MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
After a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of drugs (OUI Drugs), and negligent operation of a motor vehicle. On appeal, he claims the judge abused his discretion by permitting a State trooper to explain her training and experience in impaired driving cases, and that the evidence was insufficient to support either of his convictions. We affirm.
1. The troopers training and experience. The defendant claims the judge abused his discretion in permitting Trooper Ali Rei to testify to her training and experience with regard to OUI Drugs cases, and specifically to the fact that she attended the Advanced Roadside Impairment Driving Enforcement (ARIDE) program. The defendant claims this testimony was prejudicial error because it may have misled or confused the jury into believing that the trooper was supporting the validity of the assessments administered to the defendant at the State Police barracks. We disagree.
We review a judges evidentiary decisions for an abuse of discretion. See Commonwealth v. Andre, 484 Mass. 403, 414 (2020). That is, we must determine whether the judge made “a clear error of judgment in weighing the factors relevant to the decision, such that the decision falls outside the range of reasonable alternatives” (quotation and citation omitted). L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185 n.27 (2014).
In her testimony, Trooper Rei described various assessments she administered, and her observations of the defendant while he performed those assessments. She also described her training and experience, including a sixteen-hour training which focused on OUI Drugs and was known as ARIDE, during which she learned two additional assessments that were not taught in her regular police academy classes. Over objection, Rei described that training. She also acknowledged that she had no medical training, and was not permitted to answer questions pertaining to specific types of drugs or their side effects.
Contrary to the defendants concerns, Reis testimony merely provided background information about herself and the administration of the assessments. Her testimony was not outside the parameters of Commonwealth v. Gerhardt, 477 Mass. 775, 783-784 (2017), as she did not testify that the assessments establish that an individual was under the influence of a particular drug, or that the defendant “passed” or “failed” the assessments. Moreover, Rei neither gave an opinion on the defendants impairment, nor claimed to be an expert. See Commonwealth v. Smith, 95 Mass. App. Ct. 437, 444 (2019). Finally, there is no reason to believe the jury was misled or confused about the proper purpose of the assessments where the judge instructed the jury, in line with Gerhardt, that the “roadside assessments are not scientific tests of impairment by marijuana or [c]lonazepam,” and that it was for the jury to determine how much weight, if any, to give those assessments. The judges decision fell comfortably inside the range of reasonable alternatives, and there was no abuse of discretion. See L.L., 477 Mass. at 185 n.27.
2. Sufficiency of the evidence. The defendant also claims that the evidence was insufficient to demonstrate that he operated a motor vehicle while under the influence of marijuana or clonazepam, the latter being a “depressant” as that term is used in G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (a) (l). Specifically, he claims that the evidence was insufficient to prove that his consumption of those drugs diminished his ability to operate a vehicle safely. We disagree.
“When analyzing whether the record evidence is sufficient to support a conviction, an appellate court is not required to ‘ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ․ Rather, the relevant ‘question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677 (1979), quoting from Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979).” Commonwealth v. Rocheteau, 74 Mass. App. Ct. 17, 19 (2009).
When evaluating sufficiency, the evidence must be reviewed with specific reference to the substantive elements of the offense. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324 n.16; Latimore, 378 Mass. at 677-678. In the circumstances of this case, to establish the defendants guilt of OUI Drugs in violation of G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (a) (1), the Commonwealth was required to prove that the defendant: (1) operated a motor vehicle, (2) on a public way, and (3) while under the influence of marijuana, narcotic drugs, depressants, or stimulant substances as defined in G. L. c. 94C, § 1. See Smith, 85 Mass. App. Ct. at 440; Commonwealth v. Bouley, 93 Mass. App. Ct. 709, 712 (2018). The defendant only challenges the evidence supporting the third element.
Here, the defendant admitted to both troopers that he had smoked marijuana, and admitted to Trooper Rei that he took clonazepam. The judge properly took judicial notice that the drug qualifies as a depressant under G. L. c. 94C, § 1. See G. L. c. 94C, § 31 (identifying clonazepam as class C substance “having a depressant effect on the central nervous system”). In addition, the defendants eyes were bloodshot, his speech was slurred, and he had trouble maintaining his balance at the scene of the crash, which the defendant admitted he caused. During the roadside assessments, the defendants trouble with his balance persisted, and he was unable to follow instructions. At the barracks, in addition to his watery and droopy eyes, the defendants poor performance on the assessments continued. In fact, during one assessment, he completely lost his balance and had to grab a nearby desk to steady himself. See Gerhardt, 477 Mass. at 776 (assessments “are relevant to establish a drivers balance, coordination, mental acuity, and other skills required to safely operate a motor vehicle”).
The above evidence should also be combined with the fact that the defendant careened off the highway during clear weather, struck a mile marker, and came to stop in the snow beyond the breakdown lane. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 59 Mass. App. Ct. 164, 165-166 (2003). From all the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth,
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it was a permissible inference for the jury to conclude that the defendants consumption of drugs impaired his ability to operate his truck safely. See Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 67 Mass. App. Ct. 215, 219-220 (2006). Cf. Commonwealth v. Davis, 481 Mass. 210, 216-217 (2019).
Finally, the defendant claims that there was insufficient evidence to prove that he operated a motor vehicle negligently. In order to prove a defendant guilty of negligent operation, the Commonwealth must demonstrate that he: (1) operated a motor vehicle, (2) upon a public way, and (3) operated “negligently so that the lives or safety of the public might be endangered.” G. L. c. 90, § 24 (2) (a). See Commonwealth v. Duffy, 62 Mass. App. Ct. 921, 921 (2004). The defendant does not challenge the evidence supporting the first two elements, but only claims that it was insufficient as to the third. We disagree.
Here, the defendant admitted to consuming clonazepam (a depressant) and smoking marijuana. Thereafter, in good weather and during the day, he lost control of his car after overcompensating when he hit the rumble strip, struck a mile marker sign, and came to stop beyond the breakdown lane, in the snow. See Commonwealth v. Woods, 414 Mass. 343, 344 (1993); Commonwealth v. Ross, 92 Mass. App. Ct. 377, 380 (2017). He performed poorly on the assessments at the scene of the crash and later at the barracks, where during one assessment he completely lost his balance. This evidence, combined with the circumstances surrounding the crash that the defendant caused, was sufficient to demonstrate that the defendant operated his vehicle negligently so as to endanger the public. See Commonwealth v. Gordon, 15 Mass. App. Ct. 901, 901 (1982). Contrast Commonwealth v. Zagwyn, 482 Mass. 1020, 1022 (2019) (“evidence of a broken headlight and a broken license plate light, even when coupled with proof of intoxication, is insufficient” by itself to support conviction of negligent operation). The defendants motion for a required finding of not guilty was properly denied.
Judgments affirmed.
FOOTNOTES
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. The defendant claims that he smoked marijuana seven hours before he crashed his truck, but the jury were not required to credit his claimed time frame. See Commonwealth v. Platt, 440 Mass. 396, 403 (2003). In any event, “[j]urors may use their common sense in evaluating whether the Commonwealth introduced sufficient evidence to satisfy its burden of proof.” Gerhardt, 477 Mass. at 787.