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POLITE v. John, Defendant. (2021)

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.2021-09-23No. No. 20-55621

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Opinion

MEMORANDUM **

Rhonda Nanette Polite appeals pro se from the district courts judgment dismissing her action alleging a violation of Title VII and state law. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Colony Cove Props., LLC v. City of Carson, 640 F.3d 948, 955 (9th Cir. 2011). We may affirm on any basis supported by the record. Enlow v. Salem-Keizer Yellow Cab Co., 389 F.3d 802, 811 (9th Cir. 2004). We affirm.

Dismissal of Polites Title VII claim was correct because Polite failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (a plaintiff fails to show she is entitled to relief if the complaints factual allegations “do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct”); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973) (elements of a Title VII failure-to-hire employment discrimination claim).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Polites second amended complaint without leave to amend because amendment would have been futile. See Serra v. Lappin, 600 F.3d 1191, 1200 (9th Cir. 2010) (setting forth standard of review and factors for determining whether to grant leave to amend); Metzler Inv. GMBH v. Corinthian Colls., Inc., 540 F.3d 1049, 1072 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he district courts discretion to deny leave to amend is particularly broad where plaintiff has previously amended the complaint.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.