In these consolidated appeals, David Meyers has filed interlocutory appeals from the district courts nonfinal order. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeals for lack of jurisdiction.
Before considering an appeal, we must ensure we have jurisdiction. See Clark v. Cartledge, 829 F.3d 303, 305 (4th Cir. 2016) (recognizing our obligation to consider questions of jurisdiction sua sponte). We may exercise jurisdiction only over final decisions, 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and certain interlocutory and collateral orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1292; Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545-47, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949). “Generally, a district court order is not final until it has resolved all claims as to all parties.” Hunter v. Town of Mocksville, 789 F.3d 389, 402 (4th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, Meyers appeals the district courts order dismissing without prejudice all of Meyers’ motions in these two cases except for his motions for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Because the court has yet to resolve all the claims and no exception applies, we lack jurisdiction.
Accordingly, we dismiss these appeals for lack of jurisdiction. We deny as moot Meyers’ motions for leave to proceed without prepayment of fees under the Prison Litigation Reform Act. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
DISMISSED
PER CURIAM:
Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.