PIRTLE v. STATE (2021)

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.2021-07-28No. No. 2D19-672

Summary · law.co

Holding. The court affirmed the $50 court-appointed counsel fee but reversed the $220 court costs and remanded for the trial court to strike the unidentified costs from the sentencing order. The trial court may reimpose court costs only if it cites proper statutory authority.

Timothy Price Pirtle appealed his misdemeanor battery conviction and sentence, raising two sentencing issues through a motion to correct minor errors. He challenged a $50 court-appointed counsel fee imposed without notice or opportunity to be heard, and $220 in unidentified court costs that were neither discussed at sentencing nor explained in the sentencing order. The court found that while the $50 counsel fee was properly imposed under Florida law without requiring notice or a hearing, the $220 in court costs lacked any discernible statutory basis and were not discussed at sentencing, making them improper. The appellate court determined that when costs are imposed, the sentencing order must cite the specific statutory authority for those costs.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether notice and hearing are required before imposing a court-appointed counsel fee
Whether court costs lacking statutory citation in the sentencing order are valid
What procedural requirements apply to imposing costs at sentencing

Procedural posture

Pirtle appealed his misdemeanor battery judgment and sentence, filing a motion to correct minor sentencing errors while the appeal was pending.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

Timothy Price Pirtle appeals his judgment and sentence for misdemeanor battery. We reverse and remand to correct one minor sentencing error but otherwise affirm.

While this appeal was pending, Mr. Pirtle filed a motion to correct two minor sentencing errors under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(2). He argued that the trial court erroneously imposed a $50 fee for court-appointed counsel without giving him notice and an opportunity to be heard. He also claimed the trial court erred by including $220 of unidentified “court costs” in the sentencing order. This motion was effectively denied when the time limit for judicial action passed. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.800(b)(2)(B).

Mr. Pirtle now argues that the denial of this rule 3.800(b)(2) motion was error. To the extent Mr. Pirtles motion sought redress for the $220 in “court costs,” we agree. Because these mysterious “court costs” were neither discussed at the sentencing hearing nor cited in the subsequent sentencing order, we too are unable to discern the bases for requiring $220 in court costs. See Vick v. State, 37 So. 3d 951, 952 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (“The statutory authority for all costs imposed, whether they are mandatory or discretionary, must be cited in the written order.”).

However, we find no error with the trial courts imposition of the $50 court-appointed counsel fee. As recent supreme court precedent shows, Mr. Pirtle has no right to notice or a hearing to contest the $50 court-appointed counsel fee. See State v. J.A.R., 318 So. 3d 1256, 1258 (Fla. June 3, 2021) (“Notably, section 938.29(1)(a) does not require the trial court to announce the imposition of the statutorily required fee; nor does it afford the defendant any substantive right to contest the fee. And, no other portion of section 938.29 requires notice and a hearing when the court imposes the minimum fee required under subsection (1)(a).”).

Accordingly, we reverse the imposition of $220 court costs but affirm the $50 court-appointed counsel fee. On remand, the trial court shall strike the $220 in court costs from the sentencing order and correct the probation order to reflect these changes. See Haddock v. State, 255 So. 3d 994, 994 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018); Vick, 37 So. 3d at 952. That said, the trial court may reimpose these court costs if it cites proper statutory authority. See Vick, 37 So. 3d at 952.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with directions.

LABRIT, Judge.

KHOUZAM and LUCAS, JJ., Concur.