MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
The plaintiff, David Juarez, acting pro se, appeals from the dismissal of his civil complaint against the Department of Children and Families (department), and from the denial of his motion for summary judgment. We affirm.
Juarez filed a complaint in the Superior Court alleging that the department failed to respond to his allegations that his two year old daughter was being sexually abused by her maternal grandmother, with whom the child and her mother lived. Without setting forth specific causes of action, the complaint sought orders: (1) prohibiting contact between the grandmother and the child, (2) awarding custody of his daughter to him, (3) requiring criminal charges be filed against the mother and grandmother, (4) arranging counseling and psychological care for the child, and (5) awarding money damages to Juarez for “psychological [and] emotional injuries.”
Before the department responded to the complaint, Juarez filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that the department failed to timely answer his complaint. The motion for summary judgment was denied for (1) failure to serve the motion on the department before filing, and (2) failure to confer with the department regarding the motion, as required by Rules 9A and 9C of the Rules of the Superior Court (2018), respectively.
The department sought an enlargement of time to respond to the complaint and, around the same time, filed a notice of intent to file a motion to dismiss. The department then served Juarez with a motion to dismiss pursuant to Superior Court Rule 9A arguing, among other things, that the complaint failed to state a claim. When Juarez failed to timely serve an opposition, the department filed its motion to dismiss.
A hearing was scheduled on the motion to dismiss and notice of the hearing was sent to the plaintiff advising him that he could appear telephonically. Juarez did not appear in person or by telephone. The judge allowed the motion to dismiss based on Juarezs failure to appear at the hearing.
While we generally review the allowance of a motion to dismiss de novo, see Curtis v. Herb Chambers I-95, Inc., 458 Mass. 674, 676 (2011), where a judge dismisses a complaint on procedural grounds for failure to prosecute or comply with the rules, our review is for abuse of discretion. See Mass. R. Civ. P. 41 (b) (2), 365 Mass. 803 (1974); Anderson v. Sport Lounge, Inc., 27 Mass. App. Ct. 1208, 1209 (1989). Here, the record reflects that Juarez did not serve on the department an opposition to the motion to dismiss and failed to appear for the hearing on the motion despite notice. In these circumstances, dismissal of the complaint was well within the judges discretion.
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Nor did the judge abuse his discretion in denying Juarezs motion for summary judgment. The rules required Juarez to serve his motion for summary judgment on the department and to confer with the department prior to filing his motion. See Superior Court Rules 9A and 9C. He was also required to file a separately captioned statement of facts and the failure to do so is grounds for denial of the motion. Rule 9A(b)(5)(i); Malden Police Patrolmans Assn v. Malden, 92 Mass. App. Ct. 53, 56 (2017). Juarez failed to comply with these requirements. Our “[r]ules of procedure are not just guidelines. Their purpose is to provide an orderly, predictable process by which parties to a law suit conduct their business.” Malden Police Patrolmans Assn, 92 Mass. App. Ct. at 56, quoting USTrust Co. v. Kennedy, 17 Mass. App. Ct. 131, 135 (1983). The judge did not abuse his discretion in enforcing the rules.
Judgment dated February 14, 2020, affirmed.
FOOTNOTES
2
. We see no abuse of discretion in the judges rejection of Juarezs claim that he had no knowledge of the hearing. The record reflects that notice was sent to Juarez.