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BRADFORD v. VOONG (2021)

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.2021-09-20No. No. 20-55216

Summary

Holding. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of Bradford's § 1983 action.

Raymond Alford Bradford, a California state prisoner, appealed the dismissal of his civil rights lawsuit filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Bradford argued that because the district court had found he satisfied the "imminent danger" exception—which permits certain poor litigants to proceed without paying filing fees—his case should not have been dismissed. However, the appellate court clarified that meeting this threshold procedural requirement says nothing about whether the underlying claims have legal merit. The court rejected Bradford's allegations that the district judge improperly encouraged defendants to file dismissal motions or screened his complaints in bad faith.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

  • Whether satisfying the 'imminent danger' exception under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) indicates case merit
  • Whether the district court improperly encouraged defendants to file motions to dismiss
  • Whether the district court improperly screened complaints

Procedural posture

Bradford appealed pro se from a district court judgment dismissing his federal civil rights action.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion

MEMORANDUM **

California state prisoner Raymond Alford Bradford appeals pro se from the district courts judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging various federal and state law claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm.

Contrary to Bradfords contention, the determination that Bradford has satisfied the “imminent danger” exception under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) does not imply that the action itself has merit. See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1055 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting that “§ 1915(g) concerns only a threshold procedural question—whether a filing fee must be paid upfront or later” and that “§ 1915(g) is not a vehicle for determining the merits of a claim” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

We reject as unsupported by the record Bradfords contentions that the district court encouraged defendants to file motions to dismiss and improperly screened his complaints.

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

All pending motions and requests are denied.

AFFIRMED.