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EZOR v. DUFFY LEWIS 10 (2021)

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.2021-08-25No. No. 20-55706

Summary

Holding. The district court's order dismissing Ezor's § 1983 action was affirmed.

Arthur Edward Ezor filed a civil rights lawsuit under federal law against a judge who presided over his state court case. The district court dismissed the action, and Ezor appealed on his own behalf. The appellate court examined whether the dismissal was proper and whether Ezor should have been allowed to revise his complaint or have the judges removed from the case. The court found no errors in the district court's decision.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

  • Whether judicial immunity and Eleventh Amendment immunity barred Ezor's claims against the state judge
  • Whether amendment to the complaint would have been futile
  • Whether the judges should have been recused based on questions about their impartiality

Procedural posture

Ezor appealed pro se from a district court order dismissing his civil rights action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion

MEMORANDUM **

Arthur Edward Ezor appeals pro se from the district courts order dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against the judge presiding over his California state court action. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341 (9th Cir. 2010). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Ezors action on the basis of Eleventh Amendment and judicial immunity. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12, 112 S.Ct. 286, 116 L.Ed.2d 9 (1991) (discussing judicial immunity and its limited exceptions); Assn des Eleveurs de Canards et dOies du Quebec v. Harris, 729 F.3d 937, 943 (9th Cir. 2013) (discussing Eleventh Amendment immunity).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Ezors complaint without leave to amend because amendment would have been futile. See Chappel v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 232 F.3d 719, 725-26 (9th Cir. 2000) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that dismissal without leave to amend is proper when amendment would be futile).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Ezors motion to recuse District Judge Selna and Magistrate Judge Rosenberg because Ezor failed to demonstrate that a reasonable person would believe that either judges’ impartiality could be questioned. See United States v. Hernandez, 109 F.3d 1450, 1453-54 (9th Cir. 1997) (setting forth standard of review and discussing standard for recusal under 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 and 455).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.