CORRALES NAVARRO v. GARLAND (2021)

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.2021-07-01No. No. 19-70467

Summary · law.co

Holding. The petition for review was granted and the case was remanded to the immigration agency because the Arizona hindering prosecution statute, as an accessory-after-the-fact offense, does not categorically match the generic federal obstruction of justice crime and cannot support an aggravated felony removal charge.

Jose Luis Corrales-Navarro, a Mexican citizen, challenged a removal order based on a conviction for hindering prosecution under Arizona law. The government argued this conviction qualified as an aggravated felony involving obstruction of justice. However, the court determined that the Arizona statute criminalizes being an accessory after the fact under state common law, which does not require an ongoing proceeding to constitute the offense.

Because the accessory-after-the-fact statute is broader than the federal obstruction-of-justice category—which requires interference with pending or ongoing proceedings—the state conviction cannot be categorically matched to the federal aggravated felony definition. The court therefore found the sole basis for removal legally insufficient.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether conviction under Arizona hindering prosecution statute constitutes aggravated felony
Categorical match between state accessory-after-the-fact statute and federal obstruction of justice
Whether obstruction offense requires ongoing or pending proceeding

Procedural posture

Corrales-Navarro petitioned the Ninth Circuit for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals' dismissal of his appeal from an immigration judge's removal order.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

MEMORANDUM **

Jose Luis Corrales-Navarro, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal from an immigration judges decision finding him removable. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. Whether a crime is as an aggravated felony is a question of law subject to de novo review. Jauregui-Cardenas v. Barr, 946 F.3d 1116, 1118 (9th Cir. 2020). We grant the petition for review and remand.

Corrales-Navarro was charged with removability based on his conviction for hindering prosecution under Arizona Revised Statutes (“ARS”) § 13-2512. The agency sustained the charge of having been convicted of an aggravated felony offense relating to obstruction of justice. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(S). However, ARS § 13-2512 is the “statutory embodiment” of the common-law offense of being an accessory after the fact and does not require an ongoing proceeding, see State v. Johnson, 215 Ariz. 28, 156 P.3d 445, 451 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007) (ARS § 13-2512 is “the statutory embodiment of the distinct, independent, common-law offense of being an accessory after the fact.” (internal quotation marks omitted)), and as a result the sole charge of removability against Corrales-Navarro cannot be sustained, see Valenzuela Gallardo v. Barr, 968 F.3d 1053, 1069 (9th Cir. 2020) (holding California Penal Code § 32, accessory after the fact, is not a categorical match to the generic offense of obstruction of justice because it “encompasses interference with proceedings or investigations that are not pending or ongoing.”).

We remand to the agency for further proceedings consistent with this order. See Andia v. Ashcroft, 359 F.3d 1181, 1184 (9th Cir. 2004) (“In reviewing the decision of the BIA, we consider only the grounds relied upon by that agency. If we conclude that the BIAs decision cannot be sustained upon its reasoning, we must remand to allow the agency to decide any issues remaining in the case.”).

Corrales-Navarros motion to proceed in forma pauperis is granted.

The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.

PETITION FOR REVIEW GRANTED; REMANDED.