OPINION
This appeal concerns the imposition of restitution at sentencing. Appellant Tyler Nied argues that the evidence presented at the sentencing hearing did not support the restitution amount of $463,825.59. He also challenges the calculation of restitution for the victims medical costs and argues that his restitution obligation must be offset by the settlement amount that his insurer paid to the victim. We conclude the restitution awarded was not supported by competent evidence; thus, we vacate the restitution portion of the judgment of conviction and remand the case to the district court for further restitution proceedings. Further, in resolving Nieds arguments regarding the proper calculation of restitution, we stress that restitution is intended to compensate the victim for costs and losses caused by the defendant. Thus, restitution for a victims medical costs is limited to the amount that the medical provider accepts as payment in full rather than the amount initially billed by the medical provider. And a defendants restitution obligation must be offset by any amount the defendants insurer paid to the victim.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Nied drove a car at high speed through downtown Reno, eluding police, running red lights, and driving down a street in the wrong direction, before crashing into the victims car, seriously injuring the victim. Nied pleaded guilty to reckless driving resulting in substantial bodily harm and agreed to pay restitution.
Shortly before sentencing, the Division of Parole and Probation provided Nied and the district court with a presentence investigation report and a victim impact letter written by the victims mother. The victim impact letter stated that, because of the crash, the victim had been transported to a hospital, where he remained in a coma for a week. His injuries, which included a broken pelvis, a brain bleed, and face and head trauma, required two months of treatment in the hospital followed by approximately six weeks of treatment in a rehabilitation facility. He had lasting physical impairment and brain damage, was still being treated for his injuries, and was unable to resume his previous job. Due to his injuries, he became depressed and attempted to commit suicide exactly one year after the car accident, resulting in his hospitalization and treatment at a behavioral center. According to the letter, the victims medical costs before the suicide attempt amounted to around $600,000.
The presentence report recommended that Nied be ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $459,147.26 for the victims medical costs plus $4,678.33 for the damage to his vehicle. The report included a one-page “Medical Bills Summary” listing the total amount billed by each of the victims medical providers, but it did not include any other documentation, such as bills or receipts. Nied filed an objection to the presentence reports recommended restitution amount, arguing that no documentation supported it and that it was improperly calculated.
At the sentencing hearing, the victims mother produced printouts that she had received from the victims health insurance provider showing his medical claims from June 2017 to September 2018. She also provided a spreadsheet she had created that contained a summary of the total medical costs and the victims out-of-pocket costs. This spreadsheet stated that the victims insurance was billed a total of $277,503.43 for the hospitalization costs incurred from the accident and from his subsequent suicide attempt. Out of that amount, the victims insurance paid $87,242.79, his out-of-pocket costs were $6,052.87, and the rest was written off by the medical providers. The document also showed that the victim received Nieds automobile policy limit of $50,000 from his automobile insurance provider, 33 percent of which went to attorney fees.
The district court ordered Nied to pay $463,825.59 in restitution and sentenced him to 30 days in jail and 5 years of probation. Nied objected to the restitution amount, and this appeal followed. Nied challenges only the restitution portion of the judgment of conviction.
DISCUSSION
Nied argues that the restitution award is not based on reliable and accurate information, as neither the testimony nor the documentation at the sentencing hearing supported the restitution amount awarded by the district court. He further argues that the restitution for medical costs should not have included the costs arising from the victims suicide attempt, the costs paid by the victims insurance provider, or the amounts initially billed by the medical providers but not actually charged. Finally, he contends that the restitution amount must be offset by the payments Nieds automobile insurer made to the victim.
Sufficiency of evidence
NRS 176.033(3) authorizes a sentencing judge to “set an amount of restitution for each victim of the offense” if restitution is “appropriate.” A sentencing judge generally has wide discretion when ordering restitution pursuant to NRS 176.033(3) but must use “reliable and accurate information” in calculating a restitution award. Martinez v. State, 115 Nev. 9, 12-13, 974 P.2d 133, 135 (1999). Because restitution is a sentencing determination, this court will not overturn it absent an abuse of discretion. Id.
Here, at the sentencing hearing, the victim presented testimony and documents regarding his medical costs, including printouts from his insurance provider of the medical claims and a spreadsheet summarizing those claims. In arriving at the restitution amount of $463,825.59, the district court appears to have relied on the presentence reports computation of $459,147.26 for the victims medical costs and $4,678.33 for his vehicle damage. Nied objected to this amount because it was not supported by competent evidence substantiating the $459,147.26 in medical costs alleged in the presentence report.
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Because Nied challenged the restitution amount for the victims medical costs that the Division of Parole and Probation recommended in the presentence report, the State was required to present evidence at sentencing to prove the amount of restitution. See id. at 13, 974 P.2d at 135; 6 Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 26.6(c) (4th ed. 2021) (“It is up to the prosecutor to prove the amount of loss.”). And where, as here, the evidence at sentencing does not support the amount of costs stated in the presentence report, we conclude the district court abuses its discretion in relying on that amount to calculate restitution. Although it is clear from the record that the victim suffered serious and extensive injuries that resulted in significant medical costs, we must vacate the district courts award of restitution in the amount of $463,825.59 because it is not supported by competent evidence. Given the conflicting evidence regarding the victims actual total medical expenses, we remand for further proceedings on the calculation of restitution.
Calculation of restitution
Nieds remaining challenges to the restitution award concern how restitution should be calculated. Because we believe these challenges will arise on remand, we address them to provide the district court with guidance in ordering restitution.
Costs related to the victims suicide attempt
Nied contends that the medical costs arising from the victims suicide attempt were not a proper subject of restitution because no competent evidence supported the conclusion that the suicide attempt directly resulted from Nieds criminal conduct. We disagree. We have held that restitution may include a victims “medical costs for the treatment of [his] injuries directly resulting from the crime.” Norwood v. State, 112 Nev. 438, 441, 915 P.2d 277, 279 (1996). At the sentencing hearing, the victims wife testified that the victim was depressed about his diminished physical and mental capacity resulting from the crash and that he attempted to commit suicide on the one-year anniversary date of the crash. This testimony and the timing of the victims suicide attempt directly connected the victims mental health issues to Nieds reckless driving offense. Cf. United States v. Thunderhawk, 860 F.3d 633, 636-37 (8th Cir. 2017) (upholding restitution for medical expenses, including those stemming from a suicide attempt, where the evidence established a causal relationship between the crime and the event giving rise to the need for medical services); State v. Jent, 369 Mont. 468, 299 P.3d 332, 335-36 (2013) (concluding a victims suicide attempt was directly related to the criminal offense and thus restitution for those medical expenses was proper). It is unclear from the record whether the district court included the medical costs relating to the victims depression and suicide attempt in the restitution award. We nevertheless conclude that Nied has failed to demonstrate that such restitution would be inappropriate given the evidence presented at the sentencing hearing and Nieds lack of cogent argument or supporting authority for his contention that the suicide attempt did not directly result from the reckless driving offense. See Maresca v. State, 103 Nev. 669, 673, 748 P.2d 3, 6 (1987) (declining to consider issue where appellant failed “to present relevant authority and cogent argument”).
Computation of medical costs
Nied provides two alternative arguments regarding the proper computation of medical costs when the victims insurance covers the victims medical care. First, he contends that restitution for medical costs is limited to the victims out-of-pocket costs and does not include costs that the victims insurance company paid. We disagree. We held in Martinez that a defendants restitution obligation for a victims medical costs is not to be reduced by the amount the victims insurance company pays. 115 Nev. at 12, 974 P.2d at 135. Thus, Nieds argument that his restitution obligation should not have included medical costs paid by the victims insurer is foreclosed by Martinez.
Second, Nied contends that the restitution for medical costs should be based, at most, on the negotiated amounts that the victim and the victims insurance provider actually paid, rather than the higher amounts the medical providers initially billed but subsequently wrote off. We agree, as we have explained that the primary purpose of restitution “is to compensate a victim for costs arising from a defendants criminal act.” Major v. State, 130 Nev. 657, 660, 333 P.3d 235, 238 (2014). As compensation is the primary purpose, restitution is limited to that amount which adequately compensates a victim for any economic loss or expense as necessary to make the victim whole, but without providing the victim with a windfall. We conclude that measuring restitution in the amount the victims medical providers accepted as payment in full for their services to the victim, rather than the higher amount originally billed, is most consistent with, and best promotes, the primary purpose of restitution, as it fully compensates the victim for his or her actual costs. Because we are unable to determine from the record how the district court calculated Nieds restitution obligation for medical costs, we direct the district court on remand to calculate the restitution based on the amounts the victim and his insurer paid rather than the amounts billed.
Offset by payments from Nieds insurer
Finally, Nied argues that the restitution amount should have been reduced by the amount Nieds automobile insurance provider paid the victim, less any attorney fees. Nevada statutes are silent on this issue, but the State contends that Martinez precludes the reduction of a defendants restitution obligation based on insurance payments to the victim. Martinez, however, concerned only whether a defendants restitution obligation could be reduced because of payments that a victim received from his or her own insurance provider. 115 Nev. at 12, 974 P.2d at 135. It did not address the situation presented by this aspect of the case—where the victim receives payments from the defendants insurance provider. Furthermore, the reasoning in Martinez convinces us that its holding was not intended to apply to this situation. This court in Martinez analogized its holding “to the collateral source doctrine in the law of torts,” which precludes a victims damages from being reduced by the compensation that the victim receives “for his injuries from a source wholly independent of the tortfeasor.” Id. at 12 & n.5, 974 P.2d at 135 & n.5 (citing Proctor v. Castelletti, 112 Nev. 88, 90 n.1, 911 P.2d 853, 854 n.1 (1996)). However, the collateral source doctrine does not apply to compensation that a victim receives from a defendant. See 2 Stuart M. Speiser et al., American Law of Torts § 8:16 (2022) (“The authorities are well agreed that payments from the tortfeasor himself or herself or through or by the defendants insurer are not subject to the collateral source rule and may be shown in mitigation or reduction of recovery.”); 2 Jacob A. Stein, Stein on Personal Injury Damages § 13:5 (3d ed. 2021) (“[T]he collateral source rule [does not] apply to payments made to the plaintiff by the defendants liability insurer.”).
Moreover, as the California Court of Appeal explained in People v. Bernal, 101 Cal.App.4th 155, 123 Cal. Rptr. 2d 622, 630-31 (2002), reimbursement of the victims losses by the victims insurance provider is distinct from payments to the victim by the defendants insurance provider. Reimbursement from sources “completely distinct and independent from the defendants ․ were simply fortuitous events from which the defendants should not benefit.” Id. at 630. And, because payments by the victims insurer can be subject to claims for reimbursement, e.g., through subrogation rights, “equitable principles would tend to place the loss on the wrongdoing defendant, preclude a windfall recovery by the victim, and reimburse the third party.” Id. at 630-31. In contrast, when the defendants insurance provider makes “payments to the victim on his behalf pursuant to its contractual obligation to do so,” the provider would have no subrogation rights and thus no recourse; accordingly, if the defendants restitution is not reduced by the insurance payment, “the victim would receive a windfall to the extent that such payments duplicated items already reimbursed by [the defendants insurance provider].” Id. at 631.
We agree with this rationale and conclude that a district court must offset the defendants restitution obligation by the amount the defendants insurer paid to the victim for losses subject to the restitution order. The amount to be offset is limited to the portion of the payments intended to compensate the victim for costs recoverable as restitution; thus, any portion directed to pay attorney fees or excludable damages such as pain and suffering should not be credited against the restitution. See, e.g., People v. Jennings, 128 Cal.App.4th 42, 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d 709, 720 (2005). Such an offset furthers the primary purpose of restitution—to make the victim whole—without giving the victim a windfall or double recovery.
Here, the record reflects that Nieds automobile insurance provider paid a settlement amount of $50,000 to the victim, 33 percent of which went to the victims attorneys, but it is unclear whether any portion of the settlement was allocated to the victims medical costs or the damage to his vehicle—i.e., the losses subject to restitution. On remand, the district court should determine what amount of offset is appropriate based on Nieds insurance settlement.
CONCLUSION
Although restitution should not provide the victim with a windfall, it should adequately compensate the victim for economic losses or expenses directly related to the criminal offense and necessary to make the victim whole. Expenses may include those associated with a suicide attempt if the evidence establishes a direct relationship to the crime. In calculating restitution, a district court should not consider reimbursement of the victims losses by the victims insurance provider, as such would unfairly benefit the defendant; however, the district court should offset payments to the victim by the defendants insurance provider to avoid duplicating payments and creating a windfall for the victim. Because the evidence presented at the sentencing hearing did not support the restitution award, we vacate the restitution portion of the judgment of conviction and remand for further proceedings on restitution consistent with this decision.
FOOTNOTES
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. In fact, the spreadsheet summary, which the victims mother prepared, showed a total amount of $277,503.43 billed by the medical providers, and $92,870.66 paid by the victim and his insurer. The victims mother further testified that her summary of the medical bills accurately reflected all the medical costs incurred since the accident, though she appeared to offer contradictory testimony that the $459,147.26 amount in the presentence report accurately reflected the medical costs incurred after the accident but before the victims suicide attempt.
By the Court, SILVER, J.:
We concur:
Cadish, J.
Pickering, J.