MEMORANDUM **
Jerry Brown, a California state prisoner, appeals the district courts denial of his pro se habeas corpus 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition. He challenges a conviction on multiple counts of sex-related offenses, contending that the state trial courts questioning of Brown and his wife violated Browns due process right to a fair trial under the Fourteenth Amendment.
1. The California Court of Appeal applied Californias contemporaneous objection rule, holding that Browns failure to object to the trial courts questioning waived this issue for appeal, and rejecting Browns argument that any objection would have been futile. Its determination was reasonable. The district court held that Browns claim was, therefore, procedurally defaulted under California law and that this constituted an adequate and independent ground for rejecting Browns petition. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991); Murray v. Schriro, 745 F.3d 984, 1015 (9th Cir. 2014).
2. The district court also correctly ruled that, even if the claim were not procedurally defaulted, Brown could not show that the state courts rejection of his judicial misconduct claim “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S. 34, 38, 132 S.Ct. 38, 181 L.Ed.2d 336 (2011). In determining whether there was a denial of due process, the courts do not look only to whether the trial court committed misconduct, but to whether the courts actions “rendered the trial so fundamentally unfair as to violate federal due process under the United States Constitution.” Duckett v. Godinez, 67 F.3d 734, 740 (9th Cir. 1995). The state court held that the trial courts questions did not violate that standard because the courts questions were chiefly for the purpose of clarification, and the judge did not assume the jurys role by determining the credibility of the witnesses.
The state courts holding was not in violation of clearly established law. Brown relies principally on Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466, 53 S.Ct. 698, 77 L.Ed. 1321 (1933) to argue that the trial judges conduct amounted to a violation of his due process rights. There the trial judge took over the jurys role by assessing the credibility of the defendant for the jury and telling the jury that the defendant was likely lying. Id. at 472, 53 S.Ct. 698. The Supreme Court held that the judges characterization of the defendant “was of a sort most likely to remain firmly lodged in the memory of the jury and to excite a prejudice which would preclude a fair and dispassionate consideration of the evidence.” Id. at 472, 53 S.Ct. 698. This is not such a case. The state appellate courts ruling concerning the trial judges conduct in this case did not violate clearly established law.
AFFIRMED.