Michael Brant Allen (“Former Husband”) appeals the trial courts Supplemental Final Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage, challenging the Judgments treatment of his pension benefits. He also contests the trial courts denial of his motion to reopen the evidence. We affirm as to both issues and write only to address Former Husbands claim that the court should have granted his motion to reopen the evidence so that he could recall a witness who previously testified at trial.
I.
The parties divorced pursuant to a Consent Judgment that was entered in January 2014. The Consent Judgment established a parenting plan for the parties’ two minor children, set child support and alimony obligations, and fixed the equitable distribution of the marital estate.
In March 2020, Jacquelyn Marie Allen (“Former Wife”) filed a motion to modify child support and to compel payments. Among other issues, the motion asked the court to clarify the section of the Consent Judgment that awarded Former Wife a portion of Former Husbands pension benefits. Specifically, Former Wife asked for a determination as to her entitlement to Former Husbands pension, including cost of living adjustments, and benefits from Former Husbands participation in a deferred retirement option program. The court held a non-jury trial. At trial, the court heard testimony from three witnesses: Former Husband, Former Wife, and Chuck Hayes, who is the benefits manager for the City of Jacksonvilles Police & Fire Pension Fund.
Based on the evidence presented, the court entered a Supplemental Final Judgment which specified Former Husbands pension obligations to Former Wife under the Consent Judgment. One week later, Former Husband changed counsel. His new attorney moved to reopen the evidence alleging that the Supplemental Judgment awarded Former Wife a greater share of Former Husbands pension benefits than what she was entitled. The motion argued that additional testimony from Mr. Hayes was necessary to enable the court to separate the marital and non-marital components of Former Husbands pension benefits. The court denied the motion. This appeal followed.
II.
In cases heard without a jury, Florida Family Law Rule of Procedure 12.530(a) allows the court to “open the judgment if one has been entered, take additional testimony, and enter a new judgment.” See also Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.530(a) (employing the same language). When considering a partys request to reopen the evidence, a court considers several factors: “(1) its timeliness; (2) the character of evidence she seeks to introduce; (3) the effect of the evidences admission; and (4) the reasonableness of her excuse justifying reopening.” Barrett v. Barrett, 313 So. 3d 224, 228 (Fla. 5th DCA 2021) (citing Grider-Garcia v. State Farm Mut. Auto., 73 So. 3d 847, 849 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011)). While a trial courts discretion to reopen evidence is broad, it “is not unlimited, for it may allow reopening only ‘where this can be done without injustice to the other party.’ ” Silber v. CnR Indus. of Jacksonville, Inc., 526 So. 2d 974, 978 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988) (quoting Buckingham v. Buckingham, 492 So. 2d 858, 861 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)); see also Loftis v. Loftis, 208 So. 3d 824, 826 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017) (reaffirming that reopening the evidence is appropriate if it serves the best interests of justice and can be done without unfairly prejudicing the non-moving party). Thus, an appellate court reviews a trial courts ruling on a rule 12.530(a) motion for an abuse of discretion. Id.; Singer v. Singer, 302 So. 3d 955, 959 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020). A trial court abuses its discretion only when it adopts a position that no reasonable person would take. Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197, 1203 (Fla. 1980) (“Discretion, in this sense, is abused when the judicial action is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, which is another way of saying that discretion is abused only where no reasonable man would take the view adopted by the trial court. If reasonable men could differ as to the propriety of the action taken by the trial court, then it cannot be said that the trial court abused its discretion.”) (quoting Delno v. Mkt. St. Ry. Co., 124 F.2d 965, 967 (9th Cir. 1942)).
Here, Former Husband was displeased with the courts interpretation of which pension benefits he owed Former Wife. After the Supplemental Judgment was entered, Former Husband retained a new lawyer, who sought to reopen the evidence to recall a witness—Mr. Hayes—who previously testified at trial. The gravamen of Former Husbands motion was his belief that the trial court misinterpreted the Consent Judgment, resulting in a windfall to Former Wife. However, additional testimony from Mr. Hayes could not have remedied this alleged error, which—if it existed—would be legal in nature. While Mr. Hayes could have offered additional testimony about the value of Former Husbands pension on certain dates, under the trial courts interpretation of the Consent Judgment, this additional information would have been irrelevant. Thus, while Former Husbands motion to reopen was timely, it was not based on a claim of newly discovered evidence and would not have yielded any testimony that could have altered the trials result.
Equally important, Former Wife would have been unfairly prejudiced by having to retry a central issue that would have allowed Former Husband a “second bite at the apple to prove an essential element of [his] case.” Robinson v. Nationstar Mortg. LLC, 301 So. 3d 1059, 1063 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019). Accordingly, this evidentiary “do over” would have “greatly prejudiced [Former Wife] without serving the best interests of justice.” Id. (finding an abuse of discretion where the court allowed the movant to reopen its case so that it could “present evidence that it no doubt had access to before—and could have presented at—the first trial”).
III.
A trial court has “broad discretion” to allow a party to reopen its case to present additional evidence. Silber, 526 So. 2d at 978. Here, the trial court did not abuse that discretion when it denied Former Husbands request to reopen his case to present additional testimony from a witness who had already testified and who could not have offered any evidence that was unavailable at the trial—or altered the trials result.
Affirmed.
Jay, J.
Ray and Winokur, JJ., concur.