SUMMARY ORDER
Appellant Darren Robinson, pro se and incarcerated, appeals from the denials of his 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) motion for compassionate release and subsequent motion for reconsideration. Robinson claimed that his vulnerability to COVID-19 infection justified a sentence reduction. The District Court denied compassionate release on the grounds that (1) Robinson had failed to demonstrate an extraordinary and compelling reason for a sentence reduction under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, note 1(D), and (2) even if Robinson had demonstrated an extraordinary and compelling reason, the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors weighed against compassionate release. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.
“We typically review the denial of a motion for a discretionary sentence reduction for abuse of discretion.” United States v. Holloway, 956 F.3d 660, 664 (2d Cir. 2020). When a district court premises its decision “entirely on statutory interpretation,” we review de novo. Id. We review the denial of a motion for reconsideration for abuse of discretion. United States v. Moreno, 789 F.3d 72, 78 n.4 (2d Cir. 2015).
Under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), a district court may, “after considering the factors set forth in [18 U.S.C.] Section 3553(a),” reduce a prisoners term of imprisonment if the court finds “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A); United States v. Brooker, 976 F.3d 228, 235 (2d Cir. 2020). Those sentencing factors include, inter alia, “the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant,” and “the need for the sentence imposed ․ to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, [ ] to provide just punishment for the offense[,]” to deter criminal conduct, and to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (2). In Brooker, we made clear that, when a prisoner—rather than the Bureau of Prisons—moves for a sentence reduction, courts are free to consider “the full slate of extraordinary and compelling reasons,” and that “[n]either Application Note 1(D), nor anything else in the now-outdated version of Guideline § 1B1.13, limits the district courts discretion.” 976 F.3d at 237.
The District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Robinsons motion for a sentence reduction. It is true that, not having the benefit of our decision in Brooker when it ruled on Robinsons motion for reconsideration, the District Court erroneously permitted U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, note 1(D) to constrain its discretion in determining whether extraordinary and compelling reasons existed. Remand is nonetheless not warranted here, because the District Courts reasonable evaluation of the Section 3553(a) factors is an alternative and independent basis for denial of compassionate release. The District Courts Section 3553(a) inquiry focused on Robinsons underlying conduct, which “gravely endangered the community” by distributing highly addictive substances; his history of drug dealing spanning over 38 years; and his extensive criminal history, all of which, in the courts view, presented a “substantial danger to the community.” Govt Appx at 133. The court also determined that, because Robinson had served less than 30% of his sentence, release would not “reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, or provide just punishment for the offense.” Id. (quoting § 3553(a)(2)(A)). We find no abuse of discretion in this analysis.
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CONCLUSION
We have considered all Robinsons arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the August 13, 2020 order of the District Court.
FOOTNOTES
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. In a recent case, we came to a similar conclusion. See United States v. Butler, 845 F. Appx 74, 76-77 (2d Cir. 2021) (affirming a district courts “discretion to consider how much time an inmate has already served of his overall sentence when the court is weighing whether a release for extraordinary and compelling circumstances is consistent with the Section 3553(a) factors,” and ruling, based on the defendants four-decade-long criminal history that his service of less than 30% of his 92-month sentence did not provide sufficient deterrence or obviate the danger to the public).