SUMMARY ORDER
Defendant-Appellant Dontrell Wise appeals from a judgment of conviction entered on March 19, 2019, after a jury found him guilty of (1) conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute heroin, butyryl fentanyl, fentanyl, cocaine, and cocaine base resulting in death;
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(2) possession of butyryl fentanyl with intent to distribute;
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and (3) distribution of fentanyl resulting in the death of a woman named Amanda Jarczyk.
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We assume the readers familiarity with the record.
On appeal, Wise argues that insufficient evidence supports each of his three convictions and that the district court erred in admitting the expert testimony of Drug Enforcement Administration Special Agent James McHugh. As explained below, we disagree, and thus affirm the judgment of the district court.
I. Sufficiency of the Evidence
We evaluate challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence underlying a criminal conviction by asking “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Willis, 5 F.4th 250, 261 (2d Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted). We “draw all permissible inferences in favor of the government and resolve all issues of credibility in favor of the jurys verdict.” Id.
Wise attacks the credibility of several of the governments witnesses—witnesses who testified to, inter alia, selling drugs on Wises behalf, purchasing drugs from Wise, or, in the case of Brittney Ridgeway, reselling drugs that she had purchased from Wise to Jarczyk shortly before Jarczyks death. “We will not attempt to second-guess a jurys credibility determination[s] on a sufficiency challenge․” United States v. Baker, 899 F.3d 123, 130 (2d Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). “It is ․ well established that it is the province of the jury and not of the court to determine whether a witness who may have been inaccurate, contradictory and even untruthful in some respects was nonetheless entirely credible in the essentials of [her] testimony.” United States v. Flores, 945 F.3d 687, 710–11 (2d Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Wises remaining sufficiency challenges fault the government for proving some of its case through circumstantial evidence and for failing to disprove innocent alternative explanations for some of Wises conduct.
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The government did, as noted above, introduce direct evidence in the form of eyewitness testimony. But direct evidence is not required. “[T]he government is entitled to prove its case solely through circumstantial evidence, provided, of course, that the government still demonstrates each element of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Lorenzo, 534 F.3d 153, 159 (2d Cir. 2008) (quotation marks omitted). Wises attempts to isolate certain pieces of circumstantial evidence presented by the government to argue the insufficiency of each individual piece misstate the standard of review. Our assessment “looks at the evidence in its totality, and the [g]overnment need not negate every theory of innocence.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Examining the trial evidence in its totality and viewing that evidence in the light most favorable to the government, we conclude that a rational jury could have found the elements of each of the three counts beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we reject Wises sufficiency challenges.
II. Admission of Agent McHughs Expert Testimony
We review a preserved objection to the district courts admission of expert testimony for abuse of discretion, United States v. Mejia, 545 F.3d 179, 193 (2d Cir. 2008), and an unpreserved objection for plain error, see Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). Under either standard, we discern no error in the district courts admission of Agent McHughs expert testimony under Fed. R. Evid. 702.
Wise argues that Agent McHughs testimony, including concerning drug traffickers’ frequent use of rental cars, application of after-market tints to the windows of these cars, and practice of separating possession of drugs from money among different individuals while traveling to reduce legal exposure in the event of a run-in with law enforcement, was unnecessary and impermissibly bolstering. Although we have held that the operations of drug traffickers are a proper subject for expert testimony, we have cautioned that “such testimony should normally be used only for subjects that have aspects reasonably perceived as beyond the ken of the jury.” United States v. Tapia-Ortiz, 23 F.3d 738, 740 (2d Cir. 1994). Agent McHughs testimony meets this standard. We have no trouble concluding that jurors would not necessarily be aware of such practices by drug dealers, and that the expert testimony was appropriate in this regard. Id. at 741.
Moreover, even if we were to conclude otherwise, the governments use of expert testimony to explain “that drug traffickers employ certain techniques ․ to avoid detection” would still have been proper because Wise argued that the governments version of events did not suggest criminal activity. Id. We do not accept Wises claim that Agent McHughs testimony bolstered or mirrored the testimony of the fact witnesses. A fact witnesss credibility may not be bolstered “when the witnesss version is not attacked as improbable.” United States v. Cruz, 981 F.2d 659, 663 (2d Cir. 1992). But that is not the case here. Not only is the credibility of the fact witnesses the centerpiece of Wises appeal, but also the experts testimony on discrete topics went beyond the scope of the fact witnesses’ versions of events. Thus, the district court did not err in admitting Agent McHughs expert testimony.
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We have considered Wises remaining arguments—including those raised in his pro se supplemental brief—and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
FOOTNOTES
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. In violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(C), 846, and 851.
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. In violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(C), 851, and 18 U.S.C. § 2.
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. In violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(C), 851, and 18 U.S.C. § 2.
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. Wise also argues that the admission of Agent McHughs testimony was error, and that, absent this testimony, there was insufficient evidence for the jury to find a conspiracy among Wise, the governments fact witnesses, and co-defendant Jerell Weathersby, and to find that Wise aided and abetted Weathersbys possession of butyryl fentanyl with intent to distribute. Agent McHughs testimony provided relevant context for the jury to find a link from Wise to the butyryl fentanyl found in Weathersbys pocket. As discussed below, we discern no error in the district courts admission of Agent McHughs testimony.
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. Nor does the limited overlap between small portions of Agent McHughs testimony and the testimony of certain fact witnesses—concerning the practice of breaking distribution-level amounts of drugs into retail-level portions and diluting the drugs to increase profits—suggest that Agent McHughs testimony strayed outside the bounds of Fed. R. Evid. 702. See United States v. Amuso, 21 F.3d 1251, 1263–64 (2d Cir. 1994) (finding no error where expert law enforcement witnesss testimony overlapped with fact witnesses’ testimony).