¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this Courts quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana Reports.
¶2 Plaintiff and Appellant Peter Grigg (Grigg) appeals from the December 9, 2021 Order – Motion to Dismiss issued by the First Judicial District Court, Lewis and Clark County. The District Courts order granted the October 22, 2021 Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant and Appellee Andy Coil (Coil).
1
We affirm.
¶3 On August 16, 2021, Grigg filed a Petition for Compensation – Loss of Employment, as well as an Affidavit, alleging Coil caused Grigg to be fired from his job as a paramedic on June 2, 2020, after an incident occurred between the two outside of the St. Peters Hospital emergency room in May 2020. Griggs Petition alleged: (1) that Coil ordered him to “violate the federal HIPPA [sic] law” and he was terminated from employment after he refused; (2) that Coil “placed tort” upon Griggs “employer to terminate” him and there was no progressive discipline; (3) that Coil was “negligent in his knowledge of the HIPPA [sic] law,” causing Grigg stress and mental anguish; (4) that Coil admitted negligence and liability, but “refused to disclose such to the Montana Board of Medical Examiners”; and (5) that Grigg had been unable to work as a paramedic since Coils actions. Griggs Affidavit asserted Coil verbally abused, harassed, and threatened him in front of emergency room patients, family, and staff, as well as in Griggs ambulance, and continued to harass and threaten him “throughout the month of May 2020.” Griggs Affidavit claimed he filed incident reports with his employer, St. Peters Healthcare, and the Montana Board of Medical Examiners, to which Coil “retaliated by placing tort on my employer,” causing Grigg to be terminated by his employer on June 2, 2020. Griggs Affidavit concludes by stating Coil “ordered” Grigg to “violate the federal HIPPA [sic] law,” and, when he refused, “retaliation was termination with extreme prejudice.”
¶4 On October 22, 2021, Coil responded to Griggs Petition and Affidavit by filing Andy Coils Motion to Dismiss, along with a brief in support. Coil moved to dismiss Griggs complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to M. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Coils brief in support asserted “Griggs claim is for wrongful discharge,” and was therefore barred under the applicable one-year statute of limitations provided by Montanas Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act (WDEA). On November 4, 2021, Grigg filed an Objection to Motion to Dismiss, asserting he was seeking compensation for “stress, trauma, & mental anguish” under § 27-1-310, MCA, as well as compensation for “threats, harassment, retaliation, [and] verbal abuse under Civil Rights 1964[.]” Griggs Objection also stated, “wrongful termination was not included in this case[.]” On November 18, 2021, Coil filed Andy Coils Reply Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss. In his reply brief, Coil again asserted Griggs claim was for wrongful discharge and barred by the WDEAs statute of limitations. Coil further noted § 27-1-310, MCA, was not applicable. After Coils motion to dismiss was fully briefed, Grigg filed an Objection to Dismiss on November 26, 2021. Coil filed a motion to strike Griggs objection pursuant to M. R. Civ. P. 12(f) on December 2, 2021. Grigg filed a response to Coils motion to strike on December 8, 2021, where he once again asserted he “has never stated a claim of [w]rongful discharge against Andy Coil.”
¶5 On December 9, 2021, the District Court issued its Order – Motion to Dismiss. The District Court determined Griggs complaint was indeed a claim for wrongful discharge from employment, and was therefore barred by the WDEAs one-year statute of limitations. Grigg appeals. We restate the issue on appeal as follows: whether the District Court correctly granted Coils M. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
¶6 We review a district courts ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to M. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) de novo. Harris v. St. Vincent Healthcare, 2013 MT 207, ¶ 12, 371 Mont. 133, 305 P.3d 852. The determination of whether a complaint states a claim is a conclusion of law which we review for correctness. Harris, ¶ 12. We construe a complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs when reviewing an order dismissing a complaint under M. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). McKinnon v. Western Sugar Coop. Corp., 2010 MT 24, ¶ 12, 355 Mont. 120, 225 P.3d 1221 (citing Jones v. Mont. Univ. Sys., 2007 MT 82, ¶ 15, 337 Mont. 1, 155 P.3d 1247). “A claim is subject to M. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) dismissal only if it either fails to state a cognizable legal theory for relief or states an otherwise valid legal claim but fails to state sufficient facts that, if true, would entitle the claimant to relief under that claim.” Anderson v. ReconTrust Co., N.A., 2017 MT 313, ¶ 8, 390 Mont. 12, 407 P.3d 692 (collecting cases).
¶7 On appeal, Grigg again asserts he “has not claimed an unlawful dismissal.” Coil maintains the District Court correctly determined Griggs claim was one for wrongful discharge from employment, and therefore correctly dismissed the complaint pursuant to the WDEAs applicable statute of limitations.
¶8 To begin, we must determine if Griggs complaint was in fact a claim for wrongful discharge from employment under the WDEA. We find it was not. In all of his pleadings before the District Court in this case, Grigg never once identified his employer. The WDEA “provides the exclusive remedy for wrongful termination.” Buck v. Billings Mont. Chevrolet, 248 Mont. 276, 287, 811 P.2d 537, 543 (1991) (citing Meech v. Hillhaven West, Inc., 238 Mont. 21, 776 P.2d 488 (1989)). “All remedies provided by the [WDEA] run against the employer.” Buck, 248 Mont. at 287, 811 P.2d at 543. On appeal, for the first time in this case, Grigg identifies his employer as “Eagle EMS.” The District Court, without the benefit of Griggs admission that he was employed by Eagle EMS, determined “Grigg appears to have been employed by St. Peters Health in the emergency department or ambulance,” and found it was “unclear” from Griggs pleadings whether Coil “was also employed by St. Peters Health.” While this confusion regarding both Griggs and Coils employers is understandable due to the nature of Griggs pleadings before the District Court, those pleadings do ultimately make it clear Coil is not his employer, as Grigg repeatedly references Coil “plac[ing] tort” upon his employer. As Coil is not Griggs employer, supervisor, or even fellow employee—Coil is an emergency room physician employed by St. Peters Health and Grigg was a paramedic employed by a private ambulance company—any claims against Coil are not properly brought under the WDEA because Coil is a stranger to any employment contract between Grigg and his employer.
¶9 While the District Court erroneously determined Griggs complaint asserted a claim for wrongful discharge from employment under the WDEA and dismissed the case pursuant to the WDEAs statute of limitations, the court did correctly determine Griggs complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and dismissed the case pursuant to M. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). We will affirm a district courts result if the result is correct even if the district court reached that result for the wrong reason. Dennis v. Brown, 2005 MT 85, ¶ 6, 326 Mont. 422, 110 P.3d 17 (citing Schaefer v. Egeland, 2004 MT 199, ¶ 11, 322 Mont. 274, 95 P.3d 724). Because Coil is a stranger to Griggs contract with his employer, Griggs complaint was actually one for tortious interference. In order to establish a claim of tortious interference with contractual or business relations, “it must be shown that the defendants acts (1) were intentional and willful, (2) were calculated to cause damage to the plaintiff in his or her business, (3) were done with the unlawful purpose of causing damage or loss, without right or justifiable cause on the part of the actor, and (4) that actual damages and loss resulted.” Grenfell v. Anderson, 2002 MT 225, ¶ 64, 311 Mont. 385, 56 P.3d 326 (citing Bolz v. Myers, 200 Mont. 286, 295, 651 P.2d 606, 611 (1982)). “The element of malice ․ meaning the intentional doing of a wrongful act without justification or excuse, is an essential element of an action for interference with contract. Such malice is not presumed and cannot be inferred from the commission of a lawful act.” Taylor v. Anaconda Fed. Credit Union, 170 Mont. 51, 56, 550 P.2d 151, 154 (1976).
¶10 Motions to dismiss are “viewed with disfavor and rarely granted.” Fennessy v. Dorrington, 2001 MT 204, ¶ 9, 306 Mont. 307, 32 P.3d 1250. “Dismissal of an action is justified only when the allegations of the complaint clearly demonstrate that the plaintiff does not have a claim.” Fennessy, ¶ 9 (citing Buttrell v. McBride Land & Livestock, 170 Mont. 296, 298, 553 P.2d 407, 408 (1976)). Here, the allegations of Griggs complaint clearly demonstrate Grigg has no claim because they fail to state a claim for tortious interference upon which relief can be granted. M. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Griggs Petition in this case makes a conclusory allegation that Coil “ordered” Grigg “to violate the federal HIPPA [sic] law,” and that Grigg was fired for refusing.
2
Griggs Petition and Affidavit provide no clarity on how Coil could “order” him to violate HIPAA or how Coil somehow ordering Grigg to violate HIPAA was calculated to cause Grigg damage in his business. In addition, Griggs complaint expressly alleged Coil was “negligent in his knowledge of the HIPPA [sic] law[.]” An assertion of negligence cannot support a tortious interference claim, which requires malice, Taylor, 170 Mont. at 56, 550 P.2d at 154, therefore Grigg has failed to state a claim.
¶11 Quite simply, Griggs Petition and Affidavit in this case are a mess of conclusory statements, allegations, and legal conclusions. While, when reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, we take “all well-pled allegations and facts” as true, Scheafer v. Safeco Ins. Co., 2014 MT 73, ¶ 14, 374 Mont. 278, 320 P.3d 967, we are “not required to take as true any allegations in the complaint that are legal conclusions.” Barthel v. Barretts Minerals Inc., 2021 MT 232, ¶ 9, 405 Mont. 345, 496 P.3d 541 (citing Cowan v. Cowan, 2004 MT 97, ¶ 14, 321 Mont. 13, 89 P.3d 6). In addition, we also note that at least one of the allegations in Griggs complaint—that he “has been unable to work his chosen profession, paramedic, since [Coils] actions”—is not “well-pled,” because it is simply false and is contradicted both by a filing made by Grigg in this case, which noted Grigg was last employed as a paramedic in January of 2021, several months after he was fired by Eagle EMS, and previous litigation before this Court regarding his termination from Beaverhead Emergency Medical Services on January 29, 2021. Grigg v. Beaverhead Emergency Med. Servs., No. DA 21-0229, 2022 MT 48N, ¶ 3, 2022 Mont. LEXIS 191, 2022 WL 687259. “While pro se litigants may be given a certain amount of latitude, that latitude cannot be so wide as to prejudice the other party, and it is reasonable to expect all litigants, including those acting pro se, to adhere to procedural rules.” Greenup v. Russell, 2000 MT 154, ¶ 15, 300 Mont. 136, 3 P.3d 124. Grigg is no stranger to litigation, having filed eleven appeals before this Court since 2020, and has previously been cautioned “to refrain from filing duplicative, burdensome lawsuits or risk being declared a vexatious litigant.” In re Marriage of Grigg, No. DA 22-0252, Order (Mont. May 24, 2022). Here, once again, Grigg has filed a lawsuit entirely devoid of merit and placed the burden of responding, both in the District Court and on appeal, on a party to whom Grigg has no cognizable legal claims.
¶12 While the District Court erroneously determined Griggs complaint was a claim for wrongful discharge from employment, it correctly granted Coils Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss because Griggs complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
¶13 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of our Internal Operating Rules, which provides for memorandum opinions. In the opinion of the Court, the case presents a question controlled by settled law or by the clear application of applicable standards of review.
¶14 Affirmed.
FOOTNOTES
1
. In Griggs District Court complaint, he misspelled Coils name as “Andy Coile” in the caption. This misspelling remained in the caption throughout the proceedings below and on appeal here. We have amended the caption of this case to “more accurately reflect the actual alignment or status” of the parties. M. R. App. P. 2(4).
2
. We briefly note no “HIPPA” law exists, and presume Grigg is referring to the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA).
Justice Ingrid Gustafson delivered the Opinion of the Court.
We concur:
MIKE McGRATH, C.J.
BETH BAKER, J.
DIRK M. SANDEFUR, J.
JIM RICE, J.