MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
The defendant, Jeffrey R. Mazer, appeals from a default judgment entered by the Suffolk County Superior Court.
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The underlying dispute arises out of an arbitration award in favor of the plaintiff Patrick Sasso. On June 6, 2016, defendant Mazer Law Group, LLC, filed a complaint and motion to vacate the award in Essex County Superior Court (Essex case). Around two weeks later, Sasso, not yet served with the summons and complaint in the Essex case, filed a complaint and motion to confirm the award in Suffolk County Superior Court (Suffolk case). Sasso then filed a motion to remove the Essex case and consolidate the matters in Suffolk County. Mazer did not oppose the motion, which was allowed on July 21, 2016.
On September 1, 2016, a clerks notice issued in the Essex case warning of impending dismissal for failure to prosecute. On October 18, 2016, Sasso sent a letter addressed to an Essex County Superior Court judge (Essex judge), attaching a copy of the consolidation order from the Suffolk case and requesting that the Essex case be removed. The letter was not immediately docketed, and on November 15, 2016, a judgment of dismissal entered in the Essex case. A week later, however, Sassos letter was docketed with the following endorsement by the Essex judge: “The motion to remove case from Essex County to consolidate in Suffolk County was allowed in Suffolk case. Essex County case should be removed and consolidated in Suffolk.” The docket reflects that the Essex case was then “transferred” and the “[p]apers sent to Suffolk Superior Court” on November 23, 2016.
The cases were consolidated in Suffolk County on December 20, 2016. Thereafter, on December 28, 2016, an order of default under Superior Court Standing Order 1-88 entered against Mazer, who had yet to respond to Sassos complaint. Mazer took no immediate action to remove the default, and on January 18, 2017, Sasso moved for an assessment of damages and default judgment. Mazer still did not immediately respond, and on February 23, 2017, a judge allowed Sassos motion after a “hearing and careful review of all submissions.” Default judgment entered on February 28, 2017.
On appeal Mazer raises no argument that the judge in the consolidated cases erred by ordering the entry of the default judgment. Instead, his arguments are directed solely to the judgment of dismissal that entered in the Essex case. Passing over whether the judgment of dismissal was effectively vacated by the Essex judges order that the case be removed to Suffolk County, none of Mazers arguments have any bearing on the propriety of the default judgment, which is the issue before us. The entry of a default judgment “has to do with the management of the case and, as such, is committed to the sound discretion of the ․ judge.” Greenleaf v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 22 Mass. App. Ct. 426, 429 (1986). To obtain relief from a default judgment, a defendant must demonstrate, among other things, excusable neglect. See Christian Book Distribs., Inc. v. Wallace, 53 Mass. App. Ct. 905, 907 (2001). Even were we to assume that the judgment of dismissal in the Essex case entered in error, that is not relevant to whether Mazer acted with excusable neglect.
To the extent Mazer argues that the confusion surrounding consolidation gave rise to excusable neglect, the sequence of events leading up to the entry of the default judgment belies his assertion. The order of default did not enter until after the Essex case was transferred and the matters were consolidated. Sasso filed his motion for assessment of damages and default judgment three weeks later, and, in that intervening period, Mazer took no action to remove the default. Rather, it was not until one month after Sasso filed his motion, around the time of the assessment hearing, that Mazer finally moved, on an emergency basis, for relief from the default.
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These circumstances provide no basis on which to disturb the default judgment. See Shaev v. Alvord, 66 Mass. App. Ct. 910, 911 (2006), quoting Feltch v. General Rental Co., 383 Mass. 603, 613-614 (1981) (“The concept of excusable neglect is meant to apply to circumstances that are unique or extraordinary, not to any ‘garden-variety oversight’ ”).
Judgment entered February 28, 2017, affirmed.
FOOTNOTES
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. Although it also purportedly noticed an appeal from the judgment, the Mazer Law Group, LLC, did not participate in this appeal.
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. That motion was denied for failure to comply with Superior Court Rule 9A. After the default judgment entered, Mazer filed another emergency motion to remove the default and an emergency motion to vacate the judgment of dismissal entered in the Essex case, both of which were also denied for failure to comply with Superior Court Rule 9A.