¶ 1 Defendant Demorris Van Cathcart, II, appeals from an order denying his motion for appropriate relief. After careful review, we affirm.
Background
¶ 2 On 18 September 2014, Defendant was arrested for engaging in a sexual act with a child under the age of 13. On 6 October 2014, a Mecklenburg County grand jury returned an indictment charging Defendant with statutory sexual offense with a child by an adult, in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-27.4A (2013).
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The indictment alleged that Defendant “did unlawfully, willfully, and feloniously engage in a sexual act with C.W., a child under the age of thirteen (13) years.”
¶ 3 Defendant was tried during the 19 February 2018 criminal session of Mecklenburg County Superior Court, the Honorable Gregory R. Hayes presiding. On 23 February 2018, the jury found Defendant guilty of the charged offense. That same day, Defendant gave oral notice of appeal. State v. Cathcart, 266 N.C. App. 402, 829 S.E.2d 698, 2019 N.C. App. LEXIS 612 at *5, 2019 WL 3183698 (2019) (unpublished). By an unpublished opinion filed 16 July 2019, this Court found no error in the judgment entered upon Defendants conviction. Id. at *12.
¶ 4 On 4 March 2020, Defendant filed a motion for appropriate relief, alleging that the indictment charging him with statutory sex offense with a child failed to impart the trial court with subject-matter jurisdiction. Specifically, Defendant argued that the State had failed to comply with the naming requirement of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15-144.2(b) (2019) when it alleged that Defendant committed statutory sex offense against “C.W.,” in that the minor victims initials were not sufficiently specific to identify the victim in accordance with the statute.
¶ 5 By order entered 12 May 2020, the trial court denied Defendants motion for appropriate relief. The trial court made the following pertinent conclusions of law:
2. There are no disputed facts and an evidentiary hearing is not required.
3. In State v. McKoy, 196 N.C. App. 650, 675 S.E.2d 406 (2009), the North Carolina Court of Appeals held that, in combination with other record evidence, a victims initials could satisfy the naming requirement under N.C.G.S. § 15-144.2(b).
4. The North Carolina Supreme Court has since held that an indictment referring to “Victim #1” does not satisfy the naming requirement, and facial validity is determined by evaluating only the allegations in the criminal pleading. State v. White, 372 N.C. 248, 827 S.E.2d 80 (2019).
5. Although the Supreme Court has restricted analysis of facial validity to the four corners of the charging document, the Court did not expressly overrule McKoy. Therefore, the ultimate holding in McKoy still stands.
6. The indictment in this case satisfies the naming requirement under N.C.G.S. § 15-144.2(b) and Defendants claim fails as a matter of law.
¶ 6 Defendant filed a petition for writ of certiorari with this Court on 1 July 2020, seeking review of the trial courts denial of his motion for appropriate relief. This Court allowed Defendants petition and issued the writ on 23 July 2020.
Analysis
¶ 7 Defendant contends that the trial court erred by concluding that the indictment was sufficient, pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15-144.2(b), to confer subject-matter jurisdiction upon the trial court. We affirm the trial courts denial of Defendants motion for appropriate relief.
I. Standard of Review
¶ 8 In reviewing a trial courts order on a motion for appropriate relief, we consider “whether the findings of fact are supported by evidence, whether the findings of fact support the conclusions of law, and whether the conclusions of law support the order entered by the trial court.” State v. Wilkerson, 232 N.C. App. 482, 488–89, 753 S.E.2d 829, 834 (2014) (citation omitted). We review the trial courts conclusions of law de novo. Id. at 489, 753 S.E.2d at 834.
II. Merits
¶ 9 Here, Defendant does not challenge any of the trial courts findings of fact; he only challenges the legal conclusion that the indictment was sufficient. Defendant argues that the indictment charging him with statutory sex offense was insufficient to impart subject-matter jurisdiction upon the trial court because it failed to “nam[e] the victim” in accordance with N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15-144.2(b). Defendant asserts that the Supreme Courts decision in State v. White, 372 N.C. 248, 827 S.E.2d 80 (2019), implicitly reversed State v. McKoy, 196 N.C. App. 650, 675 S.E.2d 406, appeal dismissed and disc. review denied, 363 N.C. 586, 683 S.E.2d 215 (2009). In McKoy, this Court held that an indictment charging a defendant with rape was not insufficient where the indictment identified the alleged victim by her initials. 196 N.C. App. at 658, 675 S.E.2d at 412. In White, our Supreme Court addressed but did not overturn McKoy in reaching its holding that an indictment alleging a sex offense against a minor identified as “Victim #1” failed to establish jurisdiction in the trial court. 372 N.C. at 252, 827 S.E.2d at 83.
¶ 10 Our Court recently addressed the issue of whether initials sufficiently identify a victim in State v. Pabon, --- N.C. App. ––––, 850 S.E.2d 512, disc. review allowed on other grounds, 376 N.C. 527, 851 S.E.2d 43 (2020). In Pabon, our Court considered White’s applicability and reasoned that “[t]here is nothing in White which overturned ‘the common sense understanding that initials represent a person.’ ” Id. at ––––, 850 S.E.2d at 529 (quoting McKoy, 196 N.C. App. at 654, 675 S.E.2d at 410). We then concluded that “[c]onsistent with McKoy, it is unnecessary to include the victims full name. Therefore, the use of the victims initials is proper.” Id.; accord State v. Sechrest, --- N.C. App. ––––, ––––, 2021-NCCOA-204, ¶ 15.
¶ 11 Consequently, we must conclude that the trial court did not err in concluding that the indictment was sufficient where it alleged the commission of a statutory sex offense against “C.W.”
¶ 12 Defendant requests that we hold that White implicitly overruled McKoy, and that Pabon does not adequately address White’s effect on our precedents. However, we are bound by our Courts decision in Pabon unless and until a higher court overturns it. In re Civil Penalty, 324 N.C. 373, 384, 379 S.E.2d 30, 37 (1989) (“Where a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided the same issue, albeit in a different case, a subsequent panel of the same court is bound by that precedent, unless it has been overturned by a higher court.”). We therefore affirm the denial of Defendants motion for appropriate relief.
Conclusion
¶ 13 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not err in denying Defendants motion for appropriate relief.
AFFIRMED.
Report per Rule 30(e).
FOOTNOTES
1
. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-27.4A has been recodified as N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-27.28. See 2015 N.C. Sess. Laws 460, 462, ch. 181, § 10.(a) (effective 1 December 2015 and applicable to offenses committed on or after that date).
ZACHARY, Judge.
Judges MURPHY and CARPENTER concur.