SUMMARY ORDER
Plaintiff-appellant Russel Moody appeals the district courts judgment, entered June 18, 2020, dismissing his complaint against defendant-appellee Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (the “Commissioner”) challenging the Commissioners denial of his claims for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income. By memorandum decision and order also entered June 18, 2020, the district court denied Moodys motion for judgment on the pleadings and granted the Commissioners cross-motion for judgment on the pleadings. We assume the parties familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history of the case, and issues on appeal.
“In reviewing a district courts decision upholding a decision of the Commissioner, we review the administrative record de novo to determine whether there is substantial evidence supporting the Commissioners decision and whether the Commissioner applied the correct legal standard.” Zabala v. Astrue, 595 F.3d 402, 408 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Substantial evidence is evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Estrella v. Berryhill, 925 F.3d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Although we do not require that every conflict in a record be reconciled by the ALJ,” we do require “sufficient specificity to enable us to decide whether the determination is supported by substantial evidence.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Moody argues that “the ALJ failed to properly explain” his reasoning in weighing the medical evidence and his “conclusions are contradicted by opinion and evidence.” Appellants Br. at 24. Moody further argues that the ALJ failed to properly develop the record. For substantially the reasons articulated by the district court, we are unpersuaded.
First, the ALJ adequately explained the basis for his opinion, including the relative weight he assigned to the medical evidence. See Cichocki v. Astrue, 729 F.3d 172, 178 n.3 (2d Cir. 2013) (“An ALJ need not recite every piece of evidence that contributed to the decision, so long as the record permits us to glean the rationale of an ALJs decision.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). In fact, as the ALJ explained, he weighed some of the conflicting medical evidence in Moodys favor. See, e.g., Appx at 37 (finding that the state agency consultive examiner “understated [Moodys] limitations” and “accord[ing] this assessment limited weight.”). And, as the district court noted, the record contains sufficient support for the ALJs finding that Moody was capable of performing the full range of sedentary work. See, e.g., Dist. Ct. Dkt. 7 at 538 (Moody was “a well developed, well nourished patient who [wa]s awake, alert, and in no acute distress,” had a normal gait, and “move[d] quite well ․ getting up and down from [his] chair quite frequently”); id. at 349-356 (Moody reports that, even with his back pain, he is still able to lift weights, prepare meals, and perform non-repetitive household chores).
Second, we agree with the district court that the ALJ adequately developed the record. The ALJ provided Moodys counsel with additional time to supplement the record after the first hearing. Counsel provided the ALJ with additional documentation, and did not indicate during the second hearing that there were any outstanding documents. Further, while Moody argues that the ALJ erred in failing to identify the physician with the illegible signature, the ALJ nonetheless considered the unidentified physicians opinion in making his decision.
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We have considered Moodys remaining arguments and conclude that they are without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.