleged disabling impairments, but did not rely solely on her familial responsibilities in determining her RFC. Moreover, Hollingsworths claim that her doctor limited her daily activities to light housework is inaccurate as the medical records show that Hollingsworth stated she limited herself to light housework. The record provides substantial evidence to support the ALJs evaluation that the intensity of Hollingsworths symptoms was not consistent with the medical evidence.
C. Medical Opinions
Finally, Hollingsworth contends the ALJ erred in how he considered the medical opinions regarding her mental impairments when assessing her RFC. Specifically, she asserts the ALJ gave great weight to the opinion of Dr. Kenneth Visser, who found Hollingsworths concentration was low, she had short term memory issues, limited social effectiveness, and was limited in her ability to adapt, but the ALJ found she had only moderate limitations in concentration, persistence, and pace, and no limitations in her ability to adapt. Hollingsworth contends the ALJ erred because his decision was not consistent with Dr. Vissers and Dr. Manuel Gallegos opinions.
When evaluating a doctors opinion, an ALJ may consider numerous factors such as whether the doctor examined the claimant, whether the doctor treated the claimant, whether the doctor uses evidence to support his or her opinion, and whether the doctors opinion is consistent with the record as a whole. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c). A claimants RFC is a matter reserved for the ALJs determination, and while a physicians opinion on the matter is considered, it is not dispositive. Id. § 404.1527(d)(2). “Absent ‘good cause’ an ALJ is to give the medical opinions of treating physicians ‘substantial or considerable weight.’ ” Winschel v. Commr of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1179 (11th Cir. 2011). Good cause exists “when the: (1) treating physicians opinion was not bolstered by the evidence; (2) evidence supported a contrary finding; or (3) treating physicians opinion was conclusory or inconsistent with the doctors own medical records.” Id.
Mental impairments are evaluated based on four functional areas including: (1) understand, remember, or apply information; (2) interact with others; (3) concentrate, persist, or maintain pace; and (4) adapt or manage oneself. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(c)(3). An ALJ must state with particularity the weight attributed to medical opinions, but there is no requirement the ALJ refer to every piece of evidence so long as the decision allows the reviewing court to conclude the ALJ considered the claimants medical condition as a whole. Dyer, 395 F.3d at 1211.
Substantial evidence supports the ALJs decision to give little weight to Dr. Gallegos opinion. The ALJ gave little weight to Dr. Gallegos assessment because he determined the opinion was not well supported by the medical evidence and it was inconsistent with the record medical evidence. Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1179. Dr. Gallego failed to cite any objective medical findings to support his opinion or provide an explanation for his opinion. In addition, Dr. Gallegos opinions were inconsistent with the record as a whole as Hollingsworths treatment notes from Allied Center for Therapy indicate she had an improved mood and good levels of energy after receiving medication. Furthermore, any opinion that Dr. Gallego made regarding Hollingsworths ability to work based on her physical limitations and panic attacks is not owed any deference as that is a matter specifically reserved for the ALJ. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2).
The ALJs mental assessment of Hollingsworth was consistent with Dr. Vissers opinion. The ALJ acknowledged Dr. Vissers opinion regarding Hollingsworths limitations and cited those findings when he found Hollingsworth was capable of understanding, remembering, and following directions. The ALJ discussed Dr. Vissers finding that Hollingsworth was marginally social and had limited social effectiveness. Moreover, the ALJ accounted for the limitations Dr. Visser included by limiting Hollingsworth to “occasional interaction” with others, precluding her from production quotas, and limiting her to simple, routine, and repetitive tasks. Thus, the ALJ did not mention each of Dr. Vissers findings, but his opinions were discussed and the ALJs RFC determination is supported by substantial evidence, including the evidence submitted by Dr. Visser. Moore, 405 F.3d at 1211; Dyer, 395 F.3d at 1211.
II. CONCLUSION
The ALJ did not violate Hollingsworths due process rights. Substantial evidence supports the ALJs evaluation of Hollingsworths subjective complaints and of the opinion evidence regarding Hollingsworths mental impairments. Therefore, we affirm the district courts order affirming the decision of the Commissioner to deny Hollingsworths application for disability insurance benefits.
AFFIRMED.
FOOTNOTES
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. We must determine whether the Commissioners decision is supported by substantial evidence and based on the proper legal standards. Winschel v. Commr of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1178 (11th Cir. 2011). The Commissioners factual findings are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. Lewis v. Barnhart, 285 F.3d 1329, 1330 (11th Cir. 2002). “Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance, but rather such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005). Id.
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. The social security regulations outline a five-step, sequential evaluation process to determine whether a claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). At the fourth step, the ALJ must evaluate whether the claimant has the RFC to perform past relevant work. Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1237 (11th Cir. 2004); 20 C.F.R § 404.1520(a)(4).
PER CURIAM: