MEMORANDUM **
ORDER
In Case No. 21-55059, Plaintiffs appeal the denial of a preliminary injunction ordering Defendants to return their property following the Los Angeles County Sheriffs Departments (“LASD”) seizure of various items during two protests in September 2020. In Case No. 21-70845, Plaintiffs petition for a writ of mandamus ordering the district court to disclose Defendants’ ex parte, in camera submission cited as the basis for that denial. Reviewing for abuse of discretion, Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 739 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc), we affirm the denial of the preliminary injunction.
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We grant the petition for a writ.
1. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a preliminary injunction because Plaintiffs failed to show irreparable harm from any delay in reclaiming their property. See Marlyn Nutraceuticals, Inc. v. Mucos Pharma GmbH & Co., 571 F.3d 873, 879 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that “[i]n general, mandatory injunctions ‘are not granted unless extreme or very serious damage will result and are not issued ․ where the injury complained of is capable of compensation in damages’ ” (citation omitted) (emphasis added)). Plaintiffs fail to meet that high burden because they do not claim that Defendants, in fact, deprived them of digital papers or effects that they could not otherwise access. See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 393–94, 134 S.Ct. 2473, 189 L.Ed.2d 430 (2014) (holding that cellphones allow people to “lug around every piece of mail they have received for the past several months, every picture they have taken, or every book or article they have read”). Plaintiffs’ claim that Californias procedures for the return of seized property violate due process is foreclosed. See Perkins v. City of W. Covina, 113 F.3d 1004, 1011 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that Californias procedures to litigate the return of seized property satisfy due process), revd on other grounds, 525 U.S. 234, 119 S.Ct. 678, 142 L.Ed.2d 636 (1999); see also Oziel v. Superior Ct., 223 Cal.App.3d 1284, 273 Cal. Rptr. 196, 201 (1990) (holding that “[t]he same rule applies to property seized without a warrant” as applies to property seized with a warrant).
2. We grant Plaintiffs’ petition for a writ of mandamus in Case No. 21-70845. The district court has two options. The court can reveal the information on which it relied in denying the preliminary injunction. See Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno, 70 F.3d 1045, 1069 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that it is “the firmly held main rule that a court may not dispose of the merits of a case on the basis of ex parte, in camera submissions” (quoting Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1061 (D.C. Cir. 1986))); Al Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. U.S. Dept of Treasury, 686 F.3d 965, 983 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that courts should consider the “practical reality” of disclosure on an investigation, not the governments “abstract concerns[,]” and that redactions may prove to be a compromise solution). Alternatively, the district court can make appropriate findings to justify its blanket non-disclosure order, as our case law would require. See Al Haramain Islamic Found., Inc., 686 F.3d at 980 (applying the balancing test from Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976)); United States v. Thompson, 827 F.2d 1254, 1258–59 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that “[a]bsent ․ compelling justification, ex parte proceedings are anathema in our system of justice”). The district court may wish to consider, for instance, Defendants’ concession at oral argument that Plaintiffs here likely are no longer suspects in an ongoing criminal investigation.
In Case No. 21-55059, AFFIRMED; in Case No. 21-70845, PETITION GRANTED.
FOOTNOTES
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. We deny Defendants’ motion to dismiss because the return of some of Plaintiffs’ property does not render this appeal moot.