DECISION & ORDER
In related proceedings pursuant to Family Court Act article 6, the mother appeals from an order of the Family Court, Westchester County (Rachel Hahn, J.), entered September 20, 2021. The order, insofar as appealed from, after a hearing, granted the fathers amended petition for sole legal and physical custody of the parties’ child, in effect, denied the mothers petition for sole legal and physical custody of the child, and directed that the mothers parental access be supervised.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements.
The parties are the parents of a child born in March 2017. In May 2018, the mother left the home and took the child to Arizona without the fathers knowledge or consent. The father filed an amended petition seeking sole legal and physical custody of the child. In September 2018, the mother returned to New York pursuant to an order of the Family Court and the father was awarded temporary custody of the child. The mother then filed her own petition seeking sole legal and physical custody of the child. Initially, pursuant to an order, the mothers parental access was unsupervised, with a geographic restriction that such access was to take place in Westchester County. However, the mothers parental access was directed to be supervised after she violated the order of the court by bringing the child to Brooklyn and Manhattan. The child has lived with the father and his extended family in Westchester County since September 2018. The mother continues to live in Arizona and has traveled to New York for supervised parental access during the course of these proceedings. The court conducted a hearing on the parties’ custody petitions. Thereafter, in an order entered September 20, 2021, the court granted the fathers amended petition for sole legal and physical custody of the child, in effect, denied the mothers petition for sole legal and physical custody of the child, and directed that the mothers parental access be supervised. The mother appeals. We affirm.
“ ‘The courts paramount concern in any custody dispute is to determine, under the totality of the circumstances, what is in the best interests of the child’ ” (Matter of Gooler v. Gooler, 107 A.D.3d 712, 712, 966 N.Y.S.2d 208, quoting Matter of Julie v. Wills, 73 A.D.3d 777, 777, 899 N.Y.S.2d 669; see Eschbach v. Eschbach, 56 N.Y.2d 167, 171, 451 N.Y.S.2d 658, 436 N.E.2d 1260). In determining an initial petition for child custody, the court must consider, among other things, “(1) which alternative will best promote stability; (2) the available home environments; (3) the past performance of each parent; (4) each parents relative fitness, including his or her ability to guide the child, provide for the childs overall well being, and foster the childs relationship with the noncustodial parent; and (5) the childs desires” (Matter of Supangkat v. Torres, 101 A.D.3d 889, 890, 954 N.Y.S.2d 915; see Matter of Tinger v. Tinger, 108 A.D.3d 569, 570, 968 N.Y.S.2d 573; Matter of Swinson v. Brewington, 84 A.D.3d 1251, 1253, 925 N.Y.S.2d 96). Since custody determinations depend to a great extent upon the Family Courts assessment of the character and credibility of the parties and witnesses, deference is accorded to that courts credibility findings (see Matter of Frankiv v. Kalitka, 105 A.D.3d 1045, 1046, 963 N.Y.S.2d 393). Custody determinations will not be disturbed unless they lack a sound and substantial basis in the record (see id. at 1046, 963 N.Y.S.2d 393; see also Matter of Gooler v. Gooler, 107 A.D.3d at 712, 966 N.Y.S.2d 208).
Here, the Family Courts determination that the childs best interests would be served by awarding sole legal and physical custody to the father has a sound and substantial basis in the record and will not be disturbed (see Matter of Bowe v. Bowe, 124 A.D.3d 645, 646–647, 1 N.Y.S.3d 301; Matter of Gribeluk v. Gribeluk, 120 A.D.3d 579, 580, 991 N.Y.S.2d 117).
Contrary to the mothers contentions, the Family Court did not fail to give proper consideration to alleged incidents of domestic violence (see Matter of Saunders v. Stull, 133 A.D.3d 1383, 1383, 20 N.Y.S.3d 824; cf. Matter of Wissink v. Wissink, 301 A.D.2d 36, 39, 749 N.Y.S.2d 550).
A determination with respect to parental access, including whether it should be supervised, is within the sound discretion of the Family Court, and its determination will not be set aside unless it lacks a sound and substantial basis in the record (see Matter of Lopez v. Lopez, 127 A.D.3d 974, 974–975, 4 N.Y.S.3d 912; Matter of Costigan v. Renner, 123 A.D.3d 825, 825–826, 998 N.Y.S.2d 451; Matter of Morgan v. Sheevers, 259 A.D.2d 619, 620, 684 N.Y.S.2d 918). Supervised parental access is appropriately required only where it is established that unsupervised parental access would be detrimental to the child (see Matter of Gainza v. Gainza, 24 A.D.3d 551, 551, 808 N.Y.S.2d 296; see also Rosenberg v. Rosenberg, 44 A.D.3d 1022, 1024, 845 N.Y.S.2d 371; Purcell v. Purcell, 5 A.D.3d 752, 753, 773 N.Y.S.2d 569). Contrary to the mothers contention, there was a sound and substantial basis in the record for the Family Courts directive that her parental access with the child be supervised (see Matter of Lane v. Lane, 68 A.D.3d 995, 997, 892 N.Y.S.2d 130).
DILLON, J.P., MILLER, CHRISTOPHER and WARHIT, JJ., concur.