MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
After the plaintiff defaulted on her mortgage, the defendant, mortgagee of the plaintiffs residential property, sold the property at a foreclosure sale. The plaintiff then sought to set aside the foreclosure and alleged, in her amended complaint, that the defendant failed to provide the notice required by G. L. c. 244, § 14, prior to conducting the sale. A Land Court judge concluded that the defendant had acted in “strict compliance” with the notice provisions of the foreclosure statute and dismissed the complaint. We affirm.
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain factual allegations “plausibly suggesting ․ an entitlement to relief” (quotation and citation omitted). Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co., 451 Mass. 623, 636 (2008). The allegations in the plaintiffs complaint do not meet this standard. Rather, the record evidence shows that the defendant sent to the plaintiffs address, by certified and first class mail, notice of foreclosure sale more than thirty days before the sale. See, e.g., Eaton v. Federal Natl Mtge. Assn, 462 Mass. 569, 581 n.17 (2012) (“General Laws c. 244, § 14, requires a mortgagee initiating foreclosure proceedings, inter alia, to ․ mail notice of the foreclosure sale to the owner of record within statutorily prescribed time periods”). The plaintiff, in her brief, acknowledges as much. Accordingly, the defendant complied with the notice requirements of G. L. c. 244, § 14, and the judge correctly dismissed the plaintiffs complaint.
4
To the extent that the plaintiff argues that the defendant was required to ensure -- by, for example, in-hand service -- that she received actual notice of the foreclosure, her argument is unavailing. “Notice by certified or registered mail is a common method of providing notice in business, governmental, and legal contexts and is considered ‘reasonably calculated’ to provide actual notice.” Carmel Credit Union v. Bondeson, 55 Mass. App. Ct. 557, 560 (2002), quoting Andover v. State Fin. Servs., Inc., 432 Mass. 571, 574-575 (2000). Moreover, we have held that “if the bank showed that it had complied with the notice statute, the debtors averment that [s]he had not received the notice was ‘irrelevant to the issue whether the bank had satisfied its obligation in accordance with the statute.’ ” Carmel Credit Union, supra at 561, quoting Hull v. Attleboro Sav. Bank, 25 Mass. App. Ct. 960, 963, cert. denied, 488 U.S. 856 (1988). Whatever the merits of the plaintiffs argument as a general matter -- and we express no view on that question -- the express terms of the statute preclude it.
5
,
6
See Retirement Bd. of Somerville v. Buonomo, 467 Mass. 662, 672 (2014) (“We will not add words to a statute that the Legislature did not put there, either by inadvertent omission or by design”).
Judgment affirmed.
FOOTNOTES
4
. The plaintiff does not contend that the defendant failed to publish notice of the foreclosure sale in a local newspaper of general circulation. See G. L. c. 244, § 14.
5
. The plaintiffs conclusory allegation that the price at which the property sold at auction, “one-half of the propertys value,” was in “direct violation of the standard of law” under Clark v. Simmons, 150 Mass. 357, 360 (1890), is similarly unavailing. See Seppala & Aho Constr. Co. v. Peterson, 373 Mass. 316, 328 (1977) (“It is a notorious fact that, when land is sold, by auction, under a power contained in a mortgage, it seldom, if ever, brings a price which reaches its real value” [citation omitted]).
6
. The defendants request for attorneys fees and costs is denied.