¶1. The exclusionary rule prevents all evidence—including derivative evidence—obtained through unconstitutional means from being introduced at trial. Here, a probation officer improperly induced L.J. Green III to give a statement that led to the discovery of the linchpin evidence used against Green at his robbery trial. While the trial judge suppressed Greens statement, the judge still admitted evidence that Green possessed the victims car keys—evidence that was wholly derived from Greens excluded statement. This evidence was admitted over Greens objection. The jury convicted Green.
¶2. On appeal, both Green and the State agree the trial judge wrongly admitted the tainted evidence. Though the State claims the error was harmless, this evidence strongly contributed to Greens guilty verdicts. So its admission was not harmless error. We therefore reverse Greens conviction and sentence and remand the case for a new trial.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶3. In April 2020, three men, one of them brandishing a gun, forced their way into Alicia Sanderss home. The men took her purse, containing her cell phone and house and vehicle keys, and fled the scene. Sanders could not identify the assailants. She could only say they were African Americans of different heights—“shorter, midways and a taller one.” But Sanders did notice they were in a car belonging to Cherish Brock Frost. And she was able to track her cell phone using a “find my device” application. She gave this information to the Brookhaven Police Department. Officers tracked the phone to a car owned by Frost. The car was parked behind L.J. Green IIIs apartment. Inside the car, officers found Sanderss purse. But they did not find her house or car keys. Green and Frost were arrested.
¶4. After being Mirandized,
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Green initially admitted to a detective that he had gone to Sanderss apartment that night. But his claimed purpose was to buy drugs. And he insisted that when he got there, he stayed in the car. Shortly after Green gave this version to a detective, Greens probation officer, Bryan Cavin, arrived at the jail. Officer Cavin began questioning Green about Sanderss missing keys. Cavin assured Green he would not place a hold on Green to detain him if Green would just tell Cavin where the keys were located.
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Green eventually relented and told Cavin that Devin Kirtfield had the keys. Using this information, officers located Kirtfield and stopped him. When questioned about the keys, Kirtfield handed them over to an officer. Kirtfield also told the officers that Green had given him the keys.
¶5. A grand jury charged Green with conspiracy to commit armed robbery, armed robbery, and burglary of a dwelling.
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Before trial, Green filed a motion in limine aimed at suppressing his statement to his probation officer. Following a hearing, the trial judge concluded Greens statement had been coerced and granted the motion to suppress Greens statement about giving the keys to Kirtfield. Greens attorney also argued that evidence derived from Greens statement should be excluded too. He asserted that law enforcement would not have approached Kirtfield had Green not told Officer Cavin he gave Kirtfield the keys. Still, the trial judge withheld ruling on the admissibility of Kirtfields testimony until later in trial.
¶6. At trial, the State called Officer Alford, a detective with the Brookhaven Police Department. Green objected when Alford began testifying about the keys. The trial judge ruled that while he had already suppressed Greens statement, “whether the keys were found [was] a totally different animal.” Green continued to emphasize that the specific basis for his fruit of the poisonous tree “objection was that they found Kirtfield”—and the keys—based wholly on “the information that was obtained from [Greens excluded] statement.” The trial judge was not swayed. He ruled, “Im suppressing the statement. Thats all I can do.” And the judge allowed Alford to testify about finding the keys without mentioning Green. The judge also admitted a photo of the keys into evidence.
¶7. The State then called Kirtfield. Kirtfield identified Green, and he described being stopped by an officer and handing over the keys. He testified that he told the officer that Green gave him the keys. As Kirtfield put it, “[Green] just wiped his fingerprints off of them and just handed them to me and told me to hold them.”
¶8. The victim, Sanders, also testified. Though she recounted the break-in at her apartment, she could only describe the three perpetrators as African American men of different heights—two had their faces covered; one did not. The judge denied Greens motion for a directed verdict. And the jury found Green guilty on all three charges. Green now appeals, asserting that evidence stemming from his involuntary confession should have been suppressed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶9. When reviewing a trial courts denial of a motion to suppress, an appellate court employs a “mixed standard of review.” Dies v. State, 926 So. 2d 910, 917 (Miss. 2006). “Determinations of reasonable suspicion and probable cause should be reviewed de novo.” Id. (citing Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699, 116 S. Ct. 1657, 1663, 134 L.Ed. 2d 911 (1996)). But a trial courts decision to admit or exclude evidence is reviewed under the abuse-of-discretion standard. Chamberlin v. State, 989 So. 2d 320, 336 (Miss. 2008). The second standard applies here.
DISCUSSION
I. The trial judge wrongly admitted testimony about the victims keys.
¶10. For a defendants statement to be admissible, “it must have been given voluntarily, and not as the result of any promises, threats, or other inducements.” Chase v. State, 645 So. 2d 829, 837-38 (Miss. 1994) (citing Layne v. State, 542 So. 2d 237, 240 (Miss. 1989)). Here, the trial judge found Greens statement and disclosures about Kirtfields being the person who had Sanderss keys were not voluntary. Rather, the statement resulted from a promise by Greens probation officer that he would not seek that Green—who was already on probation—be detained. Based on this improper inducement, the judge excluded Greens statement. On appeal, the State agrees with the judges ruling and with Greens argument that his statement was properly excluded. And so do we.
¶11. The State also agrees with Greens trial, and now appellate, assertion that all evidence stemming from his excluded statement was indeed inadmissible. And because this evidence was inadmissible, it should have been excluded as fruit of the poisonous tree. After review, we too agree the derivative evidence should have been excluded.
¶12. “The ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ doctrine—also known as the exclusionary rule—‘prohibits introduction into evidence of tangible materials seized during an unlawful search.’ ” Marshall v. State, 584 So. 2d 437, 438 (Miss. 1991) (quoting Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 536, 108 S. Ct. 2529, 2532, 101 L.Ed. 2d 472 (1988)). The doctrine also prohibits admission of “testimony concerning knowledge acquired during an unlawful search.” Id. (quoting Murray, 487 U.S. at 536, 108 S.Ct. 2529). Of import here, the doctrine precludes “the introduction of derivative evidence, both tangible and testimonial, that is, the product of the primary evidence, or that is otherwise acquired as a result of the unlawful search, up to the point at which the connection becomes ‘so attenuated as to dissipate the taint.’ ” Id. (quoting Murray, 487 U.S. at 536-37, 108 S.Ct. 2529); see also Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S. Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed. 2d 441 (1963)).
¶13. While there are exceptions
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to this doctrine, the State concedes none apply here. And this Court sees no applicable exceptions. So any evidence derived from Greens “tainted” statement—most notably Officer Alfords and Kirtfields testimony about the keys—is fruit of the poisonous tree and, thus, inadmissible. Therefore, the trial judge abused his discretion by admitting this testimony and the photograph of the discovered keys.
II. Admission of Kirtfields testimony was not harmless error.
¶14. The State agrees the trial judge erred by allowing this tainted testimony. But it argues the error was harmless. See Clark v. State, 891 So. 2d 136, 142 (Miss. 2004) (“[E]ven errors involving a violation of an accuseds constitutional rights may be deemed harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where the weight of the evidence against the accused is overwhelming.” (quoting Riddley v. State, 777 So. 2d 31, 35 (Miss. 2000))). To determine if a constitutional error is harmless, we decide “whether it appears ‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.’ ” Gillett v. State, 148 So. 3d 260, 266 (Miss. 2014) (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23-24, 87 S. Ct. 824, 828, 17 L.Ed. 2d 705 (1967)).
¶15. While the stolen purse was found in Frosts car, parked behind Greens apartment, there were multiple assailants. And the victim, Sanders, could not identify Green as one of the robbers. Viewing this evidence alone, one could not reasonably say the State offered overwhelming evidence of Greens guilt. Rather, it was the tainted evidence from Greens excluded statement that not only pointed law enforcement to Kirtfield but also led to the recovery of the victims keys. And this evidence also directly resulted in securing Kirtfields testimony that Green gave him the keys after wiping his fingerprints off of them. There is zero question that this evidence, which should have been excluded, strongly contributed to the guilty verdicts. So we cannot find the judges error in admitting this tainted evidence was harmless.
CONCLUSION
¶16. We reverse Greens conviction and sentence, and we remand Greens case for a new trial, excluding the derivative testimony and evidence stemming from Greens involuntary statement.
¶17. REVERSED AND REMANDED.
FOOTNOTES
1
. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed. 2d 694 (1966).
2
. In other words, Green would be given the opportunity to bond out.
3
. Count One charged conspiracy to commit armed robbery in violation of Mississippi Code Sections 97-1-1 and 97-3-73 (Rev. 2020); Count Two charged armed robbery in violation of Mississippi Code Section 97-3-79 (Rev. 2020); and Count Three charged burglary of a dwelling in violation of Mississippi Code Section 97-17-23 (Rev. 2020).
4
. Exceptions to the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine have been carved out by the United States Supreme Court. See, e.g., Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 40 S. Ct. 182, 64 L.Ed. 319 (1920) (“independent source” exception); Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 104 S. Ct. 2501, 81 L.Ed. 2d 377 (1984) (“inevitable discovery” exception).
MAXWELL, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:
RANDOLPH, C.J., KITCHENS AND KING, P.JJ., COLEMAN, BEAM, CHAMBERLIN, ISHEE AND GRIFFIS, JJ., CONCUR.