OPINION OF THE COURT
MEMORANDUM.
The order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed.
“Defendant bears the burden of establishing his claim that counsels performance is constitutionally deficient by demonstrating the absence of strategic or other legitimate explanations for counsels alleged failures” (People v. Sposito, 30 N.Y.3d 1110, 1111, 70 N.Y.S.3d 156, 93 N.E.3d 881 [2018] [cleaned up]). Under the New York Constitution, “[i]n determining whether a defendant has been deprived of effective assistance, a court must examine whether ‘the evidence, the law, and the circumstances of a particular case, viewed in totality and as of the time of the representation, reveal that the attorney provided meaningful representation’ ” (People v. Oliveras, 21 N.Y.3d 339, 346, 971 N.Y.S.2d 221, 993 N.E.2d 1241 [2013], quoting People v. Baldi, 54 N.Y.2d 137, 147, 444 N.Y.S.2d 893, 429 N.E.2d 400 (1981)). “Essential to any representation, and to the attorneys consideration of the best course of action on behalf of the client, is the attorneys investigation of the law, the facts, and the issues that are relevant to the case” (id. at 346, 971 N.Y.S.2d 221, 993 N.E.2d 1241, citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690–691, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 [1984]). Under the United States Constitution, a party must “demonstrate both that counsels performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defendant” (People v. Caban, 5 N.Y.3d 143, 155, 800 N.Y.S.2d 70, 833 N.E.2d 213 [2005]).
Defendant failed to demonstrate that counsels representation was ineffective. “[C]ounsel logically attempted to disprove an element of the charged crime”—the element of consent—“a standard defense tactic” (People v. Benevento, 91 N.Y.2d 708, 714, 674 N.Y.S.2d 629, 697 N.E.2d 584 [1998], citing People v. Ellis, 81 N.Y.2d 854, 597 N.Y.S.2d 623, 613 N.E.2d 529 [1993], and People v. Lane, 60 N.Y.2d 748, 750, 469 N.Y.S.2d 663, 457 N.E.2d 769 [1983]). Counsels decision to waive the suppression hearing pursuant to People v. Huntley, 15 N.Y.2d 72, 255 N.Y.S.2d 838, 204 N.E.2d 179 (1965) and allow defendants statements into evidence was in accord with a reasonable defense strategy of showing that defendant had consistently maintained that the acts in question were consensual. Counsels strategy also attempted to take the sting out of defendants statements and avoided the use of them as impeachment material, which could have cast doubt on defendants credibility. Contrary to defendants argument that trial counsel was required to consult with or call expert witnesses, counsel undertook a reasonable strategic choice to focus the jury on the chosen defense, counsel was well-equipped to execute the defense strategy, and counsel in fact obtained key concessions from the Peoples experts on cross-examination (see Oliveras, 21 N.Y.3d at 346, 971 N.Y.S.2d 221, 993 N.E.2d 1241).
Defendants remaining contentions are without merit.
On review of submissions pursuant to Rules of the Court of Appeals (22 NYCRR) § 500.11, order affirmed, in a memorandum.
Chief Judge DiFiore and Judges Rivera, Garcia, Singas and Cannataro concur. Judge Wilson dissents and votes to reverse and order a new trial, for reasons stated in that portion of the dissenting opinion of Justice John P. Colangelo at the Appellate Division as concluded that trial counsels failures to consult or call expert witnesses deprived Mr. Sposito of meaningful representation (193 A.D.3d 1236, 1243–1246, 147 N.Y.S.3d 195 [2021] [Colangelo, J. dissenting])