UZIEL v. F47 (2021)

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.2021-08-23No. No. 20-55554

Summary · law.co

Holding. The court of appeals affirmed the district court's dismissal of Uziel's action as barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, failure to state a claim, Eleventh Amendment immunity, and judicial immunity.

Yehoram Uziel, representing himself, appealed a federal district court's dismissal of his lawsuit against various participants in a prior state court action, including opposing parties, attorneys, judges, and court officials. Uziel alleged violations of federal civil rights statutes and sought damages. The court of appeals upheld the dismissal on multiple independent grounds, each of which independently barred his claims.

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevented the federal court from hearing Uziel's case because his claims directly attacked the state court judgment and sought relief that would effectively overturn it. Additionally, Uziel failed to adequately plead the elements required by the federal statutes he invoked: his conspiracy claims lacked an allegation that defendants targeted him based on membership in a protected class, and two of the statutes he cited do not create private rights of action for damages. Claims against the state court and the judge in his official capacity were barred by Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity, and damages claims against the judge personally were barred by judicial immunity.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to federal challenges of state court judgments
Whether claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2) and (3) were adequately pleaded
Whether statutes 28 U.S.C. § 1343 and 18 U.S.C. § 242 provide private rights of action
Eleventh Amendment immunity for state courts and judges in official capacity
Judicial immunity from damages claims

Procedural posture

Uziel appealed the federal district court's dismissal of his civil action challenging the validity of a prior state court proceeding and seeking damages from multiple defendants.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

MEMORANDUM **

Yehoram Uziel, proceeding pro se, appeals the district courts judgment dismissing his action alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2) and (3), 28 U.S.C. § 1343, and 18 U.S.C. § 242 by the litigants, attorneys, trial court, judge, and other parties involved in his previous state-court action. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the district courts dismissal based on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 949 (9th Cir. 2004), for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), Simmons v. Sacramento Cnty. Superior Ct., 318 F.3d 1156, 1158 (9th Cir. 2003), as barred by the Eleventh Amendment, Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. v. Civish, 382 F.3d 969, 973 (9th Cir. 2004), and based on judicial immunity, Crooks v. Maynard, 913 F.2d 699, 700 (9th Cir. 1990). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Uziels action as barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because his claims directly challenge the state-court judgment and are “inextricably intertwined” with it. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005) (“The Rooker-Feldman doctrine․ [prohibits] cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.”); Cooper v. Ramos, 704 F.3d 772, 779 (9th Cir. 2012) (Rooker-Feldman also bars issues that are “inextricably intertwined” with the state-court judgment; an issue is “inextricably intertwined” if “ ‘the relief requested in the federal action would effectively reverse the state court decision or void its ruling’ ” (citation omitted)).

The district court properly dismissed Uziels action on the additional ground that he failed to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2) and (3) because he did not allege that defendants conspired to deny him equal protection of the law based on his membership in a protected class, and under 28 U.S.C. § 1343 and 18 U.S.C. § 242 because neither statute provides a private right of action. See Allen v. Gold Country Casino, 464 F.3d 1044, 1048 (9th Cir. 2006) (18 U.S.C. § 242 is a “criminal statute[ ] that do[es] not give rise to civil liability” and 28 U.S.C. § 1343 is a “jurisdictional statute [that] does not provide a cause of action”); Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1029-30 (9th Cir. 1985) (explaining requirements of a claim under § 1985(2) and (3)).

The district court properly dismissed the claims against the Los Angeles County Superior Court and Judge Sandvig in his official capacity as barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Greater L.A. Council on Deafness, Inc. v. Zolin, 812 F.2d 1103, 1110 (9th Cir. 1987) (“[A] suit against the [Los Angeles County] Superior Court is a suit against the State, barred by the eleventh amendment.”); Simmons, 318 F.3d at 1161 (Eleventh Amendment immunity extends to superior court employees).

The district court properly dismissed the damages claims against Judge Sandvig on the basis of judicial immunity. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9, 11-12, 112 S.Ct. 286, 116 L.Ed.2d 9 (1991) (per curiam) (judges are absolutely immune from suits for damages based on their judicial conduct, except for “actions not taken in the judges judicial capacity” or when acting in the complete absence of jurisdiction).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Uziels motions to recuse both the magistrate and district court judges. See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555, 114 S.Ct. 1147, 127 L.Ed.2d 474 (1994) (“judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion”); Glick v. Edwards, 803 F.3d 505, 508 (9th Cir. 2015) (standard of review).

We decline to consider matters not specifically raised and argued in the opening brief, including the district courts decision granting defendants’ motion for sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).

AFFIRMED.