Father appeals a permanency judgment as to his young daughter, who was placed in protective custody at her birth due to concerns related to open cases involving his other children. He challenges the denial of his motion to dismiss jurisdiction and terminate the wardship of his child, and also challenges the change in childs permanency plan from reunification to adoption, arguing that the court erred in concluding that the Department of Human Services (DHS) had made reasonable efforts and that he had failed to make sufficient progress to allow child to return home safely and in failing to find a compelling reason to forego ordering the department to proceed to seek termination of his parental rights. We affirm the denial of fathers motion to dismiss jurisdiction without written discussion, and also affirm the juvenile courts permanency judgment.
We briefly address each of fathers other challenges, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the juvenile courts ruling. Dept. of Human Services v. N. P., 257 Or. App. 633, 639-40, 307 P.3d 444 (2013).
Father first argues that the court erred in concluding that DHSs efforts on his behalf qualified as reasonable. We are satisfied that the extensive services that father received were reasonably focused on addressing the cognitive deficits that prevent him from safely parenting child; we are not persuaded by fathers arguments that DHSs efforts to involve fathers family members were insufficient and rendered its overall efforts unreasonable. We also reject fathers argument that he had made sufficient progress to allow for childs safe return. Although father made efforts in that regard, the record supports the juvenile courts findings that he had not made sufficient progress to alleviate the safety risks to child due to his neurocognitive disorder and that his family support did not ameliorate that risk.
Finally, we address the issue of whether a compelling reason existed not to pursue termination of fathers parental rights. When the juvenile court decides that a permanency plan should be changed to adoption, ORS 419B.476(5)(d) requires that the permanency judgment must include the courts determination of whether, among other things, “there is a compelling reason, which is documented in the case plan, for determining that * * * a petition [for termination of parental rights] would not be in the best interests of the child or ward” under ORS 419B.498(2)(b). Father argues that the juvenile courts determination that there was no “compelling reason” was erroneous because childs “close and positive” relationships with her biological family constituted a compelling reason. Specifically, he points to evidence that child is “closely bonded” to him and to his grandmother. The record here does not provide a basis for reversal. We are persuaded that the record supports the juvenile courts determination that, under the circumstances presented in this case, the childs positive relationships with father and grandmother do not rise to the level of a compelling reason not to pursue termination of fathers parental rights.
Affirmed.
PER CURIAM