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UNITED STATES v. TINLIN (2021)

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.2021-12-15No. No. 20-2862

Summary

Holding. The judgment of the district court is affirmed. Iowa domestic abuse assault with intent to inflict serious injury constitutes a crime of violence under the career-offender guideline's force clause because the intent element necessarily requires at least a threatened use of physical force.

Michael Tinlin pleaded guilty to methamphetamine conspiracy and firearm possession in furtherance of drug trafficking. At sentencing, the district court classified him as a career offender based on two prior convictions for crimes of violence, resulting in an advisory guideline range of 322 to 387 months. The court imposed a 300-month sentence after varying downward from the range. Tinlin challenged whether one prior conviction—Iowa domestic abuse assault—qualified as a crime of violence under the career-offender guideline's force clause.

The appellate court examined whether domestic abuse assault with intent to inflict serious injury necessarily involves the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force. Relying on prior circuit precedent establishing that assault with intent to inflict serious injury inherently requires at least a threatened use of physical force, the court determined that adding a domestic relationship element between victim and offender does not eliminate this force requirement. The court concluded the prior conviction properly qualified as a crime of violence, making the career-offender designation correct.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

  • Whether domestic abuse assault with intent to inflict serious injury qualifies as a crime of violence under the force clause of the career-offender guideline
  • Whether the domestic relationship element of the offense affects the force requirement
  • Proper calculation of the advisory sentencing guideline range for a career offender

Procedural posture

Tinlin appealed his sentence following conviction and guilty plea in the district court, challenging the career-offender classification based on a prior domestic abuse assault conviction.

Authorities cited

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Opinion

Michael Tinlin pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine, see 21 U.S.C. § 846, and to possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). In determining an advisory sentencing range under the sentencing guidelines, the district court

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concluded that Tinlin qualified as a career offender based on two prior convictions for a crime of violence. See USSG § 4B1.1(a). The court thus determined an advisory range of 322 to 387 months’ imprisonment and then varied downward from the range to impose a sentence of 300 months. Tinlin argues that the court miscalculated the advisory guideline range because one of his prior convictions does not qualify as a crime of violence, and that he should not have been treated as a career offender. We conclude that there was no error, and therefore affirm.

The dispute concerns the offense of domestic abuse assault, in violation of Iowa Code §§ 708.1(1) and 708.2A(2)(c). Under the so-called “force clause” of the career-offender guideline, a conviction qualifies as a “crime of violence” if it is an “offense under federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year,” that “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.” USSG §§ 4B1.1(a), 4B1.2(a). The Iowa offense is punishable by more than a year in prison, and the elements require proof that an offender (1) committed an assault against a person with an enumerated domestic relationship to the offender, Iowa Code § 708.2A(1), and (2) did so with intent to inflict serious injury upon another, or used or displayed a dangerous weapon in connection with the assault. Id. § 708.2A(2)(c). The alternatives specified in the second element appear to be different means of committing a single offense. State v. Michael, Nos. 0-602, 99-1578, 2000 WL 1675715, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 8, 2000). Tinlin does not dispute that the Iowa offense would qualify as a crime of violence if the offender displayed a dangerous weapon in connection with the assault, see United States v. McGee, 890 F.3d 730, 735-37 (8th Cir. 2018), but he argues that domestic abuse assault with intent to inflict serious injury does not necessarily require the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.

The logic of our circuit precedent dictates that Iowa domestic abuse assault with intent to inflict serious injury is a crime of violence. In United States v. Quigley, 943 F.3d 390 (8th Cir. 2019), this court held that the Iowa offense of assault with intent to inflict serious injury under Iowa Code § 708.2(1) is a crime of violence under the force clause of the guideline. The offense at issue in Quigley required proof that the offender committed an assault, as defined in Iowa Code § 708.1, with the intent to inflict on another person a serious injury, as defined in Iowa Code § 702.18. We concluded that there is no realistic probability that an offender could be convicted of that offense, including the element of intent to inflict serious injury, without at least threatening to use physical force against another. 943 F.3d at 395.

Tinlins offense, domestic abuse assault with intent to inflict serious injury, likewise required an assault committed with intent to inflict serious injury. Iowa Code § 708.2A(1), (2)(c); R. Doc. 41-1, 41-2. The “domestic abuse” element of the offense requires proof that the victim had an enumerated domestic relationship to the offender, see Iowa Code § 236.2(2)(a)-(d), but it does not change the elements of assault or intent to inflict serious injury. Given the conclusion in Quigley that an assault with intent to inflict serious injury against any person necessarily requires at least a threatened use of physical force, it follows that the same assault offense committed against a person with a domestic relationship likewise requires at least a threatened use of physical force. Accordingly, we conclude that Tinlins offense is a crime of violence under the force clause, and the district court made no procedural error in calculating Tinlins guideline range.

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

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.   The Honorable Rebecca Goodgame Ebinger, United States District Judge for the Southern District of Iowa.

COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.