MEMORANDUM **
Raul Mendez appeals pro se from the district courts judgment dismissing his action alleging federal and state law claims arising out of a dispute regarding trash collection fees. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Puri v. Khalsa, 844 F.3d 1152, 1157 (9th Cir. 2017). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Mendezs 42 U.S.C. § 1983 equal protection claim because Mendez failed to allege facts sufficient to show that defendants discriminated against him because of his race. See Hartmann v. Cal. Dept of Corr. & Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114, 1123 (9th Cir. 2013) (elements of an equal protection claim); see also Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1139 (9th Cir. 2012) (a private entity is liable under § 1983 only if the entity acted under color of state law).
The district court properly dismissed Mendezs Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) claim because, even assuming the trash collection fees qualified as a “debt” under the FDCPA, Mendez failed to allege facts sufficient to show that any defendant was a “debt collector” within the meaning of the FDCPA. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) (defining “debt collector” under the FDCPA as “any person ․ who regularly collects or attempts to collect ․ debts owed ․ another”).
The district court properly dismissed Mendezs Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) claim because Mendez failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim. See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings are construed liberally, plaintiff must present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief); Sanford v. MemberWorks, Inc., 625 F.3d 550, 557 (9th Cir. 2010) (elements of a RICO claim).
The district court did not err in denying Mendezs motions for injunctive relief without first holding hearings. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b) (“By rule or order, the court may provide for submitting and determining motions on briefs, without oral hearings.”); D. Idaho L. Civ. R. 7.1(d)(1)(B) (“If the presiding judge determines that oral argument will not be necessary, the matter will be decided on the briefs.”).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Mendezs state law claims and dismissing them without prejudice. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Parra v. PacifiCare of Ariz., Inc., 715 F.3d 1146, 1156 (9th Cir. 2013) (once a district court dismisses the only claims over which it had original jurisdiction, it does not abuse its discretion in dismissing the remaining state law claims).
To the extent that the district court erred in granting defendants’ motion to strike materials submitted by Mendez in opposition to defendants’ motion to dismiss, any error was harmless because, even considering those materials, Mendezs amended complaint failed to state a claim. See Cooper v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 945 F.2d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1991) (if an error is harmless, it does not require reversal).
We reject as meritless Mendezs contentions that the district court failed to liberally construe his complaint and that he was entitled to discovery prior to dismissal of the action.
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.