ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE
This is an appeal from a district court order granting a motion for summary judgment in an action to quiet title. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Nadia Krall, Judge. Reviewing the summary judgment de novo, Wood v. Safeway, Inc., 121 Nev. 724, 729, 121 P.3d 1026, 1029 (2005), we affirm.
1
Appellant contends that it owns the subject property free and clear of respondents deed of trust because appellant is a bona fide purchaser (BFP). Namely, appellant contends that because it acquired title to the subject property while there was a previous district court judgment (the 2015 case) ruling that the HOAs foreclosure sale extinguished respondents deed of trust, respondents deed of trust remains extinguished even though that previous judgment was reversed on appeal. See Bank of Am., N.A. v. White Lantern, LLC, No. 73948, 2019 WL 912641, at *1 (Nev. Feb. 20, 2019) (Order of Reversal and Remand).
For two alternative reasons, we agree with the district court in the underlying matter that appellants property remains encumbered by respondents deed of trust. First, as we have held in the context of a superpriority-lien tender situation, “[a] partys status as a BFP is irrelevant when a defect in the foreclosure proceeding renders the sale void” because “after a valid tender of the superpriority portion of an HOA lien, a foreclosure sale on the entire lien is void as to the superpriority portion, because it cannot extinguish the first deed of trust on the property.” Bank of Am., N.A. v. SFR Invs. Pool 1, LLC, 134 Nev. 604, 612, 427 P.3d 113, 121 (2018). Second, appellant is not a BFP. Appellant acquired the subject property while a lis pendens was recorded against that property, such that appellant had notice of the pending appeal in the 2015 case. See NRS 14.010(3) (“From the time of recording [of the lis pendens], the pendency of the action is constructive notice to a purchaser or encumbrancer of the property affected thereby.”); Weddell v. H20, Inc., 128 Nev. 94, 106, 271 P.3d 743, 751 (2012) (citing NRS 14.010(3) for the proposition that “[t]he doctrine of lis pendens provides constructive notice to the world that a dispute involving real property is ongoing”). Accordingly, we
ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.
2
Parraguirre, C.J.
Stiglich, J.
Gibbons, Sr.J.
FOOTNOTES
1
. Pursuant to NRAP 34(f)(1), we have determined that oral argument is not warranted.
2
. The Honorable Mark Gibbons, Senior Justice, participated in the decision of this matter under a general order of assignment.