MEMORANDUM **
Petitioner Anthony Haube (Haube) appeals the district courts denial of his habeas petition asserting that the state trial judge coerced a jurors consent to the guilty verdict. On habeas review, we may grant relief only if the state court decision was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. See Parker v. Small, 665 F.3d 1143, 1147 (9th Cir. 2011) (per curiam). Federal law is comprised of holdings of the United States Supreme Court. See id.
“Clearly established federal law provides that any criminal defendant being tried by a jury is entitled to the uncoerced verdict of that body․” Id. (quoting Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 241, 108 S.Ct. 546, 98 L.Ed.2d 568 (1988)) (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). However, the Alaska Court of Appeals’ conclusion that the trial judges post-verdict questioning did not coerce Juror Bs vote was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of Lowenfield. See Haube v. State, No. A-10047, 2010 WL 2871078 at *4-6 (Alaska Ct. App. Jul. 21, 2010). Polling the jury is a permissible method of ensuring unanimity. See United States v. McCaleb, 552 F.3d 1053, 1058 (9th Cir. 2009) (discussing Jenkins v. United States, 380 U.S. 445, 85 S.Ct. 1059, 13 L.Ed.2d 957 (1965)); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 31(d). Where, as here, an issue is raised regarding a jurors vote, the trial judge may permissibly clarify that vote. See McCaleb, 552 F.3d at 1058.
There is a distinction between obtaining clarity and coercion. See id. (distinguishing Jenkins). Importantly, the record reflects that Juror B never disavowed the guilty verdict or her vote in favor of that verdict. Rather, Juror B consistently expressed that she would have been more comfortable with the verdict if Haube had clarified “what he was doing” during the relevant time period. The trial judge carefully explained that Haubes decision not to testify could not be used against him, and Juror B never stated that she voted to convict Haube due to his failure to testify.
Haube has not identified any Supreme Court case holding that a trial courts clarification of uncertainty in a jury verdict constitutes coercion. See Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 122, 129 S.Ct. 1411, 173 L.Ed.2d 251 (2009) (“[T]his Court has held on numerous occasions that it is not an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law for a state court to decline to apply a specific legal rule that has not been squarely established by this Court․”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Haube also failed to demonstrate that the Alaska Court of Appeals made an unreasonable factual determination. Haube contends that the trial judge neglected to consider the “context” of Juror Bs response. However, that more than one interpretation of the record exists does not render the interpretation adopted by the state unreasonable. See Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290, 301, 130 S.Ct. 841, 175 L.Ed.2d 738 (2010).
PETITION DENIED.