MEMORANDUM **
Luther D. Maners III appeals the district courts judgment affirming the denial of supplemental security income and disability insurance benefits by the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we review de novo the district courts decision and “independently determine whether the Commissioners decision (1) is free of legal error and (2) is supported by substantial evidence.” Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996). We affirm.
1. Maners argues that the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) did not provide sufficient reasons to reject the opinions of Dr. Gritzka, Dr. Heilbrunn, Dr. Fredericks, and Dr. Tan. We disagree. We have held that it is not error for an ALJ to give minimal evidentiary weight to a treating physicians opinion that is “unsupported by the record as a whole ․ or by objective medical findings.” Batson v. Commr of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 2004).
One reason the ALJ afforded Dr. Gritzkas opinion “little to no weight,” was because the opinion conflicted with Manerss overall medical record. Specifically, Dr. Gritzkas conclusion that Maners was unable to sustain work because of the severity of his cervical spine condition, neck discomfort, and upper extremity limitations conflicted with Manerss treating neurosurgeons follow-up analysis that Manerss MRI “looked good” as well as Manerss own reporting that he was “doing great,” even though he had some neck stiffness after his second fusion surgery. And several weeks after the surgery, Maners showed grossly intact (“4+/5”) bilateral upper extremity strength, intact sensation to light touch in the bilateral upper extremities, and normal gait. In addition, Manerss medical record shows that he was discharged from physical therapy in April 2012—only nine months after his second surgery—after meeting all the goals and outcomes of that treatment. Thus, the ALJs decision to discount this opinion was supported by substantial evidence in the medical record, and the ALJ did not commit clear error in resolving the conflict between Dr. Gritzkas opinion and the medical record.
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With respect to Dr. Heilbrunns opinion, the ALJ concluded, in part, that “the longitudinal evidence suggests fewer restrictions.” Dr. Heilbrunns physical examination in March 2015 indicated that Manerss upper extremity strength was limited bilaterally on a 3/5 scale. But the record demonstrates that after Manerss August 2011 fusion surgery, his bilateral upper extremity strength was about 4+/5, and by November 2011, it was at 5/5. The record also shows that Manerss upper extremity strength did not diminish, given that Adam Burkey, one of his treating doctors, also recorded bilateral strength at 5/5 in July 2015. Therefore, the ALJ did not err in affording Dr. Heilbrunns opinion little to no weight.
The ALJ concluded that Dr. Frederickss opinion “did not contain a completed evaluation with objective findings to substantiate the limitations in the opinion” and was “not consistent with the overall medical evidence.” Dr. Fredericks opined that Maners “was limited to sedentary tasks with marked limitations in standing, walking, lifting, handling, and carrying.” But Dr. Fredericks only found neck pain to an unspecified degree. He made no other clinical findings, and the medical evidence, as a whole, did not support his opinion. Because an ALJ need not accept a medical opinion that is “conclusory, brief, and unsupported by the record,” Batson, 359 F.3d at 1195, the ALJ did not err in affording no credit to Dr. Frederickss opinion and relying instead on the longitudinal evidence in Manerss medical record.
Finally, because the basis of Dr. Tans opinion was the “Orthopedic Evaluation by Thomas Gritzka, MD dated 7/03/12,” and because the ALJ properly discounted Dr. Gritzkas opinion, it was appropriate for the ALJ to discount Dr. Tans opinion. To the extent Dr. Tans opinion was based on his independent assessment of Maners, we find no error in the ALJs rejection of his opinion because Dr. Tan “failed to provide sufficient rationale for his opinion.”
2. Maners argues that the ALJ erred because he did not provide sufficient reasons to reject Manerss claim “that he could not get comfortable at night and slept only [4.5] hours, leading to daytime fatigue and sleepiness.” Citing Laborin v. Berryhill, 867 F.3d 1151, 1155 (9th Cir. 2017), Maners contends that it was necessary for the ALJ to point to specific contradictory evidence regarding the sleep disruption and fatigue testimony. This argument is unavailing. First, the objective medical evidence does not support that Manerss alleged sleep impairments related to Manerss spine and neck injuries. In addition, Manerss records in 2010 state that he said he slept poorly as a result of financial concerns.
Second, the ALJ properly discounted Manerss allegations because of the inconsistency in his own statements as well as inconsistencies between his statements and objective medical evidence. Cf. Light v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 119 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 1997) (“An ALJs finding that a claimant generally lacked credibility is a permissible basis to reject excess pain testimony.”). As one example, Maners informed the agency that he could not perform household chores and needed help with various aspects of self-care, but informed his treating doctors that his functional activity level was 8/10 and that his medication provided 80% pain relief and improved his ability to perform household chores. And an examining psychologist noted in 2014 that Maners described his typical day as including yard work and use of an exercise bike, and that his hobbies included gold prospecting. The psychologist also concluded that, based on Manerss reporting, “[h]e doesnt seem to need assistance with self-care.” The ALJ did not err in discrediting Manerss testimony because of his general lack of credibility and because his testimony conflicted with the objective evidence.
3. Maners contends that the ALJ erred in disregarding the lay testimony allegedly corroborating his claims that he could not sleep more than four or five hours due to shoulder and neck pain. An ALJ can disregard lay testimony if the ALJ provides a germane reason for doing so. Diedrich v. Berryhill, 874 F.3d 634, 640 (9th Cir. 2017). Because the assertions in the lay testimony were generally similar to those of Maners, and because the ALJ properly discounted the relevant parts of Manerss testimony, including because of its inconsistency with the overall medical record, it follows that the ALJ did not err in disregarding the lay testimony for similarly conflicting with the overall medical record.
AFFIRMED.
FOOTNOTES
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. We note it was error to discredit Dr. Gritzkas opinion on the ground that it was improperly influenced by Manerss attorney. The record does not reflect any evidence of actual attorney impropriety, see Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 832 (9th Cir. 1995); rather, the ALJ seems to have improperly discredited the opinion based on the source of the referral, see id. Ultimately, because the ALJs other reasons for discrediting Dr. Gritzkas opinion are proper, this error is harmless. See Batson, 359 F.3d at 1197.