Tyrone Henderson appeals from the district courts order denying his motion for a reduction in his sentence under Section 404 of the First Step Act of 2018 (“the Act”), Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194. Henderson first asserts that the district court erroneously determined it was inappropriate to depart or vary from Hendersons Sentencing Guidelines range because of the nature of the proceeding. Henderson next asserts that the district court erred by failing to sufficiently explain why his post-sentencing rehabilitation efforts did not offset the nature of Hendersons offense and criminal history. We vacate and remand.
We review a district courts decision whether to grant a sentence reduction under the Act for an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Jackson, 952 F.3d 492, 497 (4th Cir. 2020) (reviewing ruling on a motion under the Act for abuse of discretion but declining to decide the parameters of such review). And while we have acknowledged that “there is little case law addressing appropriate procedures for a court to follow when considering sentence modifications under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(B),” United States v. Venable, 943 F.3d 187, 194 n.11 (4th Cir. 2019), it is generally recognized that a sentence modification is “not a plenary resentencing proceeding,” Chavez-Meza v. United States, ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S. Ct. 1959, 1965, 201 L.Ed.2d 359 (2018) (internal quotation marks omitted) (addressing 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2)); see Venable, 943 F.3d at 194 n.11 (characterizing a sentence reduction under the Act as a “sentence modification[ ]”).
Despite the foregoing, we recently held in United States v. Chambers, 956 F.3d 667, 674 (4th Cir. 2020), that, “when imposing a new sentence” under the Act, “a court does not simply adjust the statutory minimum” and “must also recalculate the Guidelines range.” Id. at 672 (internal quotation marks omitted). We also held that “the § 3553(a) sentencing factors apply in the § 404(b) resentencing context.” Id. at 674.
When explaining its decision whether to modify a sentence, the district court must “set forth enough to satisfy the appellate court that [it] has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising [its] own legal decisionmaking authority.” Chavez-Meza, 138 S. Ct. at 1964 (internal quotation marks omitted). As the Supreme Court has made clear, however, it will not “read the statute (or our precedent) as insisting upon a full opinion in every case.” Id. (citation omitted). Rather, “[t]he appropriateness of brevity or length, conciseness or detail, when to write, what to say, depends upon circumstances” and “[t]he law leaves much, in this respect, to the judges own professional judgment.” Id. (citation omitted).
Indeed, we presume that a district court adequately considered the relevant sentencing factors in a resentencing proceeding under the Act, even though such a presumption will be overcome if the district court fails to acknowledge mitigating factors that were not present at the original sentencing. United States v. McDonald, 986 F.3d 402, 412 (4th Cir. 2021). Thus, where a prisoner, despite a lengthy prison term, “utilize[s] the resources and programming they could access in prison to work toward rehabilitation, ․ that ․ is enough to require a district court to provide an explanation on the record of its reasons for deciding a sentencing reduction motion.” Id.
Addressing Hendersons assignments of error in reverse order, we conclude that, unlike in McDonald, the district court sufficiently addressed Hendersons post-sentencing mitigation evidence. As it is apparent that the district court considered Hendersons arguments and mitigation efforts but chose to exercise its decisionmaking authority to deny Hendersons motion, we discern no reversible error stemming from the district courts rationale for denying Hendersons motion. Accord McDonald, 986 F.3d at 412 (vacating courts decision denying motion for sentence reduction because “[i]t is not at all clear that the district court considered or gave any weight to Appellants’ post-sentencing conduct” (emphasis added)).
We nonetheless find merit to Hendersons argument regarding the district courts perceived inability to depart or vary from Hendersons Guidelines range. In opposing Hendersons motion, the Government asserted that Henderson was attempting to reopen his sentencing hearing by arguing for a downward variance from his Guidelines range, which the Government contended is unauthorized by the Act and § 3582. (J.A. 203).
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And in its opinion denying Hendersons motion—immediately after recognizing that Henderson was asking for “a sentence of time served, arguing that a variance under the sentencing procedures is an appropriate way to achieve that result,” (J.A. 210-11)—the district court indicated that it:
Conclude[d] that modification of sentence under Section 404 (b) of the First Step Act is not a resentencing and that it is not appropriate the modification within the framework of the guidelines (such as departures or variances) because this is not a resentencing but, instead, is a modification or reduction of sentence.
(J.A. 211). While the import of the district courts holding is somewhat unclear, because the court immediately differentiated between its authority to modify a sentence, versus conducting a full resentencing, after reciting Hendersons argument for a variant sentence, it appears that the court accepted the Governments argument and found itself unable to vary or depart from Hendersons Guidelines range.
As we expressly held in Chambers, however, “the resentencing court has discretion within the § 404(b) framework to vary from the Guidelines and, in doing so, to consider movants’ post-sentencing conduct.” 956 F.3d at 674. And here, although the district court erroneously believed it could not vary or depart from Hendersons Guidelines range,
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the court did go on to consider Hendersons arguments and evidence in support of a sentence reduction. As it is not entirely clear from the courts decision whether it deemed the perceived restriction as dispositive of or influential in its decision to deny Hendersons motion, or whether the court would have denied Hendersons motion based on his criminal history and conduct even if it knew it had authority to vary or depart from Hendersons Guidelines range, we remand the matter to the district court for it to consider Hendersons motion in light of this courts decision in Chambers.
Accordingly, we vacate the district courts order denying Hendersons motion for a sentence reduction under the Act and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We express no opinion as to the outcome of the district courts decision on remand. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
VACATED AND REMANDED
FOOTNOTES
1
. Citations to the “J.A.” refer to the contents of the joint appendix filed by the parties in this appeal.
2
. Our decision in Chambers issued on April 23, 2020, more than four months after the district court denied Hendersons motion for sentence reduction.
PER CURIAM:
Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.