UNITED STATES v. GOODLOE (2021)

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.2021-07-16No. No. 20-2753

Summary · law.co

Holding. The appellate court affirmed the district court's 120-month sentence, finding no abuse of discretion in the judge's consideration and weighing of the sentencing factors or in the upward variance based on Goodloe's extensive criminal history.

Antonio Goodloe pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. The district court calculated his sentencing guidelines range at 77 to 96 months but imposed a 120-month sentence—the statutory maximum—based primarily on his extensive criminal history. Goodloe appealed, arguing the sentence was substantively unreasonable.

The appellate court rejected all of Goodloe's arguments. The court found that although Goodloe's guilty plea had already earned him a three-point reduction in his offense level for acceptance of responsibility, he had not requested additional weight for the resources saved by avoiding trial. The court also determined that the district judge had in fact considered all relevant sentencing factors under federal law, including potential sentencing disparity. Finally, the court held that even though Goodloe's criminal history was partially reflected in the guidelines calculation, the district court could permissibly give additional weight to his exceptionally high criminal history score of 23 points—nearly double the minimum needed for the highest criminal history category—as a basis for the upward variance.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether the district court failed to consider statutory sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
Whether criminal history already accounted for in the guidelines range can support an upward variance
Whether the district court abused its discretion by not giving greater weight to guilty plea and resources saved

Procedural posture

Goodloe appealed his 120-month sentence imposed after a guilty plea to felon in possession of a firearm, challenging it as substantively unreasonable.

Authorities cited

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Opinion · public domain

[Unpublished]

Antonio Goodloe pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). At sentencing, the district court

calculated Goodloes Guidelines range as 77 to 96 months’ imprisonment. Relying heavily on Goodloes extensive criminal history, the district court varied upward and imposed the maximum sentence allowed by law, a 120-month sentence. Goodloe appeals, arguing his sentence is substantively unreasonable.

The substantive reasonableness of a sentence imposed is reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007). In this Circuit, a district court abuses its discretion if it “fails to consider a relevant factor that should have received significant weight, gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor, or considers only the appropriate factors but commits a clear error of judgment in weighing those factors.” United States v. Leonard, 785 F.3d 303, 306–07 (8th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (citation omitted).

Goodloe asserts the district court did not consider all of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and failed to provide sufficient support for its 24-month upward variance. Goodloe argues the district court (1) should have considered the fact that he pled guilty and saved the government the time and expense of a trial; (2) failed to consider the sentencing disparity created by imposing a 120-month sentence; and (3) erred in relying on his criminal history, as his Guidelines range already accounted for it. Each of these arguments is without merit.

Goodloe never asked the district court to consider the government resources that were saved by his guilty plea. Even so, Goodloes Guidelines range reflected this resource saving in the form of a three-point reduction in his offense level for acceptance of responsibility. The district court did not abuse its discretion by failing to sua sponte give more weight to Goodloes acceptance of responsibility.

A close review of the record demonstrates that Goodloes claim that the district court failed to consider the § 3553(a) factors is likewise flawed. The sentencing record reflects the court considered the § 3553(a) factors, including sentencing disparity. The district court acted within its discretion when it chose to give greater weight to the § 3553(a) factors that it specifically noted were the basis for its upward variance: “the nature and circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, the need for the sentence imposed ․ to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law and to provide just punishment for the offense, to afford adequate deterrence to other criminal conduct and to protect the public from further crimes by the defendant.”

Finally, while Goodloe is correct that his Guidelines range took into account some of his criminal history, “factors that have already been taken into account in calculating the advisory Guidelines range can nevertheless form the basis of a variance.” United States v. David, 682 F.3d 1074, 1077 (8th Cir. 2012); see also United States v. Donahue, 959 F.3d 864, 867 (8th Cir. 2020) (district court may “determin[e] that the weight the Guidelines assigned to a particular factor was insufficient” (citation omitted)). Further, Goodloes Guidelines range did not actually account for the entirety of his criminal history. A minimum score of 13 criminal history points is required to place a defendant in criminal history category VI. Goodloe had 23 criminal history points, nearly twice the minimum required to be a category VI offender. The district court did not abuse its discretion in giving greater weight to this extensive criminal history.

Goodloes disagreement with the significant weight the district court gave his extensive criminal history as well as the risk his criminality posed to the community does not amount to an abuse of discretion. These are permissible sentencing factors that are within the wide latitude district courts are afforded when determining the appropriate sentence. Leonard, 785 F.3d at 307. We affirm the judgment of the district court.

FOOTNOTES

. The Honorable Brian S. Miller, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Arkansas.

. While Goodloe provides us with information regarding the average sentence in felon-in-possession cases, it is unhelpful, as it does not take into account defendants’ criminal history categories. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) (courts should seek “to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct”).

PER CURIAM.