MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
The appellants, Marianne Baptiste and Gregory Williams, Sr., seek reversal of a judgment declaring that a homeowners insurance policy issued by Citation Insurance Company (Citation) to May Ling Chin (the insured) does not provide coverage for claims arising out of an attack by the insureds son on the son of the appellants. In April 2013, the two sons, Douglas Chin and Gregory Williams, Jr., were residents of different Department of Youth Services (DYS) programs on Bostons Long Island. Chin attacked Williams during a flag football game between their respective residential programs. Williamss parents, the appellants, sued Chin and others for damages for Williamss injuries (underlying action).
3
Chins mother, the insured, holds a homeowners insurance policy issued by Citation that has additional personal liability umbrella coverage. After receiving notice of the underlying action, the insured made a claim against her policy, and Citation filed this declaratory judgment action seeking a determination that it has no duty to defend or indemnify Chin in the underlying action.
Citation moved for judgment on the pleadings,
4
see Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (c), 365 Mass. 754 (1974), asserting that the insureds policy does not cover the appellants’ damage claims in the underlying action because (1) Chin is not an “insured,” and (2) even if Chin is an “insured,” coverage does not apply to damages caused by his intentional acts. Concluding that the pleadings established that Chin intended to harm Williams and therefore the policys “expected or intended” exclusion applied, a Superior Court judge granted Citations motion. The appellants now appeal the judgment declaring that Citation has no duty to defend or indemnify Chin in the underlying action. We affirm.
Background. The following undisputed facts are drawn from the parties’ pleadings (including the complaint in the underlying action) and the attached exhibits. See Merriam v. Demoulas Super Mkts., Inc., 464 Mass. 721, 723 (2013). Around noon on April 19, 2013, Williams and Chin were on the same playing field for a flag football game between their residential programs. Earlier that morning, Chin had said that he wanted to get “kicked out” of his residential program and that he wanted to punch someone so that the program would discharge him and send him elsewhere. To further this plan, Chin later said that he was going to attack the “big one,” referring to Williams. Within a few minutes of the games starting, Chin ran toward Williams, who was not looking at Chin, “wound up,” and directed a forceful, closed-fist strike to the left side of Williamss throat and jaw. Williams fell to his knees, winded and struggling to breathe, and Chin then hit him one or two more times. The attack caused Williams to have a stroke, seizures, and brain swelling; he spent a month in a medically induced coma and now has severe and permanent brain damage. Williams lives in a specialized residential program and requires twenty-four hour care.
As a putative insured under the Citation policy, Chin is potentially entitled to a defense and to “personal liability” coverage (coverage E) “[i]f a claim is made or a suit is brought against an ‘insured’ for damages because of ‘bodily injury’ ․ caused by an ‘occurrence’ to which this coverage applies.” The appellants, in turn, are potentially entitled to “medical payments to others” coverage (coverage F) for “bodily injury” that “[i]s caused by the activities of an ‘insured.’ ” The policy contains certain “exclusions,” however, including a clause providing that coverage E and coverage F “do not apply to ‘bodily injury’ ․ [w]hich is expected or intended by the ‘insured.’ ” The judge held that this clause excludes coverage for the appellants’ claims against Chin.
Standard of review. “We review de novo the judges order allowing a motion for judgment on the pleadings under rule 12 (c).” Wheatley v. Massachusetts Insurers Insolvency Fund, 456 Mass. 594, 600 (2010), and case cited. “The interpretation of an insurance contract and the application of policy language to known facts present questions of law for the judge to decide.” Herbert A. Sullivan, Inc. v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 439 Mass. 387, 394 (2003).
Discussion. The judge concluded that the policy did not apply because Chin intentionally injured Williams. The appellants claim error, maintaining that the incident was an “occurrence” under the policy because it was “an accident” in which Chin did not intend the extent of Williamss “bodily injury,” and the judge misapplied governing precedent. They also maintain that the record was insufficient to allow the judge to conclude that Chin intended to cause Williams bodily harm. Whether framed as an error of law or an absence of necessary evidence, the appellants’ claim fails. “The duty to defend is determined based on the facts alleged in the complaint, and on facts known or readily knowable by the insurer that may aid in its interpretation of the allegations in the complaint.” Billings v. Commerce Ins. Co., 458 Mass. 194, 200 (2010). “[W]hen the allegations in the underlying complaint lie expressly outside the policy coverage and its purpose, the insurer is relieved of the duty to investigate or [to] defend” the insured (quotations and citation omitted). Herbert A. Sullivan, Inc., 439 Mass. at 394-395. “If an insurer has no duty to defend, based on the allegations in the plaintiffs complaint, it necessarily follows that the insurer does not have a duty to indemnify.” Bagley v. Monticello Ins. Co., 430 Mass. 454, 459 (1999).
The allegations in the appellants’ underlying complaint establish that Citation has neither a duty to defend, nor to indemnify, Chin for claims arising out of his conduct on April 19, 2013. Chins prior statements that he was going to punch someone and get expelled from his program, and his identification of Williams (“the big one”) as his intended victim, followed by his acts of punching Williams in the throat and jaw and then hitting him again while he was on the ground, are sufficient as a matter of law to establish that Chin intended to cause bodily harm. See Worcester Ins. Co. v. Fells Acres Day Sch., Inc., 408 Mass. 393, 399-400 (1990), and cases cited.
5
The law does not require proof that Chin intended to cause the exact extent of Williamss injuries for the “expected or intended” exclusion to apply. It is necessary only that Chin intended to, and did, punch Williams in the throat and jaw. See Newton v. Krasnigor, 404 Mass. 682, 685 (1989); Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Casey, 91 Mass. App. Ct. 243, 250 (2017).
The judge did not err in concluding that Chins deliberate striking of Williamss head established Chins intent to cause the resulting harm to Williams, precluding the policy from covering the attack, and that Citation therefore had no duty to defend or indemnify Chin in the underlying action. Because we affirm the judges order granting Citations motion for judgment on the pleadings on this ground, we need not reach the issue of whether Chin is an “insured” under the policy.
Judgment affirmed.
FOOTNOTES
3
. In the underlying action, the appellants allege that Chin is liable for assault, battery, and loss of consortium.
4
. The appellants opposed Citations motion for judgment on the pleadings, but Chin and his mother did not.
5
. Given our conclusion that these allegations are unambiguous as to Williamss intent and establish that Citations policy does not apply, we do not see how the additional discovery sought by the appellants could improve their legal posture.