OPINION *
Donte Lawrence appeals the District Courts denial of his writ of habeas corpus petition. He argues that trial counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance by failing to object to the Commonwealths characterization of him as a “cold-blooded murderer” during its opening statement. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the District Court.
1
I.
To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Lawrence must show that trial counsels performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that trial counsels errors prejudiced his defense.
2
In determining whether trial counsels performance was deficient, we must be “highly deferential” and “indulge a strong presumption that counsels conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.”
3
Here, trial counsels choice to withhold objection is entitled to double deference under Strickland v. Washington and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act.
4
Accordingly, counsel is “strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.”
5
Even if we were to find that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance, we would then have to determine that the state courts contrary holding was unreasonable under the Supreme Courts decision in Harrington v. Richter, wherein the Court explained that “[a] state courts determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fair-minded jurists could disagree’ on the correctness of the state courts decision.”
6
During the Post-Conviction Relief Act hearing, trial counsel explained that he did not believe the comment would warrant a mistrial and did not want to further highlight the Commonwealths characterization of his client.
7
That was certainly a reasonable strategy. However, even if we concluded it was an unreasonable dereliction of the standard of professionalism owed Lawrence, the double deference that Richter requires would still preclude our holding that the state courts contrary conclusion was unreasonable.
Nevertheless, before concluding, we emphasize that the fact that we must affirm the District Courts denial of Lawrences habeas petition in no way suggests that the prosecutors opening statement here was appropriate or proper. On the contrary, the prosecutors opening was the kind of argument that should be reserved for summation, where such argument is allowed so long as it is based on the trial record. Given the zeal of the Commonwealths opening statement here, it is apparently necessary for us to remind counsel of a fundamental principle of trial advocacy: “[t]he purpose of an opening [statement] is to give the broad outlines of the case to enable the jury to comprehend it. It is not to poison the jurys mind against the defendant․” 8
Neither the emotion of the courtroom nor adversarial zeal should blind attorneys to the fact that “[a]n opening statement has a narrow purpose and scope. It is to state what evidence will be presented, to make it easier for the jurors to understand what is to follow, and to relate parts of the evidence and testimony to the whole; is not an occasion for argument.”
9
Nevertheless, a habeas petitioner must establish more than an ill-advised or unprofessional opening statement by a prosecutor to establish relief under Strickland. For the reasons we have explained, any professional transgression here is simply not sufficient to establish that Lawrence is entitled to relief.
II.
Thus, we will affirm the District Courts denial of Lawrences petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
FOOTNOTES
1
. The District Court had jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 2253. Because the District Court ruled on the habeas petition without holding an evidentiary hearing, our review of its decision is plenary. Dellavecchia v. Secy Pa. Dept of Corr., 819 F.3d 682, 691 (3d Cir. 2016).
2
. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).
3
. Id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052.
4
. See, e.g., Premo v. Moore, 562 U.S. 115, 121-23, 131 S.Ct. 733, 178 L.Ed.2d 649 (2011).
5
. Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12, 22, 134 S.Ct. 10, 187 L.Ed.2d 348 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052).
6
. 562 U.S. 86, 101, 131 S.Ct. 770, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011) (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664, 124 S.Ct. 2140, 158 L.Ed.2d 938 (2004)).
7
. App. at 127.
8
. United States v. DeRosa, 548 F.2d 464, 470 (3rd Cir. 1977) (emphasis added) (quoting Govt of Virgin Islands v. Turner, 409 F.2d 102, 103 (3rd Cir. 1968)).
9
. Id. at 471 (quoting United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 612, 96 S.Ct. 1075, 47 L.Ed.2d 267 (1976) (Burger C.J., concurring)).
McKEE, Circuit Judge.