Rickey Reno filed this petition for a writ of mandamus requesting that this Court direct Judge Joseph Clark Stankoski to set aside his order to garnish Renos inmate trust fund account issued on April 5, 2021.
On July 28, 2000, Reno was sentenced as a habitual felony offender to 17 years in prison for his convictions for possession of a forged instrument and second-degree receiving stolen property. Reno was ordered to pay a $2,000 fine, a $50 Alabama crime victims compensation fee, attorney fees, and court costs for each conviction. On August 24, 2000, the trial court imposed restitution in case no. CC-00-199 in the amount of $450 and in case no. CC-00-565 in the amount of $3,413.84.
On April 1, 2021, the State filed a motion seeking to garnish Renos inmate trust fund (“ITF”). The motion asserted that Reno was an inmate in the custody of the Alabama Department of Corrections (“DOC”) and that he had an outstanding balance, in restitution, court costs, fines, and fees, of $5,024.17 in case no. CC-00-199 and $7,911.74 in case no. CC-00-565. The motion further asserted that Reno may have received, and may receive in the future, economic impact payments (“EIP”) – federal funds distributed to eligible individuals pursuant to the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, more commonly known as the CARES Act. Pub. L. No. 116-136, 134 Stat. 281 (2020). The motion sought an order from the circuit court garnishing all EIP received by Reno while in the custody of the DOC so that the funds could be applied to Renos restitution, court costs, fines, and fees.
On April 5, 2021, Judge Stankoski issued orders in case no. CC-00-199 and case no. CC-00565 granting the States motion. Judge Stankoski confirmed the amounts owed as asserted by the States motion and stated that he had inquired and investigated the reasons for Renos nonpayment. Judge Stankoski found that Reno had received $1,800 in EIP and noted that Reno may receive additional EIP in the coming years. Judge Stankoski directed the DOC to withhold all EIP received by Reno in his ITF until the amounts owed by Reno were paid in full and to forward the funds to the clerk of the Baldwin Circuit Court.
On April 13, 2021, the State filed a motion to correct a clerical error in its motion filed on April 1, 2021. Specifically, the motion stated that the States previous use of the term “garnish” was in error; rather than asking the circuit court to use the legal process of garnishment, the State was instead seeking to have the circuit court enforce its prior orders of restitution in case no. CC-00-199 and case no. CC-00-565. Later that day, Judge Stankoski entered orders enforcing its orders of restitution by directing the DOC to withhold all EIP from Renos ITF and to forward those funds to the clerk of the Baldwin Circuit Court.
The following day, Reno filed a motion raising various challenges to Judge Stankoskis order regarding his EIP. The documents before this Court indicate that Judge Stankoski has not ruled on Renos motion. Reno reasserts the claims raised below in his petition for writ of mandamus, which was filed in this Court on April 15, 2021.
1
In order to obtain mandamus relief, it is Renos burden to establish four prerequisites:
“Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy and will be granted only where there is ‘(1) a clear legal right in the petitioner to the order sought; (2) an imperative duty upon the respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3) the lack of another adequate remedy; and (4) properly invoked jurisdiction of the court.’ Ex parte Alfab, Inc., 586 So. 2d 889, 891 (Ala. 1991). This Court will not issue the writ of mandamus where the petitioner has ‘ “full and adequate relief” ’ by appeal. State v. Cobb, 288 Ala. 675, 678, 264 So. 2d 523, 526 (1972) (quoting State v. Williams, 69 Ala. 311, 316 (1881)).”
Ex parte Ocwen Fed. Bank, FSB, 872 So. 2d 810, 813 (Ala. 2003).
I.
Reno first argues that Judge Stankoski lacked jurisdiction to modify the restitution orders. Here, Reno relies on the well-settled rule that a trial court loses subject-matter jurisdiction at the expiration of 30 days following the entry of a final judgment. See Ex parte Butler, 295 So.3d 1115, 1118 (Ala. Crim. App. 2019) (citing State v. Webber, 892 So. 2d 869, 870 (Ala. 2004)). Because restitution was ordered in August 2000, Reno reasons that Judge Stankoski lacked jurisdiction to modify restitution in April 2021.
However, Judge Stankoski did not modify the circuit courts order of restitution; rather, he acted to enforce it. A circuit court has continuing jurisdiction to enforce an order of restitution until the restitution has been satisfied. Restitution is enforceable while a defendant is under a sentence of imprisonment, as is Reno, see § 15-18-71, Ala. Code 1975, and a circuit courts jurisdiction remains even after a defendant has completed his or her sentence, see § 15-18-64(a), Ala. Code 1975. Therefore, Reno has failed to establish that he is entitled to mandamus relief on the basis that Judge Stankoski lacked authority to modify the restitution orders.
II.
Reno argues that Judge Stankoski lacked the statutory or regulatory authority to order 100% of his EIP to be withheld by the DOC. In support of his argument, Reno cites § 14-15-5, Ala. Code 1975, which limits collections of an indigent inmates ITF to 20% of the inmates average monthly prisoner balance for the prior 12 months to satisfy the filing fee for an action filed pursuant to the Alabama Prisoner Litigation Reform Act, and § 14-8-6, Ala. Code 1975, which limits collections of an inmates earnings from work release for the cost incident to confinement to 40% of the inmates earnings.
On its face, neither Code section applies to restitution; thus, neither supports Renos argument. Further, § 15-18-71, Ala. Code 1975, states that an “order of restitution shall be enforceable during the period of imprisonment when the defendant has any asset or other income or any portion thereof to which a defendant is or may be entitled.” (Emphasis added.) Therefore, Reno has failed to establish that he is entitled to mandamus relief on the basis that Judge Stankoski was without authority to order his EIP to be withheld.
III.
Reno argues that Judge Stankoskis order of garnishment did not comply with the procedural requirements of §§ 6-6-370 et seq., which governs the civil remedy of garnishment. As stated herein, however, Judge Stankoski did not use the civil remedy of garnishment. Instead, Judge Stankoski was merely enforcing a prior order of the court. The courts of this State have the authority to “compel obedience to [their] judgments, orders and process and to orders of a judge out of court, in an action or proceeding therein.” § 12-1-7-(3), Ala. Code 1975. See Ex parte Stewart, 74 So. 3d 944 (Ala. 2011).
2
Therefore, Reno has failed to establish that he is entitled to mandamus relief on the basis that Judge Stankoski failed to comply with the procedures governing garnishment.
IV.
Reno asserts that because he was not afforded an attorney during the proceedings to withhold his EIP, he was denied counsel at a critical stage of the proceedings.
“A criminal defendant has a right to counsel at any ‘critical stage’ in the proceedings in which he or she is prosecuted and sentenced, e.g., United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224, 87 S. Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed. 2d 1149 (1967), that is, at any stage at which a substantial right of the accused may be affected, Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 134, 88 S. Ct. 254, 19 L.Ed. 2d 336 (1967).” Judge Stankoskis enforcing a prior order of restitution was not a critical stage in Renos criminal proceedings, and Reno has not identified any substantial right that was affected. Therefore, Reno has failed to establish that he is entitled to mandamus relief on the basis that he was denied counsel at a critical stage of the proceedings.
V.
Reno argues that Judge Stankoskis order violated his right to equal protection. Specifically, he asserts that only those inmates who could not set up a bank account will be forced to surrender their EIP; thus, he, as someone who cannot afford to establish a bank account, is being treated differently than inmates who can afford to establish a banking account.
“The Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution requires the government to treat similarly situated people alike.” Evatt v. Thomas, 99 So. 3d 886, 890 (Ala. Civ. App. 2012) (citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985)). Renos premise appears to be that inmates who have bank accounts will have funds beyond the reach of the courts. This is simply not true.
Reno has failed to establish that he is being treated differently from similarly-situated people; therefore, Reno has failed to establish that he is entitled to mandamus relief on the basis that Judge Stankoski violated his right to equal protection.
VI.
Reno asserts that Judge Stankoski was without authority to withhold his EIP because the United States Congress in enacting the CARES Act did not prohibit inmates from receiving EIP or state that EIP could be seized for the payment of restitution.
Indeed, inmates were not prohibited from receiving EIP and the CARES Act does not appear to speak directly to whether EIP could or could not be used for the payment of restitution. See Pub. L. No. 116-136, 134 Stat. 281 (2020). Of course, the relevant inquiry would be whether the CARES Act expressly prohibits the use of EIP for the payment of restitution, and Reno has failed even to allege any such prohibition exists. This Court also notes that several federal courts have approved the use of EIP to satisfy federal inmates’ restitution. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, [Ms. 4:17-CR51 RLW, May 14, 2021] ––– F.Supp. 3d ––––, ––––, 2021 WL 1945855 (E.D. Mo. 2021); United States v. Kieffer, [Ms. 3:14-CR-30051-NJR-1, May 4, 2021] ––– F.Supp. 3d ––––, ––––, 2021 WL 1758815 (S.D. Ill. 2021). Therefore, Reno has failed to establish that he is entitled to mandamus relief on the basis that Judge Stankoski was without authority pursuant to the CARES Act to withhold his EIP.
VII.
Finally, Reno argues that neither §§ 12-17-225 et seq. nor Rule 26.11, Ala. R. Crim. P., authorizes modifying the terms of restitution without a hearing or due process of law.
Yet, neither of the sources of authority Reno cites require a circuit court to hold a hearing before modifying the terms of repayment. Judge Stankoski specifically stated that he had inquired and investigated the reasons for Renos failure to pay restitution. See Rule 26.11(g), Ala. R. Crim. P. And, again, Renos due-process claim is without merit as he was afforded all the due process to which he was entitled when restitution was originally imposed. Therefore, Reno has failed to establish that he is entitled to mandamus relief on the basis that Judge Stankoski could not enforce his restitution orders without holding a hearing.
As the petitioner, it was Renos heavy burden to demonstrate that he was entitled to mandamus relief by establishing: (1) a clear legal right in the petitioner to the order sought; (2) an imperative duty upon the respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3) the lack of another adequate remedy; and (4) properly invoked jurisdiction of the court. See Ex parte Ocwen Fed. Bank, FSB, 872 So. 2d at 813. Reno has failed to do so. Therefore, this petition is due to be, and is hereby, denied.
PETITION DENIED.
FOOTNOTES
1
. On June 25, 2021, this Court transferred this petition to the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals. The case was returned to this Courts active docket on August 30, 2021.
2
. To the extent Reno raises a due-process claim, this Court notes that he was afforded all the due process to which he was entitled with respect to restitution when that restitution was originally imposed.
PER CURIAM.
Windom, P.J., and Kellum, McCool, Cole, and Minor, JJ., concur.