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BLEDSOE v. GUILIANI (2021)

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.2021-06-29No. No. 20-16650

Summary

Holding. The appellate court affirmed the district court's dismissal of Bledsoe's action because he failed to allege sufficient facts to state a plausible claim for relief, and affirmed the denial of leave to amend because amendment would be futile.

Donnell Bledsoe, proceeding without an attorney, appealed a district court decision that dismissed his lawsuit containing federal claims. The appellate court reviewed the dismissal without deference to the district court's decision and found that Bledsoe's complaint failed to present sufficient factual allegations to support any valid legal claim, even when interpreted generously as required for pro se litigants.

The court also upheld the district court's refusal to allow Bledsoe to revise his complaint, concluding that any amendment would be pointless given the fundamental weakness of his underlying claims. The opinion noted that certain defendants—including public defenders acting in their traditional counseling role, judges performing judicial functions, and prosecutors—enjoy legal immunity from the type of damages claims Bledsoe appeared to be pursuing.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

  • Whether complaint states a plausible claim despite pro se status
  • Whether denial of leave to amend was proper based on futility
  • Immunity doctrines applicable to public defenders, judges, and prosecutors

Procedural posture

Bledsoe appealed pro se from a district court judgment dismissing his federal claims action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion

MEMORANDUM **

Donnell Bledsoe appeals pro se from the district courts judgment dismissing his action alleging federal claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (order). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Bledsoes action because Bledsoe failed to state any plausible claim. See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings are construed liberally, plaintiff must present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying leave to amend because amendment would be futile. See Gordon v. City of Oakland, 627 F.3d 1092, 1094 (9th Cir. 2010) (setting forth standard of review and stating leave may be denied if amendment would be futile); see also Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325, 102 S.Ct. 445, 70 L.Ed.2d 509 (1981) (public defender does not act under color of state law when performing a lawyers traditional functions as counsel in a criminal proceeding); Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1075-76 (9th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (judges are immune from damage actions for judicial acts taken within the jurisdiction of their courts; prosecutors are entitled to immunity from § 1983 claims).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

Bledsoes request for appointment of counsel, set forth in the opening brief, is denied.

AFFIRMED.